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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
JUSTIN S. REYNOLDS and S. KRISTINE 








TROUT JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN, 
P.A.; and DAVID T. KRUECK, 
individually and in his capacity as a 
member of the Defendant Law Firm, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
HONORABLE RICHARD D. GREENWOOD 
DONALD W. LOJEK MICHELLE R. POINTS 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 







Date: 8/10/2011 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: CCTHIEBJ 
Time: 08: 19 AM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 3 Case: CV-OC-2010-04458 Current Judge: Richard D. Greenwood 
Justin S Reynolds, eta!. vs. Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman PA, eta!. 
Justin S Reynolds, S Kristine Reynolds, Sunrise Development L1c vs. Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman PA, David Thomas 
Krueck 
Date Code User Judge 
3/9/2010 NCOC CCLATICJ New Case Filed - Other Claims Richard D. Greenwood 
COMP CCLATICJ Complaint Filed Richard D. Greenwood 
SMFI CCLATICJ Summons Filed Richard D. Greenwood 
5/18/2010 ACCP CCNELSRF Waiver and Acceptance Of Service of Summons Richard D. Greenwood 
and Complaint (04/19/10) 
11/12/2010 ANSW CCGARDAL Answer (Points for Trout Jones, David Kruek) Richard D. Greenwood 
11/18/2010 HRSC TCJOHNKA Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference Richard D. Greenwood 
01/26/2011 04:30 PM) plaintiff 
11/22/2010 ORDR TCJOHNKA Order for Scheduling Conference and Order Re: Richard D. Greenwood 
Motion Practice 
12/14/2010 MOTN CCWRIGRM Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment Richard D. Greenwood 
AFFD CCWRIGRM Affidavit of David T Krueck in Support of Richard D. Greenwood 
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 
MEMO CCWRIGRM Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion Richard D. Greenwood 
for Summary Judgment 
12/20/2010 HRSC CCAMESLC Notice of Hearing (Motion for Summary Richard D. Greenwood 
Judgment 01/31/2011 03:00 PM) 
1/10/2011 AMEN CCCHILER Amended Notice of Hearing (2/28/11 @ 3 pm) Richard D. Greenwood 
HRSC CCCHILER Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Richard D. Greenwood 
judgment 02/28/2011 03:00 PM) 
1/18/2011 HRVC TCJOHNKA Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Richard D. Greenwood 
held on 01/31/2011 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
1/21/2011 STIP CCCHILER Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning Richard D. Greenwood 
1/24/2011 HRVC TCJOHNKA Hearing result for Scheduling Conference held on Richard D. Greenwood 
01/26/2011 04:30 PM: Hearing Vacated plaintiff 
HRSC TCJOHNKA Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Richard D. Greenwood 
12/14/2011 04:30 PM) defense 
HRSC TCJOHNKA Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 01/23/201209:00 Richard D. Greenwood 
AM) 3 days 
1/27/2011 ORDR TCJOHNKA Order Governing Further Proceedings and Setting Richard D. Greenwood 
Trial 
2/14/2011 BREF CCWRIGRM Answering/Opposition Brief of Plaintiffs in Richard D. Greenwood 
Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
AFFD CCWRIGRM Affidavit of Plaintiff Justin S Reynolds Richard D. Greenwood 
AFFD CCWRIGRM Affidavit of Ylonda Hays Richard D. Greenwood 
2/22/2011 RPLY CCVIDASL Reply to Opposition to Motion for Summary Richard D. Greenwood 
Judgment 
MOTN CCVIDASL Motion to Stike Richard D. Greenwood 
MEMO CCVIDASL Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Richard D. Greenwood 
MOTN CCVIDASL Motion for Order Shortening Time for Hearing on Richard D. Greenwood 
Motion to Strike 
NOHG CCVIDASL Notice Of Hearing on Motion to Strike and Motion Richard D. Greenwood 






Date: 8/10/2011 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: CCTHIEBJ 
Time: 08:19 AM ROA Report 
Page 2 of 3 Case: CV-OC-2010-04458 Current Judge: Richard D. Greenwood 
Justin S Reynolds, eta!. vs. Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman PA, eta!. 
Justin S Reynolds, S Kristine Reynolds, Sunrise Development Lie vs. Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman PA, David Thomas 
Krueck 
Date Code User Judge 
2/23/2011 CNST CCWRIGRM Consent to Motion for Shortened Time to Richard D. Greenwood 
Respond to Motion to Strike and Consent to Oral 
Argument, and Objection to Motion to Strike 
Material from Affidavits 
2/28/2011 DCHH TCJOHNKA Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Richard D. Greenwood 
held on 02/28/2011 03:00 PM: District Court 
Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Fran Morris 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 60 pages 
ORDR TCJOHNKA Order Shortening Time for hearing on Richard D. Greenwood 
Defendant's Motion to Strike 
3/14/2011 MOTN CCCHILER Motion for an Award of Attorney Fees and Costs Richard D. Greenwood 
AFFD CCCHILER Affidavit of Michelle R Points Setting Forth Richard D. Greenwood 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees 
MEMO CCCHILER Memorandum in Support of Motion for Costs and Richard D. Greenwood 
Attorney Fees 
3/21/2011 NOHG CCSULLJA Notice Of Hearing (04/25/11 @ 4:00 PM) Richard D. Greenwood 
HRSC CCSULLJA Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Richard D. Greenwood 
04/25/2011 04:00 PM) Defendants' Motion for an 
Award of Attorney Fees and Costs 
ORDR TCJOHNKA Order Richard D. Greenwood 
,IDMT TCJOHNKA Judgment Richard D. Greenwood 
3/24/2011 CDIS TCJOHNKA Civil Disposition entered for: Krueck, David Richard D. Greenwood 
Thomas, Defendant; Trout Jones Gledhill 
Fuhrman PA, Defendant; Reynolds, Justin S, 
Plaintiff; Reynolds, S Kristine, Plaintiff; Sunrise 
Development Lie, Plaintiff. Filing date: 3/24/2011 
3/28/2011 OBJE MCBIEHKJ Objection to Motion for Fees and Costs Richard D. Greenwood 
AMEN CCWRIGRM Amended Notice of Hearing (05/11/11 @ 4:00pm) Richard D. Greenwood 
HRSC CCWRIGRM Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Richard D. Greenwood 
05/11/2011 04:00 PM) Motion for Award of 
Attorney Fees and Costs 
4/4/2011 MOTN CCMASTLW Motion to Alter & Amend Judgment Richard D. Greenwood 
MEMO CCMASTLW Memorandum in Support Richard D. Greenwood 
NOHG CCMASTLW Notice Of Hearing (04/25/11 @ 4PM) Richard D. Greenwood 
4/8/2011 OPPO CCCHILER Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Richard D. Greenwood 
Alter or Amend Judgment 
4/18/2011 REPL MCBIEHKJ Reply Brief on Motion to Alter or Amend Richard D. Greenwood 
Judgment 
4/25/2011 DCHH TCJOHNKA Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Richard D. Greenwood 
04/25/2011 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: Kim Madsen 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 






Date: 8/10/2011 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: CCTHIEBJ 
Time: 08: 19 AM ROA Report 
Page 3 of 3 Case: CV-OC-2010-04458 Current Judge: Richard D. Greenwood 
Justin S Reynolds, eta!. vs. Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman PA, eta!. 
Justin S Reynolds, S Kristine Reynolds, Sunrise Development Lie vs. Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman PA, David Thomas 
Krueck 
Date Code User Judge 
5/2/2011 AFFD CCSIMMSM Supplemental Affidavit of Michelle R. Points Richard D. Greenwood 
Setting Forth Memorandum of Costs and Attorney 
Fees 
5/11/2011 HRVC TCJOHNKA Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on Richard D. Greenwood 
12/14/2011 04:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
defense 
HRVC TCJOHNKA Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Richard D. Greenwood 
05/11/2011 04:00 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion 
for Award of Attorney Fees and Costs 
5/1812011 HRVC TCJOHNKA Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 01/23/2012 Richard D. Greenwood 
09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 3 days 
ORDR TCJOHNKA Order Richard D. Greenwood 
,IDMT TCJOHNKA Amended Judgment Richard D. Greenwood 
STAT TCJOHNKA STATUS CHANGED: closed Richard D. Greenwood 
5/27/2011 JDMT TCJOHNKA Second Amended Judgment Richard D. Greenwood 
6/27/2011 APSC CCLUNDMJ Appealed To The Supreme Court Richard D. Greenwood 
6/28/2011 NOTC CCLUNDMJ Notice of Substitution of Counsel (Lojek for Richard D. Greenwood 
Plaintiff's) 
7/18/2011 RQST CCCHILER Request for Additional Documents and transcripts Richard D. Greenwood 
on Appeal 
7/22/2011 AMEN CCWRIGRM Amended Request for Additional Documents and Richard D. Greenwood 
Transcripts on Appeal 
8/9/2011 NOTC CCTHIEBJ (2) Notice Of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court Richard D. Greenwood 




Robert C. Huntley ISB#894 
The HUNTLEY LAW FIRM PLLC 
815 W. Washington Street 
P.O. Box 2188 
Boise, Idaho 83701 J D.A\,ID NA\iJ\HFlO. Clerk 
8'/ CAj~~.,"".' LATIJ',:i(.' :lETelephone: 208-388-1230 
Facsimile: 208-388-0234 
rhuntley@huntleylaw.com 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JUSTIN S. REYNOLDS and S. KRISTINE 
REYNOLDS; and SUJ'J"RISE CV DC 100 4458
DEVELOPMENT LLC, Case No. 




TROUT JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN, Demand for Jury Trial
 
P.A.; and DAVID T. KRUECK, individually
 





Plaintiffs as their claim allege: 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Plaintiffs and Defendants are all residents of or incorporated in the state of Idaho. 
The Defendant law firm has its principal place of business in Ada County, Idaho and the 
arrangements between the parties were executed and transacted in Ada County. The damages 
involved exceed the minimum required for District Court jurisdiction. 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - I 
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2. The Defendant, David T. Krueck at all times material has been and is a practicing 
attorney in the state ofIdaho and the acts or omissions which are the subject of this action were in 
the course and scope of his employment with the law firm of the Defendant, Trout Jones Gledhill 
Fuhrman, P.A. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
3. Defendant was employed by Plaintiffs to draft a real estate contract for the purchase 
ofan acreage for development in Ada County, Idaho. The real estate Purchase and Sale Agreement 
for the purchase by Plaintiffs from Quasar Development LLC, ("Sellers") ofa parcel of land which 
would accommodate the construction of approximately 30 town-home lots for approximately 
$3,450,000, carried with it a provision for an Earnest Money payment of $60,000. 
4. The Earnest Money was returnable to the Purchasers if the Seller was unable to 
procure a platting of the property within twelve months. The platting was not finalized and 
approved within twelve months and the Plaintiffs then sought the return from the Seller of the 
$60,000 Earnest Money, pursuant to the terms of the Purchase and Sale Agreement. 
5. Upon demand by Plaintiffs for the return of the Earnest Money, the Sellers refused 
to make timely reimbursement based upon the fact that the Purchase and Sale Agreement did not 
require any particular time certain for the return ofthe money. Plaintiffs were then required to file 
suit in Ada County District Court to compel return of the Earnest Money. 
6. Additionally, the Purchase and Sale Agreement was defectively drafted in that it did 
not make clear whether the entire $60,000 was refundable upon the failure to obtain a plat, or 
whether $30,000 would be the refundable sum. 







7. On or about March 11,2008 the Court detennined that the refundable amount was 
$60,000 and detennined further that in the absence of the Purchase and Sale Agreement having 
specified a time for refund of the $60,000, that a question of fact remained for trial. The Court 
detennined that under the totality ofthe circumstances ofthe case, the deadline for repayment would 
be a reasonable time, and that further litigation would be required to establish what a reasonable 
time would be. 
8. The parties then commenced negotiations resulting in an agreement for a stipulated 
judgment entered September 2, 2008 stipulating that the entire $60,000 was then due and payable, 
subject to Plaintiffs agreeing not to execute on the judgment until August 15,2009. 
9. The Defendant Attorney, David Krueck, had failed to timely file his reply brief in 
the court proceedings leading up to March 11, 2008, which reply brief dealt in part with the issue 
of the reasonable time for return of the Earnest Money deposit. The trial court rejected that brief 
as untimely. 
10. As a result of the malpractice and defects in scrivener-ship by David Krueck, the 
$60,000 has never been repaid because the Quasar Development LLC had become insolvent and 
have been and continue to be unable to make payment. Quasar was not insolvent at the time the 
money would have been due had the Purchase and Sale Agreement been properly crafted. 
11. As a result of Defendants' negligence, the Plaintiffs have been damaged in the 
amount of the $60,000 Earnest Money deposit plus, additionally, attorneys fees and other expenses 
bringing their total damages in excess of$77,000 plus interest, the exact amount of which will be 
proven at trial, and which amount the Defendants should be required to pay to Plaintiffs. 




12. Plaintiffs are entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee pursuant to Idaho Code Section 
12-120(3). 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray judgment as follows: 
1. For general damages in the sum of$77,000 or such other and further amount as may 
be proven at trial. 
2. For their costs and reasonable attorney fees and such other and further relief as may 
be meet and equitable in the premises. 
PLAINTIFFS HEREBY DEMAND A TRIAL BY JURY. 
DATED this 9th day of March, 2010. 
The HUNTLEY LAW FIRM 
__----=--_0_.~_~7--------. 
Robert C. Huntley 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 4 
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Craig L. Meadows, ISB No.1 081 
Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 





Attorneys for Defendants Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman 
P.A. and David T. Krueck 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JUSTIN S. REYNOLDS and S. KRISTINE )
 










TROUT JONES GLEDHILL FUHRNAM, ) 
P.A.; and DAVID T. KRUECK, individually ) 
and in his capacity as a member of the ) 






COMES NOW Defendants Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A. and David T. Krueck 
(collectively "Defendants"), by and through their counsel of record, Hawley Troxell Ennis & 
Hawley, LLP, and by way of answer to the Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ("Complaint") 
ANSWER - 1 
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filed by Plaintiffs Justin S. Reynolds, Kristine Reynolds and Sunrise Development, LLC, admits, 
denies and alleges as follows: 
ADMISSIONS AND DENIALS 
1. Defendants deny all allegations not specifically admitted herein. 
2. With respect to the allegations set forth in paragraph 1 of the Complaint, 
Defendants deny that Plaintiffs have suffered any damages, but admit the remaining allegations 
set forth therein. 
3. With respect to the allegations set forth in paragraph 2 of the Complaint, 
Defendants admit that at all times material, Defendant David Krueck was authorized to practice 
as an attorney in the state of Idaho, but deny the remaining allegations set forth therein as those 
allegations set forth conclusions of law to which no response is required. 
4. Defendants deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 3 of the Complaint as the 
terms of the referenced document speak for themselves. 
5. With respect to the allegations set forth in paragraph 4 of the Complaint, 
Defendants admit the Earnest Money was returnable and that Plaintiffs sought return of the 
Earnest Money pursuant to the terms of the Real Estate Purchase Agreement, but deny the 
remaining allegations set forth therein, as stated. 
6. With respect to the allegations set forth in paragraph 5 of the Complaint, 
Defendants admit that upon demand by Plaintiffs for the return of the Earnest Money, the Sellers 
refused to pay them the Earnest Money, and that Plaintiffs were required to file a lawsuit in 
Ada County District Court to compel the return of the Earnest Money, but deny the remaining 
allegations set forth therein, as stated. 






8. Defendants deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 7 of the Complaint as the 
tenus of the referenced Order speak for themselves. 
9. Defendants deny the allegations set forth in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Complaint, 
as stated. 
10. Defendants deny the allegations set forth in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of the 
Complaint. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
The following defenses are not stated separately as to each claim for relief or allegation 
of Plaintiffs. Nevertheless, the following defenses are applicable, where appropriate, to any and 
all of Plaintiffs' claims for relief. In addition, Defendants, in asserting the following defenses, 
do not admit that the burden of proving the allegations or denials contained in the defenses is 
upon Defendants but, to the contrary, assert that by reason of denials and/or by reason of relevant 
statutory and judicial authority, the burden of proving the facts relevant to many of the defenses 
and/or the burden of proving the inverse of the allegations contained in many of the defenses is 
upon Plaintiffs. Moreover, Defendants do not admit, in asserting any defense, any responsibility 
or liability of Defendants but, to the contrary, specifically denies any and all allegations of 
responsibility and liability in the Complaint. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs are barred from maintaining this action against Defendants based upon 
Section 5-219(4) of the Idaho Code and/or any other applicable statute of limitation. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff are barred from maintaining this action against Defendants by reason of 
Plaintiffs' voluntary assumption of a known risk. 
ANSWER- 3 





THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs are barred from maintaining this action against Defendants because Defendant's 
actions were taken with Plaintiffs' consent. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' recovery in this action, if any, should be reduced in accordance with the 
doctrine of avoidable consequences. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs are barred from maintaining this action against Defendants because Plaintiffs' 
injuries, if any, were proximately caused, in whole or in part, by the negligence or other conduct 
of parties other than these Defendants and/or of persons not parties to this action. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs are barred from maintaining this action against Defendants based upon the 
doctrine of laches. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs are barred from maintaining this action against Defendants based upon the 
doctrine of waiver. 
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs are barred from maintaining this action against Defendants based upon the 
doctrine of estoppel. 
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs are barred from maintaining this action against Defendants because Defendant's 




TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs should be denied any equitable relief herein on the ground of unclean hands. 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
In order defend this matter, Defendants have been required to retain the services of 
Hawley Troxell Ennis and Hawley, LLP and should be awarded their reasonable attorney fees 
and costs incurred in defending this action pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3), Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54 and other applicable law. 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' DEMAND FOR RELIEF 
In response to Plaintiffs' prayer for relief, Defendants deny that Plaintiffs are entitled to 
any of the relief requested. As previously set forth and stated, Defendants expressly denies each 
and every allegation of the Plaintiffs' Complaint not specifically admitted by way of answer to 
the Complaint. 
RULE 11 STATEMENT 
Defendants have considered and believe that they may have additional defenses, but does 
not have enough information at this time to assert such additional defenses under Rule 11 of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants do not intend to waive any such defenses and 
specifically asserts its intention to amend this answer if, pending research and after discovery, 
facts come to light giving rise to such additional defenses. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Defendants hereby demand a trial by jury as to all issues so triable, and will not stipulate 
to a jury of less than twelve (l 2) jurors. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 







1. That Plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed and Plaintiffs take nothing thereby; 
2. That Defendants be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs necessarily 
incurred in defending this action; and 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
DATED THIS lJi-{!;;;ofNovember, 2010. 
ANSWER - 6 
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HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
8. . 5.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~~November, 2010, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing ANSWER by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of 
the following: 
Robert C. Huntley t/ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
The HUNTLEY LAW FIRM PLLC Hand Delivered 
815 W. Washington Street __ Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 2188 ---,L:.. E-mail 










Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A. 
20-4944753
 




Ph: (208) 331-1170 Fax:(208) 331-1529 
Joo25,2006 
Sunrise Development LLC 
372 S. Eagle #155 
Eagle, ID 83616 
File #: 4232-001 
Inv #: 14 
RE: Quasar Development, LLC 
DATE	 DESCRIPTION HOURS AMOUNT LAWYER 
Jun-14-2006	 Review letter of intent; Calls to client 0.70 115.50 DTK 
Joo-15-2006	 Call to client re: letter of intent and 0.20 33.00 DTK 
negotiations with Quasar 
Totals	 0.90 $148.50 
Total Fees & Disbursements $148.50 
Transferred from Trust to General $0.00 
Previous Balance $0.00 
Previous Payments Since Last Bill $0.00 





















Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A.
 
20-4944753 
225 N 9th St., Ste. 820, PO Box 1097 
Boise, ID 83701 
Ph:(208) 331-1170 Fax:(208) 331-1529 
Sunrise Development LLC 
372 S. Eagle #155 






RE: Quasar Development, LLC 
DATE DESCRIPTION HOURS AMOUNT LAWYER 
Jun-29-2006 Review PIS Agreement and letter of intent 1.40 231.00 DTK 
call to client RE: revision to PIS Agreement 0.70 115.50 DTK 
Revise PIS Agreement call and fax to client 1.20 198.00 DTK. 
Additional revisions to PIS Agreement 0040 66.00 DTK 
Call from counsel for Quasar RE: contract 
terms 
0.40 66.00 DTK 
Jul-05-2006 Call to client re:status of contract negotiations 0.20 33.00 DTK 
Jul-07-2006 review email from opposing co\U1sel; call from 
client 
0.20 33.00 DTK 
Jul-09-2006 Analyze latest draft ofPIS Agreement from 
sellers counsel; review previous draft we 
submitted; annotate issues and proposed 
revisions & review email comments from 
opposing counsel 
1.50 247.50 DTK 
Jul·10-2006 Draft email with comments re: revisions to 
purchase & sale agreement to client; Analyze 
drafts and letter ofintent provision 















Invoice #: 421 .., Page 2 JUly~2006 
Ju1-18-2006 
Ju1-20-2006 
Email to/from client; Revise purchase & sale 
agreement 
Review final draft emailed from opposing 
coWlSel. Email the same to client with 
comments. 
Call from client. Email to opposing counsel 














Total Fees & Disbursements 
Transferred from Trust to General 
Previous Balance 
Previous Payments Since Last Bill 
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Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A. 
20-4944753
 




Ph:(208) 331-1170 Fax:(208) 33] -1529 
Sunrise Development LLC 
372 S. Eagle #155 






RE: Quasar Development, LLC 
DATE DESCRIPTION HOURS AMOUNT LAWYER
 








Total Fees & Disbursements 
Transferred from Trust to General 
Previous Balance 
Previous Payments Since Last Bill 












Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A. 
20-4944753
 




Ph: (208) 331-1170 Fax:(208) 331-1529
 
Aug 28, 2007 
Sunrise Development LLC 
372 S. Eagle #155 
Eagle, ill 83616 
File #: 4232-001 
Inv #: 4249 
RE: Quasar Development, LLC 
DATE	 DESCRIPTION HOURS AMOUNT LAWYER 
Jul-31-2oo7	 Review Purchase Agreement; draft termination 0.70 122.50 DTK 
letter to Seller and Seller's attorney; review 
notice and escrow provisions in Agreement; 
call to client 
Aug-09-2007 Letter to opposing cOWlsel re: default and 0.40 70.00 DTK. 
breach of contract; call from client 
Aug-14-2007 Call from client; call to opposing counsel; 0.50 87.50 DTK 
draft default and demand letter to Quasar 
Review Quasar email; forward to client with 0.20 35.00 DTK. 
comments 
Aug-I5-2007 Multiple calls to and from client and opposing 0.40 70.00 DTK 
counsel re: issues relating to refund of earnest 
money deposit and strategy going forward 
Aug- I6-2007 Multiple emails and phone calls to and from 0.50 87.50 DTK 
client and opposing counsel re: terms for 
resolving refund of earnest money and related 
issues 
Aug-17-2007 Review promissory note from opposing 0.80 140.00 DTK 
counsel; draft Personal Guaranties for 
principals of Quasar; email to client 
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Invoice#: 4249 ......... Page 2 AugtJw28, 2007 
Total Fees & Disbursements 
Transferred from Trust to General 
Previous Balance 










Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A. 
20-4944753
 




Ph:(208) 331-1170 Fax:(208) 331-1529 
Sep 28, 2007 
Swuise Development LLC 
372 S. Eagle #155 
Eagle, ID 83616 
File #: 4232-001 
Inv #: 4612 
RE: Quasar Development, LLC 
DATE DESCRIPTION HOURS AMOUNT LAWYER 
Aug-31-2007 Calls to and from client and opposing counsel; 0.30 52.50 DTK 
call to client's banker; revise Personal 
Guaranties 
Sep-04-2007 Call and email from opposing counsel re: 0.50 87.50 DTK 
guaranties and note; call to client re: status 
Sep-05-2007 review letter and email from opposing counsel; 0.50 87.50 DTK 
call to client; review Note and Purchase 
Agreement re: remedies available upon default 
Sep-06-2007 Conference with DK in re available remedies ·0.30 0.00 SIG 
for breach ofunderlying agreement and prom 
note. (No Charge) 
Sep-10-2007 Emails to and from opposing counsel; call 0.30 52.50 DTK 
from client re: status 
Sep-18-2007 Communicate (in finn) with DTK to prepare a 0.40 0.00 BRW 
complaint on behalfof client (No Charge) 
Sep-19-2007 Call to opposing coWlSel and client re: Quasar 0.20 35.00 DTK 
payment 
Sep-24-2007 Teleconference with client re: Quasar strategy 0.50 87.50 DTK 
and process going forward 









   
. 
Invoice #: 4612 Page 2 SepWflber 28, 2007 
Draft/revise complaint against Quesar 
Sep-25-2007 Revise and finalize Complaint; prepare 
Summons for filing with the Court 
Draft/revise complaint against Quasar 
Totals 
DISBURSEMENTS 
Sep-25-2007 Filing Fee: Complaint (Ann) 
Totals 
Total Fees & Disbursements 
Transferred from Trust to General 
Previous Balance 
Previous Payments Since Last Bill 























Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A. 
2Q..4944753
 




Ph:(208) 331-1170 Fax:(208) 331-1529 
Oct 31, 2007 
Sunrise Development LLC 
372 S. Eagle #155 
Eagle, ID 83616 
File #:. 4232-001 
Inv #: 5008 
RE: Quasar Development, LLC 
DATE	 DESCRIPTION HOURS AMOUNT LAWYER 
Oct-01-2007	 Review letter and pleadings from opposing 0.20 35.00 DTK 
counset email to client 
Totals	 0.20 $35.00 
Total Fees & Disbursements $35.00 
Transferred from Trust to General $0.00 
Previous Balance $1,008.00 
Previous Payments Since Last Bill $0.00 









Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A. 
20-4944753
 




Ph: (208) 331-1170 Fax:(208) 331-1529 
Nov 29,2007 
Sunrise Development LLC 
372 S. Eagle #155 
Eagle, 10 83616 
File #: 4232-001 
lnv #: 5202 
RE: Quasar Development, LLC 
DATE DESCRIPTION HOURS AMOUNT LAWYER 
Oct-31-2007 Call from client; review Scheduling Order 0.40 70.00 DTK 
from Court; can from opposing counsel re: 
stipulation for scheduling 
Nov-02-2007 stipulated scheduling order for trial wi Quasar 0.30' 37.50 BRW 
Nov-12-2007 phone call wi Andrus regarding stipulated 0.20 25.00 BRW 
order 
Totals 0.90 $132.50 
Total Fees & Disbursements $132.50 
Transferred from Trost to General $0.00 
Previous Balance $1,043.00 
Previous Payments Since Last Bill $1,008.00 















Ph: (208) 331-1170 Fax:(208) 331-1529 
Jan 02, 2008 
Sunrise Development LLC 
372 S. Eagle #155 
Eagle, ill 83616 
File#: 4232-001 
Inv #: 5490 
RE: Quasar Development, LLC 
DATE DESCRIPTION HOURS AMOUNT LAWYER 
Nov-27-2007 discussion wI DTK. regarding motion for 8J 0.30 37.50 BRW 
Nov-28-2007 research case law, draft motion, affidavit, 4.40 550.00 BRW 
memo in support of SJ 
Nov-29-2007 motion for 8J, memo in support, affidavits 0.80 100.00 BRW 
Nov-30-2007 Revise Affidavits and Motion for 8mnmary 0.50 87.50 DTK 
Judgment 
Call to client re: status and strategy going 0.40 70.00 .. DTK 
forward 
Dec-04-2007 Revisions to summary judgment pleadings; 1.20 210.00 DTK 
review contract and file correspondence; 
finalize all pleadings ~d obtain hearing date 
from Court 
Dec-14-2007 Call from opposing counsel re: stipulation to 0.20 35.00 DTK 
judgment; call to client 
Dec-17-2007 Calls to and from client and opposing counsel 0.50 87.50 DTK 
re: potential settlement; review file 
Dec-18-2007 Multiple calls to and from client and opposing 0.70 122.50 DTK 
counsel re: settlement tenns; email 












Involce#: 5490 Page 2 Janulr12. 200~ 
Totals 9.00 $1,300.00 
DISBURSEMENTS 
Dec-01-2007 Thomson West - Legal Research - Nov 1,2007 
through Nov 30,2007 - Inv. #814956285 
Totals 
Total Fees & Disbursements 
Transferred from Trust to General 
Previous Balance 
Previous Payments Since Last Bill 














Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A. 
20-4944753
 




Ph:(208) 331-1170 Fax:(208) 331-1529 
Jan 30, 2008 
Sunrise Development LLC 
372 S. Eagle #155 
Eagle, 1D 83616 
File #: 4232-001 
Inv #: 5876 
RE: Quasar Development, LLC 
DATE	 DESCRIPTION HOURS AMOUNT LAWYER 
Dec-27-2007 Review opposition to our motion for summary 0.80 140.00 DTK 
judgment; call to client to discuss strategy 
going forward 
Jan·10-2008	 legal research re: reasonable time for payment, 3.00 375.00 BRW 
earnest money, ordinary course ofbusiness 
Jan-l 1-2008	 legal research re: reasonable time for payment 2.00 . 250.00 BRW 
perfonnance, real estate, ordinary course, 
refund, real property - draft memo regarding 
research results 
legal research re: unreasonable delay,' 2.50 312.50 BRW 
preference 
Jan-14-2008	 research re: failure to cite authority, reasonable 1.50 187.50 BRW 
time for payment, draft section ofbrief arguing 
reasonable time has passed 
Jan-I 5-2008	 draft/revise section ofreply brief regarding 0.30 37.50 BRW 
reasonable time, legal research re: bad faith 












      
 to ! 
Invoice #: 5876 ""..... Page 2 Janl/Mf 30, 2008 
Total Fees & Disbursements 
Transferred from Trust to General 
Previous Balance 









Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A. 
20-4944753
 




Ph: (208) 331-1170 Fax:(208) 331-1529 
Feb 28, 2008 
S~e~vclopmemLLC 
372 S. Eagle #1S5 
Eagle, ill 83616 
File#: 4232-001 
Inv #: 6233 
RE: Quasar Development, LLC 
DATE	 DESCRIPTION HOURS AMOUNT LAWYER 
Feb-OS-2008 Work on Reply Brief in Support ofour motion 3.70 647.50 DTK 
for summary judgment 
Feb-06-2008 Complete drafting and finalizing Reply Brief; 3.30 577.50 DTK 
complete all research and analysis ofpleadings 
filed by Defendants 
legal research re: time is of the essence (No 1.10 0.00 BRW 
Charge) 
Feb-II-2oo8	 Call from opposing counsel re: settlement; call 0.30 52.50 DTK 
to client 
Feb-I3-2008	 Prep for summary judgment hearing; review 3.50 612.50 DTK 
pleadings and Agreement; review Affidavits 
and Exhibits; legal research; prepare hearing 
outline; review docs from client re: appraisal 
and settlement 
Argue our Motion for Summary Judgment 1.30 227.50 DTK 
before Judge Williamson 
assist in preparation for DTK's oral argwnent, 1.90 0.00 BRW 
legal research re: time is of the essence, refund 
on demand (No Charge) 





unrise Develop nt  
ID 
 







Involce#: 6233 Page 2 ' Feb~ 28, 2008 
, Totals 16.10 $2,117.50 
DISBURSEMENTS 
Feb-01-2008 Thomson West - Legal Research- Jan 1,2008 
through Jan 31, 2008 -Inv. # 815364745 
Totals 
Total Fees & Disbursements 
Transferred from Trust to General 
Previous Balance 
Previous Payments Since Last Bill 













Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, PeA. 
20-4944753
 




Ph: (208) 331-1170 Fax:(208) 331-1529 
Mar 27, 2008 
Sunrise Development LLC 
372 S. Eagle #155 
Eagle, ID 83616 
File #: 4232-001 
Inv #: 6501 
RE: Quasar Development, LLC 
DATE DESCRIPTION HOURS AMOUNT LAWYER 
Mar-03-2008 Review offer letter from opposing counsel; 0.20 35.00 DTK 
email and call to client 
Totals 0.20 $35.00 
DISBURSEMENTS Disbursements Receipts 
Mar-Ot-2oo8 Thomson West - Legal Research - Feb 1,2008 1.58 
through Feb 29, 2008 - Inv. # 815532888 
Totals $1.58 $0.00 
Total Fees & Disbursements $36.58 
Transferred from Trust to General $0.00 
Previous Balance $4,920.23 
Previous Payments Since Last Bill $0.00 







Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A. 
20-4944753
 




Ph: (208) 331-1170 Fax:(208) 331-1529 
Sunrise Development LLC 




Apr 29, 2008 
4232-001 
6829 
RE: Quasar Development, LLC 
DATE DESCRIPTION HOURS AMOUNT LAWYER
 








Total Fees & Disbursements 
Transferred from Trost to General 
Previous Balance 
Previous Payments Since Last Bill 













Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A. 
204944753
 




Ph: (208) 331-1170 Fax:(208) 331-1529 
Jun27, 2008 
Sunrise Development LLC 
372 S. Eagle #155 
Eagle, ID 83616 
File #: 4232-001 
Inv #: 7576 
RE: Quasar Development, LLC 
DATE	 DESCRIPTION HOURS AMOUNT LAWYER 
Jun-09-2008	 Review file and trial order; draft letter to 0.40 70.00 DTK 
opposing counsel re: discovery and potential 
settlement; email to client 
Joo-18-2oo8	 review response from opposing counsel to 0.50 87.50 DTK 
previous correspondence; outline discovery 
plan and deposition notice for Amanda Alvaro 
Totals	 0.90 $157.50 
Total Fees & Disbursements $157.50 
Transferred from Trust to General $0.00 
Previous Balance $5,009.31 
Previous Payments Since Last Bill $4,956,81 













Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A. 
20-4944753
 




Ph: (208) 331·1170 Fax:(208) 331-1529 
Ju129,2008 
Sunrise Development LLC 
372 S. Eagle #155 
Eagle, ID 83616 
File #: 4232-001 
Iov #: 7879 
RE: Quasar Development, LLC 
DATE	 DESCRIPTION HOURS AMOUNT LAWYER 
Jun-26-2008	 Receive and review file; begin preparation of 1.30 0.00 RWH 
discovery materials. 
Jun-27-2008	 Prepare draft notice ofdeposition to Amanda 2.40 300.00 RWH 
Alvaro; 30(b)(6) Notice; subpoena duces 
tecum; begin draft ofFirst Interrogatories and 
Requests for Production. 
Jun-28-2008	 Complete draft of First Set ofInterrogatories 1.80 225.00 RWH 
and Requests for Production. 
Jun-30-2008	 revise Deposition and Subpoena Notices; 0.80 140.00 DTK 
reivew file notes and correspondence; 
conference with Red H. 
Trial preparation; review deadlines, prepare 0.90 112.50 RWH 
notice oflay witnesses. 
lul·OI-2008	 Work on Discovery Requests; review and 1.50 262.50 DTK 
outline discovery responses and trial strategy 
Jul-02-2008·	 research potential experts for Case; review 1.00 175.00 DTK 
discovery served on Sunrise; conference with 
Reid re: responses and trial strategy 
Examine discovery requests propounded by 0.40 50.00 RWH 

















JUly~ 2008Invoice #:	 7879 Page 2 




Work on locating experts to testify at trial; 
calls and emails to First American Title, 
Colliers and Thornton Oliver Keller to attempt 
to retain expert; emails and calls to Idaho 
Mutual Trost re: additional expert witnesses 
Jul-07-2008	 Review discovery requests from Quasar; 
search for expert; calls to and from brokers at 
Colliers and Thornton Oliver Keller; calls to 
and from Steve Weeks and other potential 
experts; call to Marty Igo; meet with Gourley 
re: experts for case 
JuI-08-2008	 Review IRCP and Court's Scheduling Order; 
continued work and search for expert 
witnesses; calls and emails to Marty Igo 
Jul-09-2oo8	 review file; prep for meeting with Marty Igo 
(expert witness); office conference with Mr. 
Igo to discuss expert qualifications and review 
transaction documents and related pleadings to 
assist in forming ex~ opinion 
Jul-II-2008	 Review settlement offer letter from opposing 
counsel; call and email to Kristine 
JuI-14-2008	 Search statutes and Idaho Real Estate 
Commission Rules and Guidelines regarding 
return ofearnest money. 
Prepare draft of letter to opposing counsel 
regarding settlement. 
Leave message with attorney Larry Hunter at 
Moffett Thomas regarding expert witness J. 
Martin Igo. 
JuI-15-2oo8	 Call from opposing cOlUlsel; call to client re: 
settlement; revise letter to opposing colDlSel 
Work with Reid on expert disclosure and trial 
strategy 
Jul-16-2008	 Begin preparation of answers to Quasar's 
interrogatories, assemble documents 










































7879 "".... Page 3 
Revise Expert Disclosure; call to client~ call to 
expert (Marty Igo) 
Revise discovery responses; call to Kristine re: 
stratey going forward and potential settlement 
options 
Calls and emails to and from opposing 










Total Fees & Disbursements 
Transferred from Trust to General . 
Previous Balance 
Previous Payments Since Last Bill 












Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A. 
20-4944753
 




Ph:(208) 331-1170 Fax:(208) 331-1529 
Aug 28, 2008 
Sunrise Development LLC 
372 S. Eagle #155 
Eagle,ID 83616 
File#: 4232-001 
Inv #: 8344 
RE: Quasar Development, LLC 
DATE	 DESCRIPTION HOURS AMOUNT LAWYER 
Jul-28-2008	 Calls and emails to and from Kristine and 0.40 70.00 DTK 
opposing counsel re: potential settlement 
tenus; letter to opposing counsel 
Aug-12-2008 Review settlement docs and pleadings; call 0.50 97.50 DTK 
expert 
Aug-20-2008 Call to opposing counsel; calculate amounts 0.70 136.50 DTK 
due; call to expert (Marty Igo); revise 
settlement docs; call to client 
Totals	 1.60 $304.00 
DISBURSEMENTS	 Disbursements Receipts 
Aug-27-2008 The Igo Company· Professional real estate 300.00 
services 















Involce#: 8344 ......... Page 2 Aug~28,2008 
Total Fees & Disbunements 
Transferred from Trust to General 
Previous Balance 









Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A. 
20-4944753
 




Ph:(208) 331-1170 Fax:(208) 331-1529 
Sunrise Development LLC 
372 S. Eagle #155 
Eagle, ID 83616 
File #: 
Inv #: 
RE: Quasar Development, LLC 
DISBURSEMENTS Disbursements 
Sep-12-2008 Recording Fee for Judgement (Gabrielle) 6.00 
Certification Fee (Gabrielle) 2.00 
Sep 29, 2008 
4232-001 
Receipts 
Totals $8.00 $0.00 
Total Fees & Disbursements 
Transferred from Trust to General 
Previous Balance 

















Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P4A. 
20-4944753
 




Ph: (208) 331-1170 Fax:(208) 331-1529 
Sunrise Development LLC 
372 S. Eagle #155 
Eagle, 10 83616 
File #: 
Inv #: 
RE: Quasar Development, LLC 
DISBURSEMENTS Disbursements 
Oct-28-2008 Certification Fee: Judgment [gc] 2.00 
Recording Fee: Judgment (gc) 6.00 




Totals $8.00 $0.00 
Total Fees & Disbursements 
Transferred from Trust to General 
Previous Balance 












Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A. 
20-4944753
 




Ph:(208) 331·1170 Fax:(208) 331-1529 
Sunrise Development LLC 
372 S. Eagle #155 
Eagle, ID 83616 
File #: 
Inv #: 
RE: Quasar Development, LLC 
DATE DESCRIPTION HOURS AMOUNT 
Apr-01-2009 Meeting with K. Reynolds regarding case 0.50 90.00 
issues. 
Totals 0.50 $90.00 





Total Fees & Disbursements $90.00 
Transferred from Trust to General $0.00 
Previous Balance $3,990.00 
Previous Payments Since Last Bill $0.00 
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YOUR IMMEDIATE ATIENTION IS SOLICITED. 
DTKlkrJ 
cc:	 Client 
Lauren Reynoldson (viafacsimile) 
Fax No. 388-1001 
000043
 
Trout. Jones. Gledhill. Fuhrman, P.A. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
David T. Krueck 
August 9, 2007 
Via Facsimile 388-1001 
Lauren Reynoldson 
SPINK BUTLER, LLP 
251	 E Front St., Ste. 200 
PO Box 639 
Boise, ID 83701 




Dear Ms. Reynoldson: 
As we discussed earlier this week, Sunrise Development, LLC ("Sunrise") terminated the 
purchase and sale agreement with Quasar, LLC ("Quasar") for the Dunham Place Subdivision 
project after Quasar failed to file the tinal plat in accordance with the agreement. I sent a Jetter 
to you and Quasar on behalf of Sunrise on July 31, 2007 tenninating the agreement and 
requesting a refund of the Earnest Money deposit in the amount of $60,000.00 by close of 
business last Friday, August 3, 2007. The Earnest Money deposit has not been remitted to my 
office as of the date of this letter. 
Quasar has defaulted under the tenns of the parties' agreement. Sunrise has no other 
alternative than to demand that Quasar deliver a check made payable to Sunrise Development, 
LLC to my office by 5:00 p.m. this Friday, August 10, 2007. If I do not receive the check 
tomorrow, I have been authorized to file a Complaint against Quasar for breach of contract. In 
the event suit is filed, Sunrise will seek an award of its attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the 
terms of the parties' agreement. 




The 9th & Idaho Center. 225 North 91h Street, Suite 820 
P. O. Box 1097 • Boise, Idaho 83701 











Trout. Jones + Gledhill. Fuhrman, P.A. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
David T. Krueck 
August 14, 2007 
VIA FACSIMILE AND u.S. MAIL 
FAX NO. 288-1516 
Amanda Alvaro 
Quasar Development LLC 
3090 Gentry Way #150 
Meridian, ill 83642 




Dear Ms. Alvaro: 
I write to you as the attomey for Sunrise Development, LLC ("Sunrise") regarding the 
Real Estate Purchase Agreement ("Agreement") Quasar Development, LLC ("Quasar") entered 
into with Sunrise in the summer of 2006. I sent a letter to Quasar on behalf of Sunrise on July 
31, 2007, terminating the Agreement pursuant to the terms ofSection 7(a) of the Agreement, and 
requested a refund of the $60,000.00 Eamest Money. On August 9, 2007, I sent a letter on 
behalfofSunrise to legal counsel for Quasar demanding a refund of the Earnest Money. Neither 
I nor Sunrise has received any response from Quasar to these correspondences. Consequently, 
Sunrise hereby formally holds Quasar in default of the Agreement. 
Section 15(1) of the Agreement provides that time is of the essence for the performance of 
any act required by the parties, which would certainly include the refund of the Earnest Money 
contained in Section 7{a). Quasar has been given two weeks to refund the Earnest Money, but 
has taken no action to fulfill this contractual obligation. Therefore, pursuant to Section 1O(b) of 
the Agreement, Sunrise has the right to hold Quasar in breach of the Agreement and seek all 
damages resulting from such breach. In addition, Sunrise is entitled to a full refund of the 
Eamest Money. Sunrise also has the right to seek full reimbursement for all attorney's fees and 
costs incurred with respect to this transaction and all fees and costs incurred in pursuing Quasar 
for breaching the Agreement. 
The 9th & Idaho Center. 225 North 9th Street. Suite 820 
P. O. Box 1097 • Boise, Idaho 83701 FIPhone (208) 331-1170 • Facsimile (208) 331-1529 EXHIBIT 
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September 7, 2007 
Page 2 of2 
If Quasar fails to deliver the fully executed Promissory Note to my office by close 01 
business today, I have been directed to file suit on Monday, September 10, 2007 for breach ofthe 
Purchase Agreement. Sunrise will seek multiple remedies against Quasar under the terms of 
Section lOeb) of the Purchase Agreement, including a return of the Earnest Money and damages 
Sunrise has incurred as a result of Quasar's breach. In addition, Sunrise will seek recovery of its 
attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Section 15(k) of the Purchase Agreement. 





Richard H. Andrus 
JoAnn C. Butler 
T. Hethe Clark 
Lauren Maiers Reynoldson 
Michael T. Spink 
(208) 388-1092 
mspink@sb-attorneys.cQm 
September 6, 2007 
Via E-Mail 
David T. Krueck 





RE:	 Quasar Development LLOSunrise Development LLC 
SB File No. 22344.12 
Dear Dave: 
Attached please find a proposed Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement form which I 
would ask you to have your client execute upon delivery of the Promissory Note. I am 
attaching an unexecuted copy of the Promissory Note as Exhibit A. Please let me know if you 
have any objection to the language. The intent of this document is that the only claim surviving 
this arrangement between the parties would be performance of the Promissory Note requiring 
payment of the $60,000.00 fee by September 17, 2007. If changes to the document are necessary, 
I will be reachable by my secretary by late morning on Friday. 
Very truly yours, 
DIII1ated	 by Michael T. 
Spin!<., and deI/Vef8d without 
signature to avoid delay. 





c:	 Amanda Alvaro (via e-mail)
 
Richard W. McGraw (via e-mail)
 
Bradley M. Minasian (via e-mail)
 
251 E. FRoNT STREET 
SUITE 200 
P.O. BOX 639 
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MUTUAL RELEASE AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
THIS MUTUAL RELEASE AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ("Agreement"), by and between 
Quasar Development LLC, an Idaho limited liability company (hereinafter "Quasar"), and Sunrise 
Development LLC, an Idaho limited liability company (hereinafter "Sunrise"), (hereinafter collectively the 
"Parties") is intended to effect the extinguishment of obligations herein designated. 
RECITALS 
Disputes and differences have arisen between Quasar and Sunrise with respect to that certain 
Real Estate Purchase Agreement ("Purchase Agreement") dated July 21, 2006 for Quasar to sell, and 
Sunrise to purchase, certain real property located at 110 S. Cloverdale Road, Boise, Ada County, Idaho 
("Dunham Place SUbdivision"). By this Agreement, the Parties, for themselves, their successors, heirs, 
assigns, servants, employees, representatives and insureds, together with any and all persons acted 
before, by or through them, or anyone of them, individually, collectively and severally release each other 
from all claims, liabilities, demands, contracts and/or agreements and/or alleged contractual relationships, 
costs, expenses, promises, damages, representations, actions and causes of action, and judgments of 
every kind, in any manner whatsoever resulting, or to result, from or connected with or arising out of the 
contracts and business relationship described above. 
It is further agreed by the Parties that this Agreement is a general release. The Parties each 
agree to assume the risk of any and all claims for damages which may exist as of this date, or which may 
arise or become known in the future, even if any such claim, if known, would materially affect the Parties' 
respective decision to enter into this Agreement. Sunrise further agrees that it accepts the consideration 
set forth herein as a complete compromise of the matters involving disputed issues of law and fact, and 
fully assumes the risk that the facts or loss may be otherwise than it believes them to be. 
The Parties have agreed to execute this Agreement in settlement of their dispute. 
RELEASE 
1. In consideration of the mutual relinquishment of their respective legal rights with respect 
to the Purchase Agreement, and in consideration of the execution of this Agreement and the Promissory 
Note attached hereto as Exhibit A, each party, for itself and its heirs, legal representatives, successors, 
assigns and affiliates, does hereby expressly release the other and its heirs, legal representatives, 
successors, assigns and affiliates from any and all claims, demands, damages, actions or right of action 
of whatever kind or nature, known or unknown, which they now have or may in the future claim, having to 
do or arising out of the contracts and business relationship described above. 
2. Each party further covenants, in consideration of the mutual promises contained herein, 
that it will make no assignment of any putative right, claim or cause of action to any third party arising out 
of the circumstances referenced herein, and hereby acknowledges that the other party would suffer 
irreparable harm by virtue of any such assignment. 
3. In the event a party must take action to enforce its rights under this Agreement, the 
prevailing party in any resulting litigation shall be entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney fees 
incurred in connection therewith. 
4. It is understood and agreed that this settlement is the compromise of a doubtful and 
disputed claim, and that payment made is not to be construed as an admission of liability on the part of 
the Parties hereby released, and that each denies liability therefore, and intends merely to avoid litigation 
and to buy its peace. 
5. The Parties acknowledge that after entering into this Agreement, they may discover 
different and/or additional facts concerning the subject matter of this Agreement or their understanding of 
the facts. The Parties expressly assume the risk of such facts being so different, and agree that this 
MUTUAL RELEASE AND SETILEMENT AGREEMENT - 1 
S:IDocslQuasar Development LLCIDunham Commons SalelAGRIMutual Release & Settlement Agmt (9-6-07).doc 
000048
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Agreement shall in all respects be effective and not subject to rescission, cancellation or termination by 
reason of such different and/or additional facts. The Parties understand and acknowledge that the only 
right between them surviving the execution of this Agreement shall be the right of Sunrise to payment in 
full of the obligation reflected on Exhibit A attached hereto. 
6. The Parties, and each of them hereby, acknowledge that they have been represented by 
counsel, and have made independent investigations and inquiries deemed necessary or appropriate in 
connection with the subject matter of this Agreement prior to the execution hereof. 
DATED this _ day of September, 2007. 
QUASAR: 
QUASAR DEVELOPMENT LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company 
By: McGraw & Co., Inc., 
an Idaho corporation 
Its: Managing Member 
By: Richard W. McGraw 
Its: President 
By: A. Alvaro Real Estate, Inc., 
an Idaho corporation 
Its: Managing Member 
By: Amanda Alvaro 
Its: President 
By: Mirlyn, Inc., 
an Idaho corporation 
Its: Managing Member 
By: Bradley M. Minasian 
Its: President 
SUNRISE: 
Sunrise Development LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company 
By: Sandra Kristine Reynolds 
Its: Managing Member 
MUTUAL RELEASE AND SETILEMENT AGREEMENT - 2 







Maker: Quasar Development LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company 
Effective Date: August 17, 2007 
Place of Making: Boise, Idaho 
Principal Amount: $60,000.00 
Interest Rate: 8% per annum 
Maturity Date: September 17, 2007 
1. Terms. The undersigned (herein "Maker"), for value received, jointly and severally 
promise to pay to the order of Sunrise Development LLC, an Idaho limited liability company (herein 
"Payee" or "Holder"), at 372 S. Eagle Road, Suite 155, Eagle, Idaho 83616, or such other place or places 
as may be designated by Holder, the principal sum of Sixty Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($60,000.00) in 
lawful currency of the United States of America, together with interest thereon as provided hereunder, 
which such principal and interest shall be payable as follows: 
1.1 The principal balance and all accrued but unpaid interest, if any, shall be due and 
payable in full without demand on September 17, 2007 (the "Maturity Date"); and 
1.2 The unpaid principal amount hereof from time to time outstanding shall bear 
interest from and after the Date of Making at the rate of eight percent (8%) per annum. After the 
Maturity Date, acceleration or default, the total unpaid indebtedness hereunder shall bear interest 
at the lesser rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum, or until paid or until the default is otherwise 
cured. All payments hereunder shall be applied first to fees, charges, including late charges, 
attorney fees and costs, if any, then to interest and then to principal. Interest shall be computed 
on the basis of a three hundred sixty (360) day year, and charged for the actual number of days 
elapsed. 
2. Prepayment. Maker shall have the right of prepayment without penalty. 
3. Immediately Available Funds. All payments made under this Promissory Note, whether 
on account of the principal sum or interest, if any, shall be made in immediately available funds without 
setoff or counterclaim and free and clear of and without deduction for or on account of all present and 
future fees, deductions, withholdings, restrictions or conditions of whatsoever nature, if any, now or 
hereafter imposed, levied, calculated, withheld or assessed. "Immediately available funds" shall mean 
funds tendered without conditions or restrictions on release and in a medium which is subject to 
immediate deposit and/or credit without confirmation, clearance period, waiting or other delay for or 
restriction on immediate use, or negotiation. Acceptance of any payment made otherwise than in 
immediately available funds shall not constitute a waiver of the right to require payment in immediately 
available funds. 
4. Default. In the event of default hereunder, Holder shall be entitled to all remedies 
available under Idaho law, including recovery of attorney fees and costs as provided below. 
5. Modifications. The undersigned agree that the Holder hereof may extend the time of 
payment or otherwise modify the terms of payment of any part or the whole of the indebtedness 
evidenced hereby or release and/or subordinate any security for this Promissory Note at any time at the 
request of anyone now or hereafter liable, and such consent shall not alter nor diminish the liability of any 
PROMISSORY NOTE - 1
 










person or the enforceability of this Promissory Note. Each and every party now or hereafter signing or 
endorsing this Promissory Note binds such party as a principal, and not as a surety. All of the terms, 
covenants, provisions and conditions herein contained are made on behalf of, and shall apply to and bind, 
the undersigned and their respective personal representatives, successors and assigns, jointly and 
severally. 
6. Attorney Fees. The undersigned agree that if any installment of principal and/or interest 
or any other amount due under this Promissory Note or any other instrument relating to or securing this 
Promissory Note is not paid on the applicable payment or Maturity Date, then the undersigned shall pay 
to Holder all costs, including, without limitation, attorney fees, expenses, penalties and other damages 
incurred by Holder as a result of such late payment or failure to pay as provided herein. 
7. Applicable Law. This Promissory Note shall be governed by the laws of the State of 
Idaho. 
EXECUTED effective as of the Date of Making set forth above. 
MAKER: 
QUASAR DEVELOPMENT LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company 
By: McGraw & Co., Inc., 
an Idaho corporation 
Its: Managing Member 
By: Richard W. McGraw 
Its: President 
By: A. Alvaro Real Estate, Inc., 
an Idaho corporation 
Its: Managing Member 
By: Amanda Alvaro 
Its: President 
By: Mirlyn, Inc., 
an Idaho corporation 
Its: Managing Member 
By: Bradley M. Minasian 
Its: President 
PROMISSORY NOTE - 2
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SEP 25 2007 
David "r, Krueck, ISH No. 6246 
TROUT. JONES. GLEDHILL. FUHRMAN, P.i\. J. DAVID NAVARRO. Cter1< 
The 9th & Idaho Center By M. STROMER 
08'UJY225 North 9th Street, Suite 820 
P.O. Box 1097 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 331-1170 
Facsimile: (208) 331·1529 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Sunrise Development, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
QUASAR DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho 
SUNRISE DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, ~ 
) 









limited liability company ) 
) 
Defendant. )
COMES NOW Sunrise Development, LLC ("Swuise" or "Plaintiff') by and 
through its attorneys of record, TROUT. JONES. GLEDHILL. FUHRMAN, P.A., 
and hereby alleges and complains against the above named Defendant as follows: 
I. 
PARTIES AND VENUE 
1. The Plaintiff is an Idaho limited liability company in good standing with its principal 
place ofbusiness located in Boise, Ada County, Idaho. 
2. The Defendant Quasar Development, LLC ("Quasar" or "Defendant") is an Idaho 
limited liability company in good standing with its principal place of business located in 
Meridian, Ada County, Idaho. 
EXHIBIT 
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3. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Idaho Code § 
1-705. 
4. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendant pursuant to Idaho Code § 5­
514. 
5. Venue is proper in the Fourth Judicial District in and for the County of Ada, 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404. 
II. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
6. Plaintiff hereby realleges paragraphs 1 through 5 above and incorporates the same 
by reference as though fully set forth herein. 
7. On or about JuIy 21, 2006, the parties entered into a Rea Estate Purchase Agreement 
("Agreement") whereby the Plaintiff agreed to purchase real property located in Ada 
County, Idaho from the Defendant under certain terms and conditions. Attached hereto as 
Exhibit •A,' and fully incorporated herein by this reference, is a true and correct copy of the 
Agreement. 
8. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, the Plaintiff deposited $60,000.00 as 
Earnest Money to be applied toward the purchase price for the real property in the event the 
parties closed the transaction under the tenns of the Agreement. 
9. Section 7(a) of the Agreement specifically provides that in the event the Defendant 
failed to record the fmal plat for the Dunham Place Subdivision ("Subdivision") by July 31, 
2007, the Plaintiff has the right to tenmnate the Agreement and seek a full refund of the 
Earnest Money. 
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10. The Defendant failed to record the final plat for the Subdivision by July 31, 2007. 
Based upon infonnation and belief, the Defendant has not recorded the final plat for the 
Subdivision as of the date of this Complaint. 
11. On July 31, 2007, the Plaintiff provided written notice to the Defendant that the 
Plaintitf terminated the Agreement due to the Defendant's failure to record the final plat for 
the Subdivision pursuant to Section 7(a) of the Agreement and demanded a refund of the 
Earnest Money.
G The Plaintiff has made various demands to the Defendant for the return of the 
Earnest Money pursuant to the Agreement. Despite numerous promises to pay, the 
Defendant has failed and refused to pay the Eamest Money owed to the Plaintiff. 
III.
 




13. Plaintiff re-alleges the allegations set forth in paragraphs I through 12 above and 
incorporates the same by reference as though fully set forth herein. 
14. The Plaintiffprovided written notice of its election to tenninate the Agreement to the 
Defendant under the terms ofSection 7(a) of the Agreement and receive a full reftmd of the 
Earnest Money on July 31, 2007. 




16. The Defendant is obligated under the tenns of the Agreement to fully refund the
 
Earnest Money deposit to the Plaintiff
 
17. The Defendant has breached the Agreement by failing to refund the Earnest Money 
to the Plaintiffafter the Plaintiff tenninated the Agreement. 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL· 3 
000054
i'








            
           
1




   
18. Pursuant to provision 15(1), time is of the essence in this contract. The Defendant 
has not timely pertonned its obligation to refund the Earnest Money to the Plaintiff after the 
Plaintiffmade its written demand to the Defendant for a refund ofsaid Earnest Money. 
19. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's material breach of the 
Agreement, the Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial, including 
but not limited to, the amount of the Eamest Money deposit and other incidental and 
consequential damages, and such amount exceeds the jurisdictional limits ofthis Court. 
IV. 
SECOND CAUSE OF AcrION 
(Brea£h of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing) 
20. Plaintiff re-alleges the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 19 above and 
incorporates the same by reference as though fully set forth herein. 
21. Implied into every contract as a matter of law is a covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
22. Defendant has a duty to perform its obligations under the Agreement fairly and in 
good faith. 
23. Defendant has breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in its 
dealings with the Plaintiff under the tenns of the Agreement. 
24. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's material breach of the 
Agreement, the Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial, including but 
not limited to, the amount of the Earnest Money deposit and other incidental and 
consequential damages, and such amount exceeds the jurisdictional limits ofthis Court. 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 4 000055
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ATTORNEY'S FEES AND INTEREST
 
25. Plaintiff re-alleges the allegations set forth in paragraphs I through 24 above and 
incorporates the same by reference as though fully set forth herein. 
26. The Plaintiff has been required to retain the services of the law fonn of Trout Jones 
Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A. to represent and prosecute its interest in this matter. The Plaintiff is 
entitled to an award of attorney's fees against the Defendant under the tenns of the 
Agreement and Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121, and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
54. A reasonable amount of attorney's fees is $3,000.00 in the event a default judgment 
is rendered against the Defendant. The Plaintiff is also entitled to an award of 
prejudgment interest at the maximum rate allowed by law. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff demands a jury trial on all issues pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
38(b). 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for reliefas follows: 
A. For a judgment for damages against Defendant on Plaintiff's Breach of Contract 
claim in an amount to be proven at trial; 
B. For a judgment against Defendant on Plaintitrs claim for Breach of the Covenant 
ofGood Faith and Fair Dealing in an amount to be proven at trial; 
C. That Defendants be ordered to pay the Plaintiff's attorneys' fees and costs pursuant 
to provision 1O(b) of the Agreement, I.C. §§ 12-120, 12-121, and Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(d). for which $3,000.00 is a reasonable amount of attorneys' fees in the event 
that a default judgment is rendered against the Defendant; and 








D. For such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper in these 
premises. 
t-
DATED this ~ay of September, 2007. 
S • GLEDHILL. FUHRMAN, P.A.
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Anomeys for Defendant Quasar Development LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
SUNRISE DEVELOPMENT LLC. an Idaho ) 
limited liability company. ) 







QUASAR DEVELOPMENT LLC, an Idaho )
 




Defendant Quasar Development LLC ('~Defendantn). by and through its undersigned 
counsel of record the law finn of Spink Butler. LLP. in answer to Plaintiffs Complaint lUld 
Demand for Jury Trial (the "Complaint"). affirms and alleges as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
1. Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
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3. Defendant is without personal knowledge or sufficient information to admit the 
allegations of Paragraph 1, but upon information and bel icf will admit that Sunrise Development 
LLC ("Plaintiff") is an Idaho limited liability company. 
4. Defendant admits that Quasar Development LLC is an Idaho limited liability 
company doing business in Ada County. Idaho. Defendant denies all other allegations contained 
in Paragraph 2. 
5. Defendant admits the allegations contained Paragraphs 3, 4, and S. 
6. Defendant hereby incorporates its responses to each respective paragraph 
referenced in Paragraph 6. 
7. Defendant admits that on or about July 21, 2006 Plaintiffand Defendant entered 
into a certain Real Estate Purchase Agreement (the"Agreement'') whereby Plaintiffagreed to 
purchase real property (the "Property") located in Ada County, Idaho from Defendant under 
cenain tenns and conditions. Defendant denies all other allegations contained in Paragraph 7. 
8. Defendant admits the allegations conUlined in Paragraph 8. 
9. Section 7(a) of the Aareement speaks for itself. Paragraph 9 also contains legal 
conclusions for which no response is required. To the extent a response is required for 
Paragraph 9. Defendant denies all other allegations contained !herein. 
10. Defendant admits that when Plaintiffrequested tennination of the Agreement, 
Defendant halted efforts to record the final plat of the Property in order to mitigate tho damages 
caused by Plaintiff's termination. Defendant admits it has not yet recorded a final plat. 
Defendant denies all other allegations contained in Paragraph 10. 
11. Defendant admits that counsel for Plaintiffsent a letter to Defendant on July 31, 
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Money by alleging Section 7(a) of the Agreement allowed for a full refund. Defendant denies all 
other allegations contained in Paragraph 11. 
12. Defendant admits Pla.intiff has requested a return of all Earnest Money. and that 
Plaintiff and Defendant have had ongoing discussions on how to resolve the matter. Defendant 
denies all other allegations contained in Paragraph 12. 
13. Defendant hereby incorporates its responses to each respective paragraph 
reterenced in Paragraph 13. 
14. Defendant admits that counsel for Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant on July 31, 
2007 seekins to terminate the Agreement and demanding release of $60,000.00 in Earnest 
Money by alleging Section 7(a) oftha Agreemcm allowed for a full refund. Defendant denies all 
other allegations containocl in Paragraph 14. 
15. Paragraph IS contains a legal conclusion for whic:h no response is required. To 
the extent a response is required, Defendant denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 15. 
16. Defendant denies the allegations conlained in Paragraph )6 and 17. 
17. Section 15(1) of the Agreement speaks for itself. Defendant denies aU other 
allegations contained in Paragraph 18. 
1S. Paragraph 19 contains legal conclusions for which no response is required. To the 
extent a response is required. Defendant denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 19. 
19. Defendant hereby incorporates its responses to each respective paragraph 
referenced in Paragraph 20. 
20. Paragraphs 21, 22, 23, and 24 contain Icpl conclusions for which no response is 
required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
Paragraphs 21,22,23, and 24. 
ANSWER· 3 
000060
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21. Defendant hereby incorporates its responses to each respective paragraph 
referenced in Paragraph 25. 
22. Defendant admits that Plaintiff has retained the services of the law firm ofTrout 
Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A. Paragraph 26 contains legal conclusions for which no response is 
required. To the extent a respons~ is required, Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
Paragraph 26. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
The claims put forth by Plaintiff aro baned by the waiver. laches, estoppel, unclean 
hands. and the statute of frauds. 
ADDITIONAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
Defendant reserves the right to amend this Answer and 10 include additional affirmative 
defenses as they are revealed through the discovery process. 
ATfORNEY'S FEES 
Defendant has been required to retain the services of Spink Butler, LLP to defend this 
action, and is entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney's fees. 
DATED this 25" day ofOctober. 2007. 
SPINK. BUTLER, LLP 
By: :P .,J. i:«r 
Richard H. Andrus 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
JHEREBY CERTIFY thal on tm!> 2Slh day of October, 2007. 1caused a true and correct 
copy of the above ANSWER to be served upon the following individuals in the manner indicated 
below: 
David T. Krueck [Xl U.S. Mail 
Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A. [ ] Hand-Delivery 
P. O. Box 1097 [ ] Federal Express 
Boise, JD 83701 [Xl Via Facsimile 
Facsimile: 208/331-1529 [ ] Via Process Server 
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Boise, Idaho 8370 I
 




Attorneys for PlaintiffSunrise Development, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Ii,j.~:.:..,:--=­SUNRISE DEVELOPMENT, LLC., an Idaho ) ",.- ­
limited liability company, )
 




) AFFIDAVIT OF KRISTINE
 
v. ) REYNOLDS IN SUPPORT OF 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY
 
QUASAR DEVELOPMENT, LLC, and Idaho ) JUDGMENT
 











County of Ada )
 
KRlSTINE REYNOLDS, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states the 
following: 
1. I am at least eighteen (18) years of age and am competent to testify regarding 
the matters set forth herein. 
2. I am one of the members of Sunrise Development, LLC ("Sunrise") and have 
personal knowledge of the matters stated in this Affidavit. 
AFFIDAVII OF KRISTINE REYNOLDS TN SUPPORT OF EXHIBIT 
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3. That on or about July 21, 2006, Sunrise entered into a Real Estate Purchase 
Agreement ('"Agreement") with Quasar Development, LLC ("Quasar") whereby Sunrise 
agreed to purchase real property located in Ada County, Idaho from Quasar under certain 
terms and conditions. Attached hereto as Exhibit'A,' and fully incorporated herein by this 
reference, is a true and correct copy of the Agreement. 
4. Pursuant to Section 2(a) of the Agreement, Sunrise paid Quasar $60,000.00 as 
Earnest Money to be applied toward the purchase price of the real property in the event the 
parties closed the transaction under the tenns of the Agreement. 
5. Section 7(a) of the Agreement specifically provides that "[t]he First Closing 
Date shall occur no later than July 31,2007. In the event Seller [Quasar] fails to record the 
final plat of the Subdivision with the Ada County Recorder's Office by July 31, 2007, 
Buyer [Sunrise] may, at its sole discretion terminate this Agreement upon written notice to 
Seller, and Buyer may then obtain a full refund of the Earnest Money without further 
obligation under the tenns of this Agreement." 
6. Quasar failed to record the final plat for the Dunham Place Subdivision 
("Subdivision") by July 31,2007. 
7. That on July 31, 2007, legal cOWlSel for Swuise provided written notice to 
Quasar that Sunrise tenninated the Agreement based on the Defendant's failure to record 
the final plat for the Subdivision pursuant to Section 7(a) of the Agreement and demanded a 
full refund of the Earnest Money. 
8. Sunrise has made numerous written demands to Quasar seeking a refund of the 
Earnest Money pursuant to the express terms of the Agreement. 
9. Quasar has failed to refund the Earnest Money to Sunrise. 
AFFIDAVIT OF KRISTINE REYNOLDS IN SUPPORT OF 









FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT.
 
J~I SUBSCRffiED AND SWORN to before me this __day of December, 2007. 
0_-4.\9- K~-· • ­ ~.u:.;..••
 
:~y~O T "4;:,~•• Not ublic !2J;IdfUlQ
• , .-f'. 
Residing at flN/,"P,.., ~ ~ Idaho 
~ , ... , , .: :*** 1 : Commission expires: ,Ts-t:'bIJ. 
~ • "'\ A_. '." . • cP;·.;.UBL\~"O •••• -f1jj----- ~~_• 
••• OFro••-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ay of December, 2007 I caused to be 
served a true copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Richard Andrus W Hand Delivered 
SPINK BUTLER, LLP ~ U.S. Mail 
251 E Front St., Ste. 200 o Facsimile: 388-1001 
PO BOX 639 o Overnight Mail 
Boise, ill 83701 
AFFIDAVIT OF KRlSTINE REYNOLDS IN SUPPORT OF 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF ADA
 
SUNRISE DEVELOPMENT LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company, ~ Case No. CV OC 0717098 
Plaintiff: ) 
vs. ~ JUDGMENT 
) 
QUASAR DEVELOPMENT LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company ) 
) 
-....;.....;......;.;=~__.J________ Defendant. ) 
This matter having come before the Colll1 upon the parties' Stipulation for Entry of 
Judgment and the Covenant Not to Execute, and good cause appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That Plaintiffis awarded judgment against Defendant in the amount ofSixty 
Thousand and No/I00 ($60,000.00), plus Plaintiff's costs in the amount ofFour Hundred Fifty­
Seven and 31/100 Dollars ($457.31), plus Plaintiff's attorney fees in the amount ofTen 
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Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Eighty-Eight and 81/100 Dollars ($70,488.81), with interest 
acenting at the judgment rate. 
It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed this II- day of ~ ,2008. 
DARLA S. WILLIAMSON 
Darla A. Williamson 
District Judge 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this.112- day of ~ , 2008, I caused a 
true and correct copy of the above JUDGMENT to be serv~wing individuals in 
the manner indicated below: 
Michael T. Spink [Xl U.S. Mail 
Richard H. Andros [ ] Hand-Delivery 
Spink Butler, LLP [ ] Federal Express 
2S1 E. Front Street, Suite 200 [ ] Via Facsimile 
Boise, ID 83702 
P.O. Box 639 
Boise, ID 83701 
Facsimile: 208/388-1001 
David T. Krueck [X] U.S. Mail 
Reid W.Hay [ ] Hand-Delivery 
Trout-Jones-Gledhill-Fuhrman, P.A. [ ] Federal Express 
225 N. 9th Street, Suite 820 [ ] Via Facsimile 
Boise, ID 83702 
P.O. Box 1097 
Boise, In 83701. . 
Facsimile: 208/331-1529 
----:::J=AN1=NE~· ...... ...._"!-~-~ ~~."
KO_· ~
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DEC , ~ 2010 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By J. RANDALL 
DEPUTY 
Craig L. Meadows, ISB No.1 081 
Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 





Attorneys for Defendants Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman 
P.A. and David T. Krueck 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JUSTIN S. REYNOLDS and S. KRISTINE ) 
REYNOLDS; and SUNRISE ) Case No. CV OC 1004458 
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID T. KRUECK IN 
Plaintiffs, ) SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
) FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
VS. ) 
) 
TROUT JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN, ) 
P.A.; and DAVID T. KRUECK, individually ) 
and in his capacity as a member of the ) 





DAVID T. KRUECK, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows. 
1. I am a Defendant in the above-entitled action. I have personal knowledge of the 
facts set forth herein and can testify as to the truth of the matters contained herein if called upon 
as a witness at the trial of this action. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID T. KRUECK IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
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2. I am a member of the law firm of Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A. and have 
knowledge of the facts set forth herein and can testify as to the truth of the matters contained 
herein if called upon as a witness at the trial of this action. 
3. I represented Justin and Kristine Reynolds and Sunrise Development, LLC 
(collectively "Reynolds") in a transaction wherein they wished to purchase certain real property 
located in Ada County, Idaho, commonly known as the Dunham Place Subdivision ("the 
Property") from Quasar Development, LLC ("Quasar"). 
4. On or about July 21, 2006, Reynolds and the principals of Quasar entered into a 
Real Estate Purchase Agreement ("Agreement") whereby Reynolds agreed to purchase the 
Property from Quasar under certain terms and conditions. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and 
correct copy of the Agreement. 
5. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Reynolds deposited $60,000 as earnest 
money, to be applied toward the purchase price for the Property, in the event the parties closed 
the transaction under the terms of the Agreement. It was always understood that the $60,000 in 
earnest money paid by Reynolds was going to be used by Quasar for costs incurred in getting the 
Property through the platting process. 
6. Section 7(a) of the Agreement provided that in the event Quasar failed to record 
the final plat for the Property by July 31, 2007, Reynolds had the right to terminate the 
Agreement and seek a full refund of the earnest money. 
7. Quasar failed to record the plat for the Property by July 31,2007. On that same 
date, I provided written notice to counsel for Quasar that Reynolds terminated the Agreement 
due to Quasar's failure to record the plat pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, and also 
demanded a full refund of the $60,000 paid in earnest money. Attached as Exhibit B is a true 
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID T. KRUECK IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 




and correct copy of my July 31, 2007 letter to counsel for Quasar. In response to this demand, 
Quasar did not refund Reynolds the $60,000 earnest money. 
8. On August 9, 2007 on behalf of Reynolds, I sent a letter to counsel for Quasar 
again demanding return of Reynolds' earnest money. Attached as Exhibit C is a true and correct 
copy of my August 9, 2007 letter to counsel for Quasar. In response to this demand, Quasar did 
not refund Reynolds the $60,000 earnest money. 
9. On August 14,2007, after receiving no response from Quasar or counsel, I sent 
another demand for full refund of Reynolds' earnest money. Attached as Exhibit D is a true and 
correct copy of my August 14, 2007 letter to counsel for Quasar. In response to this demand, 
Quasar did not refund Reynolds the $60,000 earnest money. 
10. On September 6,2007, I received a letter from counsel for Quasar, along with a 
proposed promissory note and release agreement, which proposed promissory note provided that 
Quasar would pay Reynolds, or Sunrise Development, LLC, $60,000 no later than September 17, 
2007. The parties could not reach a resolution regarding the terms of the proposed promissory 
note and release agreement, and no payment was ever made by Quasar. Attached as Exhibit E is 
a true and correct copy of the September 6, 2007 letter from Quasar's counsel, with enclosures. 
11. Quasar never represented that they didn't owe Reynolds a portion of the earnest 
money, it was always presented to me that they didn't believe the full amount was due, and that 
they were having financial difficulties and needed more time to come up with the money for a 
refund. Because they didn't pay anything to Reynolds, it was decided to proceed with litigation 
to collect the earnest money. 
12. On September 25,2007, I filed on behalf of Reynolds, a Complaint and Demand 
for Jury Trial as Sunrise Development, LLC v. Quasar Development, LLC, Ada County Case 
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID T. KRUECK IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 
04188.00822143606.1 
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No. CV OC 0717098 (the "Underlying Litigation"). Attached as Exhibit F is a true and coneet 
copy of the Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. 
13. On October 25,2007, Quasar filed its Answer in the Underlying Litigation. 
Attached as Exhibit G is a true and conect copy of the Answer. 
14. On December 4,2007, Reynolds filed a motion for summary judgment in the 
Underlying Litigation. On that same date, the Affidavit of Kristine Reynolds in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment was filed. Attached as Exhibit H is a true and conect copy of 
Mrs. Reynolds' Affidavit. The Reynolds prevailed on their motion for summary judgment to the 
extent the District Court found that the full $60,000 should be refunded to Reynolds. 
15. In August of 2008, Quasar stipulated to the entry of a Judgment against it (subject 
to a covenant not to execute) for the full refund amount of $60,000, in addition to attorney fees 
and costs incuned by Reynolds, for a total amount of $70,488.81. Attached as Exhibit I is a true 
and correct copy of the Judgment which was entered September 10, 2008. 
16. Attached as Exhibit J are true and conect copies of invoices sent by Trout Jones 
Gledhill Fuhrman P.A. to Reynolds following Reynolds and Quasar's execution of the 
Agreement in July of 2006. 
Further, your affiant sayeth naught. 
~-£iJ-­
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID T. KRUECK IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 







STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County ofAda ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this /O.ft..-day of December, 2010. 
('--. 
Name: 1<0.$-e.c &rrMO 
Notar Public for Idaho 
Residing at :Eo, SfJ 10 
My commission eXlJ'ires D{-2.0 - ;2 IN l,e 
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID T. KRUECK IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 








CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this L!i~~ caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID T. KRUECK IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to each of the following: 
Robert C. Huntley V' U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
The HUNTLEY LAW FIRM PLLC Hand Delivered 
815 W. Washington Street __ Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 2188 E-mail 
Boise, ID 83701 __ Telecopy: 208.388.0234 
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID T. KRUECK IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 





REAL ESTATE PURCHASE AGREEMENT ,+­
THIS REAL ESTATE PURCHASE AGREEMENT (this "Agreement") is made thiS0ay of 
July, 2006, by and between Quasar Development LLC. an Idaho limited liability company ("Seller"), and 
Sunrise Development LLC. an Idaho limited liability company ("Buyer"). 
RECITALS 
A. Seller owns that certain property located at 110 S. Cloverdale Road, City of Boise. 
County of Ada, State of Idaho. and commonly known as Dunham Place (the ·Subdivision"). more 
particularfy described on Exhibit A, attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
B. Seller desires to sell, transfer and convey certain Building Lots. defined below, in the 
Subdivision, and Buyer desires to purchase such Building Lots, all according to the provisions hereinafter 
set forth. 
AGREEMENT 
NOW, THEREFORE. for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which 
are hereby acknowledged and agreed. and in consideration of the recitals above. which are incorporated 
herein, and the premises and the mutual representations, covenants, undertakings and agreements 
hereinafter contained, Seller and Buyer represent, covenant. undertake and agree as follows: 
1. DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY. 
Seller agrees to sell, transfer and convey and Buyer agrees to purchase and have transferred 
and conveyed, all for a purchase price and subject to and upon each of the terms and conditions 
hereinafter set forth, the following: 
(a) Property. The land legally described in exhibit A, attached hereto and made a part 
hereof, together with all right. title and interest of Seller in and to all easements, tenements, . 
hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging (the "Land'). and improvements and 
structures located on the Land (collectively, the "Improvements"). The Improvements and the Land are 
hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Real Property." Without limiting the foregoing, the Real 
Property is comprised of thirty (30) building lots (each. a aBUilding Lot." and collectively, the "BUilding 
Lots"). 
(b) Personalty. All personal property and other tangible property, if any, whether 
enumerated herein or not. in which Seller has an Interest and which is not owned by any tenant. now or 
hereafter located on or in the Land or the Improvements, used in connection with the operation or 
maintenance thereof Including, without limitation, all plans, working draWings, and specifications for the 
Residential Homes, defined below. to be built on the BUilding Lots (collectively, the aplans and 
Specifications") (all of the foregoing collectively referred to herein as the ·Personalty"). 
(c) Intangible Property. All intangible property. whether enumerated herein or not, in which 
Seller has an interest, now or hereafter used In connection with the operation or maintenance of the 
Improvements, the Land. or the Personalty, Including, without limitation, all leases, licenses and other 
agreements to occupy a/l or any part of the Real Property (all hereinafter collectively referred to as the 
"Intangible Property"). 
(d) Appurtenant Rights. All right. title, and interest of Seller to land. if any, lying in the bed of 
any street. road. or avenue. open or proposed. at the foot of or adjoining the Land to the center line of 
such street. road or avenue, and to the use of all easements. if any, whether of record or not. appurtenant 
to the Land and the use of all strips and rightS-Of-way, if any. abutting. adjacent, contiguous or adjoining 
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such Land, and to all water and water rights, ditch and ditch rights, water storage and water storage rights 
(all hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Appurtenant Rights"). 
The Real Property, Personalty, Intangible Property and Appurtenant Rights are hereinafter sometimes 
collectively referred to as the "Property." 
2. PURCHASE PRICE AND PAYMENT TERMS. The purchase price to be paid by Buyer to 
Seller for the Property (the "Purchase Price") shall be Three Million Six Hundred Sixty Thousand and 
No/100 Dollars ($3,660,000.00). The Purchase Price is based upon the sale of thirty (30) Building Lots 
at a cost of One Hundred Twenty-Two Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($122,000.00) per Building Lot. 
If the number of Building Lots transferred to Buyer at Closing, defined below, is greater than or less than 
thirty (30) Building lots, then the Purchase Price shall be recalculated based upon the formula of One 
Hundred Twenty-Two Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($122,000.00) per Building lot. The Purchase 
Price shall be payable in the folloWing manner: 
(a) Earnest Money. Seller acknowledges that Buyer has already deposited the sum of Five 
Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($5,000.00) (the "Initial Deposit") with The Real Estate Group Trust 
Account (Rick McGraw, responsible broker), as escrowee ("TREGIO). The Initial Deposit shall become 
non-refundable to Buyer, and shall be released to the Seller on the Approval Date, defined below. Within 
two (2) business days following execution of this Agreement, Buyer shall deposit an additional sum of 
Twenty-Five Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($25,000.00) (the "Additional Deposit") with TREG. The 
Additional Deposit shall become non-refundable to Buyer, and shall be released to Seller, on the 
Approval Date. TREG shall hold the Initial Deposit and the Additional Deposit under the standard escrow 
instructions currently in use by "tREG until release to Seller, as set forth herein. Upon the Approval Date, 
Buyer shall pay 10 Seller an amount equal to Thirty Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($30,000.00) (the 
"Approval Deposit") within sixty (60) days following execution of this Agreement. The Initial Deposit. the 
Additional Deposit, and the Approval Deposit may be collectively referred to herein as the "Earnest 
Money". The Earnest Money shall be held by returned to Buyer or delivered to Seller in accordance with 
the lerms hereof. The Earnest Money shall be applicable to the Purchase Price at Closing, provided that 
the transaction contemplated by this Agreement proceeds through Closing. 
(b) Cash. The balance of the Purchase Price, plus or minus prorations set forth herein, shall 
be paid by wire transfer or official bank check on the respective Closing Dale, defined below. 
3. TITLE MATTERS. 
(a) Documents Evidencing Title. Buyer may, but is not obligated to, obtain a commitment for 
an owner's title insurance policy for one or more Building Lot(s) issued by TitleOne Corporation ("Title 
Insurer"). The parties acknowledge and agree that Seller has absolutely no obligation to provide title 
insurance for any Building lot(s), or pay any title insurance premiums related to such BUilding lot(s), or 
the transactions contemplated by this Agreement. 
(b) Title Defects· In the event Buyer obtains one or more title commitments relating to the 
Building Lot(s), Buyer shall object in writing to any material exception shown thereon (other than 
monetary encumbrances that shall be released on the Closing Date using proceeds of the transactions 
contemplated by this Agreement and other than exceptions caused by Buyer) no later than the Closing 
Date and, if after exercise of Seller's best efforts to remove same, said exception(s) cannot be removed 
from the title commitment for any BUilding lot by Seller on or before the Closing Date, Buyer shall have 
the right to terminate this Agreement with respect to the affected Building Lot(s) only, in which event all 
parties thereafter shall be released and discharged from any further obligation under this Agreement 
relating solely to the affected Building lot(s). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the parties shall proceed 
through Closing on all other BUilding Lots as further set forth in this Agreement. The failure of Buyer to 
deliver written notice of an objection to a material exception shown on any title commitment within the 
time provided shall conclusively constitute the approval by Buyer of the exceptions shown in all title 
commitments. 
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(a) Right to Inspect. For a period of fifteen (15) days from the date hereof (sometimes 
hereinafter referred to as the "Review Period"), Buyer and Buyer's agents, shall have the right, during 
reasonable hours, to inspect the Property, and to undertake, at Buyer's expense, such tests and surveys 
and other activities as it shall determine in connection therewith, including, without limitation, the right to 
make: (i) a complete physical inspection of the Property; (ii) investigations regarding zoning, subdivision 
and code requirements; (iii) real estate tax analysis and investigation of available financing; (iv) 
investigation of all records and all other documents and matters, pUblic or private pertaining to Seller's 
ownership of the Property; and (v) to make application for and receive any and all permits, approvals and 
written agreements satisfactory to Buyer (including, without limitation, site plan approvals, subdivision 
plat(s), building and use permits) required by the appropriate public or governmental authorities to permit 
the development of the Property in accordance with Buyer's intended use. The foregoing shall hereinafter 
sometimes be collectively referred to as the "Inspection." 
During the Review Period, Seller shall give Buyer reasonable access to the Property and Seller's 
books and records relating to the Property for Buyer's Inspection. In addition, Seller shall furnish to 
Buyer, during the Review Period, such engineering data and other information relating to the Property as 
Buyer shall reasonably request; prOVided that such information is currently in Seller's possession. Buyer 
agrees to retain all confidential information relating to Seller and/or the Property so obtained from Seller 
on a confidential basis; provided, however, any information relating to the Property or Seller obtained by 
Buyer from a person or entity other than Seller and information already in the pUblic domain shall not be 
SUbject to the foregoing confidentiality provision. Upon the termination of this Agreement for any reason, 
Buyer shall promptly return to Seller any and all printed information, without retaining copies thereof, 
received from Seller in connection with the transaction contemplated by this Agreement. The Inspection 
to be conducted by Buyer shall not disturb the quiet enjoyment of Seller or be without prior notice to 
Seller. 
Buyer agrees to indemnify and hold Seller harmless from any and all costs and expenses 
incurred or sustained by Seller as a result of such acts of Buyer, or Buyer's agents or independent 
contractors pursuant to the right granted by this paragraph; provided Buyer's liability and Indemnity shall 
not extend to any condition currently eXisting or discovered on the Property. 
(b) Approval Notice. In the event that Buyer, in Buyer's sole and exclusive discretion, is not 
satisfied for any reason with the results of the Inspection, Buyer may, by written notice (the ''Tunnlnatlon 
Notice" delivered to Seller on or before two (2) days after the termination of the ReView Period (the 
"Approval Date"), terminate this Agreement, which thereafter shall be of no force and effect without 
further action by the parties hereto. Upon a termination as herein provided, the Earnest Money, to the 
extent the same has been paid, shall be returned to Buyer. It is understOOd and agreed that the failure of 
Buyer to deliver a Termination Notice for any reason, as a result of Buyer's Inspection, on or before the 
Approval Date shall constitute a waiver of Buyer's right to terminate this Agreement pursuant to the terms 
of this paragraph. 
(c) ContinUing Right to Inspect. Notwithstanding the limitations of this Section 4, Buyer shall 
have the continUing right to continue the Inspection after the Review Period expires. 
5. BUYER'S CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO CLOSING. 
(a) Conditions Precedent This Agreement, and Buyer's obligation to close the transaction 
contemplated herein, are subject to the following express conditions precedent In favor of Buyer. 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary which may be contained herein, each of the conditions 
precedent may be waived In writing by Buyer, such conditions being for the exclusive protection and 
benefit of Buyer. Seller agrees to cooperate with Buyer and to execute any documents which may be 
necessary or convenient to the performance or satisfaction of these conditions by Buyer on or before 
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(i) Zoning. That at Closing, the Property and the Buyer's intended use is (or will 
be) zoned and/or subdivided and all studies, reports, permits, approvals and written agreements 
satisfactory to Buyer (including, without limitation, site plan approvals, subdivision plat(s), building and 
use permits, and environmental reports and permits) required by the appropriate public or governmental 
authorities to permit the development of the Property in accordance with Buyer's intended use have 
been finally adopted, all without conditions that, in Buyer's reasonable opinion, would cause 
construction of facilities andlor site work on the Property to be economically unfeasible. 
(ii) ~. Seller shall, at Seller's sole cost and expense, deliver to Buyer no later 
than thirty (30) days following the date hereof, a current ALTA survey of the Property, prepared by a 
licensed surveyor in accordance with Buyer's requirements and certified to both Buyer and Seller (the 
"Survey") which shalt show: (1) the tegal description of the Property (it is agreed that the tegal 
description contained in the Survey shall be the legal description used in the Warranty Deed conveying 
the Property to Buyer); (2) that the Property extends to all adjacent streets, alleys and rights-of-way, 
which streets, alleys and rights-of-way have been dedicated to, and accepted for pUblic use by. the 
appropriate governmental authority; (3) that utilities are available to the boundaries of the Property 
adequate to serve Buyer's proposed use; and (4) if the Property contains more than one parcel, then all 
of the parcels together form one parcel, and each parcel forming the larger parcel shares its interior 
boundary lines with the other parcel or parcels. The Survey shall be sufficient to cause the Title Insurer 
to delete the standard printed survey exception and to issue a title policy free from any survey-related 
objections or exceptions. whatsoever. 
(iii) Title. Title to the Property shall be good and marketable and shall be free and 
clear of all liens, encumbrances, easements, assessments, restrictions, tenancies (Whether recorded or 
unrecorded) and other exceptions to tille, except the lien of taxes not yet due and payable, and the 
Permitted Exceptions. 
(b) Failure of a Condition Precedent. In the event of a failure of any condition precedent set 
forth herein, then Buyer may declare this Agreement null and void, in which event the refundable Earnest 
Money, if any, shall be returned to Buyer, and the parties shall have no further obligations or liabilities 
hereunder. 
SA. SELLER'S CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO CLOSING. 
(a) Conditions Precedent. This Agreement. and Seller's obHgation to close the transaction 
contemplated herein, are SUbject to the follOWing express conditions precedent in favor of Seller. 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary which may be contained herein, each of the conditions 
precedent may be waived in writing by Seller, such conditions being for the exclusive protection and 
benefit of Seller. Buyer agrees to cooperate with Seller and to execute any documents which may be 
necessary or convenient to the performance or satisfaction of these conditions by Seller on or before 
Closing: . 
(i) Financial Ability. Buyer has the financial means and assets to satisfy all of
 
Buyer's obligations under this Agreement
 
(ii) Negotiations with Canal Company. Seller has completed, to Seller's sole 
satisfaction, negotiations with Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District related to the repair of the 
Ridenbaugh Canal running through portions of the Property on terms reasonably satisfactory to Seller, 
in Seller's sole discretion. 
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(b) Failure of a Condition Precedent. In the event of a failure of any other condition 
precedent set forth herein, then Seller may declare this Agreement null and void, and the parties shall 
have no further obligations or liabilities hereunder. Notwithstanding any other provision contained herein, 
in the event this Agreement fails to close because of a failure of condition precedent 5A(a)(ii) only, Seller 
agrees to return the Earnest Money to Buyer. 
6. REPRESENTATIONS, WARRANTIES AND COVENANTS OF SELLER. 
Seller hereby represents, warrants and covenants to Buyer that as of the date hereof and as of 
the respective Closing Date: 
(a) Owner; Marketable Title. That Seller is and shall be the owner of mar1<etable and 
insurable fee simple title to the Property, free and clear of all liens, encumbrances, covenants, conditions, 
restrictions, rights-of-way, easements, leases, tenancies, licenses, claims, options, options to purchase 
and any other matters affecting title, except, as of the date hereof, for the exceptions shown on the Title 
Commitment, and those liens of a definite and ascertainable amount which shall be removed at Closing. 
There shall be no change in the ownerShip, operation or control of the Property from the date hereof to 
the Closing Date. Without limiting the foregoing, Seller believes that Buyer may need to submit to the 
applicable governmental entities a hillside development application prior to developing certain BUilding 
Lots, but Seller makes no representation about which BUilding Lots may require submission and approval 
of such hillside development application. 
(b) No JudicIal Proceedings. That there are no condemnation or judicial proceedings, 
administrative actions or examinations, claims or demands of any type which have been instituted or 
which are pending or threatened against Seller, the Property or any part thereof. In the event Seller 
receives notice of any such proceeding, action, examination or demand, Seller shall promptly deliver a 
copy of such notice to Buyer. 
(c) Access. That there is legal access to the Property from adjoining private or public 
streets, highways. roads and ways and adequate access to all electric, telephone, drainage and other 
utility equipment and services required by law or necessary for the operation of the Property. No fact or 
condition exists which would result in the termination or impairment of the furnishing of service to the 
Property of electric, telephone, drainage or other such utility service. 
(d) ComoHance With laws. That, to Seller's actual knOWledge without independent inqUiry or 
investigation, Seller and the Property, and the use and operation thereof, are in compliance with all 
applicable municipal and governmental laws, ordinances, regulations, licenses, permits and 
authorizations, and there are presently in effect all licenses, permits and other authorizations necessary 
for the use, occupancy and operation of the Property as it is presently being operated. That. to Seller's 
actual knowledge without independent Inquiry or investigation. there exists no condition with respect to 
the operation, use or occupancy of the Property which violates any environmental, zoning, building, 
health, fire or similar law, ordinance or regulation. That there has been no notice of any violation of any 
enVironmental. zoning, building, health, fire or similar law, ordinance or regulation relative to the 
maintenance, operation, use or occupancy of any building or other improvements constituting part of the 
Property which has not been fully complied with, nor has Seller received any notice, written or otherwise, 
from a government agency requiring the correction of any condition with respect to the Property which 
has not been fully complied with. Seller shall promptly comply with any notices received after the date 
hereof and shall promptly deliver to Buyer a copy of any such notice together with evidence of compliance 
therewith. 
(e) Good Condition and Repair. That from and after the date hereof and until the respective 
Closing Date, Seller shall maintain, or cause to be maintained, the Property In good condition and repair, 
and shall continue to make or cause to be made ordinary repairs, replacements and maintenance to the 
Property. 
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(f) No Mechanic's Liens. That there are and will be no unrecorded mechanic's or 
materialmen's liens or any claims for such liens affecting the Property, and as of the respective Closing 
Date, there will be no work or material performed or furnished for which payment will not have previously 
been made in the ordinary course of business. 
6A. REPRESENTATIONS, WARRANTIES AND COVENANTS OF BUYER. 
Buyer hereby represents, covenants and warrants to Seller that as of the date hereof and as of
 
the respective Closing Date:
 
(a) Duly Organized: Good Standing. That Buyer is an Idaho limited liability company that 
has been duly organized and is validly existing and in good standing under the laws of the State of Idaho, 
and has the full power and authority to: (i) acquire title to the Property; (ii) enter into this Agreement; and 
(iii) carry out and consummate the transactions contemplated by this Agreement. 
(b) Authority. That the execution and delivery of this Agreement by the signatories hereto on 
behalf of Buyer. and the performance of this Agreement by Buyer, have been duly authorized by Buyer. 
Neither the execution of this Agreement nor the consummation of the transactions contemplated hereby 
will: (i) result in a breach of or default under agreement, document or instrument to which Buyer is a party 
or by which Buyer is bound; or (ii) violate any eXisting statute, restriction, order, writ, injunction or decree 
of any court, administrative agency or governmental body to which Buyer is SUbject. 
(c) No Pending Actions. That there is no action, SUit, proceeding, inqUiry, or investigation 
before any court, governmental agency or instrumentality pending or. to the knoWledge of Buyer, 
threatened, against Buyer wherein an unfavorable decision, ruling or finding would adversely affect 
Buyer's ability to consummate the transactions contemplated by this Agreement. 
(d) Buyer's Financial Resources. Buyer has the financial resources necessary to
 
consummate the transactions contemplated by this Agreement.
 
7. CLOSING AND RELATED MATTERS. 
(a) First Closing Date. Buyer and Seller shall close on the purchase of fifteen (15) Building 
Lots mutually designated in writing by Buyer and Seller (the "First Building Lots") on or before thirty (30) 
days following recordation of the final plat of the Subdivision with the Ada County, Idaho Recorder's 
Office (the MFlrst Closing Dat.~) at the office of Titreone Corporation ("Escrow••"). The parties shall 
identify the First Building Lots in ail amendment to this Agreement no later than thirty (30) days prior to 
the First Closing Date. No later than one (1) day prior to the First Closing Date, Seller and Buyer shall 
walk the First Building Lots to confirm that all on-site improvements including, without limitation, grading, 
utilities stUbbed, sidewalks completed, and all improvements to the First Building Lots have been finally 
and properly completed as submitted for approval to the City of Boise. Any repairs, changes or 
improvements to the on-site improvements to the First Building Lots after the First Closing Date shall be 
Buyer's sole responsibility._The First Closing Date shall occur no later than July 31, 2007. In the event 
Seller fails to record the final plat of the Subdivision with the Ada County Recorder's Office by July 31, 
2007, Buyer may, at its sole discretion, terminate this Agreement upon written notice to Seller, and Buyer 
may then obtain a full refund of the Earnest Money without any further obligations under the terms of this 
Agreement. 
(b) Seller's Deposits. On or before the First Closing Date, Seller shall deliver the follOWing 
documents to Escrowee: 
(i) Signed and acknOWledged warranty deed, transferring title to each of the First 
Building Lots from Seller to Buyer; 
(ii) Seller-approved Closing statement; 
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(iii) The Plans and Specifications relating to the First Building Lots; and 
(iv) Such other documents as Escrowee, Buyer or Buyer's attorneys may 
reasonably require in order to effectuate or further evidence the intent to transfer title to the First 
Building Lots. 
All of the documents and instruments to be delivered by Seller hereunder shall be in form and substance 
reasonably satisfactory to counsel for Buyer. 
(c) Buyer's Deposits. On or before the First Closing Date, Buyer shall deliver the following 
documents to Escrowee: 
(i) Buyer-approved Closing statement; 
(ii) 
Agreement; and 
Cash or certified funds necessary to meet Buyer's obligations under this 
(iii) Such other documents as the Escrowee, Seller or Seller's attorneys may 
reasonably reqUire in order to effectuate or further evidence the intent to transfer title to the First 
Building Lots. 
All of the documents and instruments to be delivered by Buyer hereunder shall be in form and substance 
reasonably satisfactory to counsel for Seller. 
(d) Second Closing Date. Buyer and Seller shall close on the purchase of the remaining 
fifteen (15) Building lots mutually designated in writing by Buyer and Seller (the ·Second Building Lots·) 
on or before ninety (90) days following recordation of the final plat with the Ada County, Idaho Recorder's 
Office (the "Second Closing Date-) at the office of Escrowee. The parties shall identify the Second 
Building lots in an amendment to this Agreement no later than thirty (30) days before the Second Closing 
Date. No later than one (1) day prior to the Second Closing Date, Seller and Buyer shall walk the Second 
Building Lots to confirm that all on-site improvements including, without limitation, grading, utilities . 
stubbed, sidewalks completed, and all improvements to the Second Buildjng Lots have been finally and 
properly completed. Any repairs, changes or improvements to the on-site improvements to the Second 
Building Lots after the Second Closing Date shall be Buyer's sole responsibility. 
(e) Seller's pePOsits. On or before the Second Closing Date, Seller shall deliver the 
following documents to Escrowee: 
(I) Signed and acknowledged warranty deed, transferring title to each of the 
Second Building Lots from Seller to Buyer; 
(ii) Seller-approved Closing statement; 
(iii) The Plans and Specifications relating to the Second Building Lots; and 
(iv) Such other documents as Escrowee, Buyer or Buyer's attorneys may 
reasonably reqUire in order to effectuate or further evidence the intent to transfer title to the Second 
Building Lots. 
All of the documents and instruments to be delivered by Seller hereunder shall be in form and substance 
reasonably satisfactory to counsel for Buyer. 
(f) Buyer's Deposits. On the Second Closing Date, Buyer shall deliver the following 
documents to Escrowee: 
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(i) Buyer-approved Closing statement; 
(ii) Cash or certified funds necessary to meet Buyer's obligations under this 
Agreement; and 
(iii) Such other documents as the Escrowee. Seller or Seller's attorneys may 
reasonably require in order to effectuate or further evidence the intent to transfer tiUe to the Second 
Building Lots. 
All of the documents and instruments to be delivered by Buyer hereunder shall be in form and substance 
reasonably satisfactory to counsel for Seller. 
(g) Escrow Closing. The Closing of the transaction contemplated herein shall take place at 
the office of Escrowee, 1101 W. River Street, Suite 201, Boise. Idaho 83702; 208/424-8511 (telephone); 
208/424-0049 (facsimile). Closing shall be through escrow with Escrowee, using form escrow instructions 
then in use by Escrowee, modified to reflect the terms and conditions of the transaction contemplated 
herein. The parties shall use their best efforts to have the Title Insurer commit to insure the title of Buyer 
upon receipt of all of Buyer's and Seller's deposits. The cost of the escrow (including long term escrow 
fees, if any) relating to the transaction contemplated herein shall be equally divided between Seller and 
Buyer. This Agreement shall not be merged into any escrow agreement, and the escrow agreement shall 
always be deemed auxiliary to this Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement shall always be 
deemed controlling as between Seller and Buyer. The respective attorneys for Seller and Buyer are 
hereby authorized to enter into and execute such escrow agreement and any amendments thereto. 
(h) Possession. Possession of each Building Lot shall be delivered to Buyer When the 
warranty deed to such Building Lot is recorded by Escrowee. 
(i) Tax-deferred Exchange. Notwithstanding any other prOVisions contained herein, either 
party may use the transaction contemplated herein to facilitate a tax-deferred exchange of property under 
such terms and conditions that qualify as a tax-deferred exchange under Section 1031 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. The parties hereby agree to cooperate with each other fully in 
completing such tax-deferred exchange(s), provided, however that (i) such tax-deferred exchange(s) 
creates no additional liability to the party not effecting such tax deferred exchange. (ii) all costs of 
facilitating such tax-deferred exchange are paid by the party effecting the 1031 Exchange, and 
(ill) Closing of the transaction contemplated by this Agreement is not delayed due to such tax-deferred 
exchange. 
8. PRORATIONS AND ADJUSTMENTS. 
The following items shall be prorated and adjusted as of the respective Closing Date: 
(a) Real Estate Taxes. General real estate taxes and all other levies and charges against 
the Property for the year of Closing that are accrued but not yet due and payable. Such taxes shall be 
prorated as of each respective Closing Date on the basis of the most recent ascertainable tax bills. 
(b) Utilities. All charges for utilities, including water charges, shall be paid by Seller to the 
respective Closing Date. Bills received after the respective Closing Date which relate to expenses 
incurred or services performed allocable to the period prior to the date of the respective Closing Date 
shall be paid by Seller following such respective Closing Date as and when due. 
(c) Closing Fees. Any impositions on the conveyance shall be paid by Seller. Buyer shall 
not be liable for any state, county, federal income, excise or sales tax liabilities of Seller. Premiums for 
title insurance (if applicable), and all recording fees in connection with the conveyance. shall be paid by 
Buyer. All other Closing fees shall be split equally between the parties. 
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(d) Accounts Payable. All accounts payable and other obligations incurred by Seller in 
connection with the Property prior to the respective Closing Date shall be caused to be paid or performed 
by Seller on or before the respective Closing Date and Buyer assumes no obligation or responsibility for 
the payment or performance thereof. Seller shall use best efforts to remove any and all liens or 
encumbrances placed against the Property or any portion thereof by vendors, materialmen or 
subcontractors prior to the respective Closing Date for such Building lot(s). Seller shall have the right to 
insure around any existing liens, in order to facilitate the release of any encumbrance(s) on a timely basis. 
(e) Other Items. Such other items as are customarily prorated in transaction of the type 
contemplated in this Agreement. 
9. POST·CLOSING OBLIGATIONS. 
(a) Marketing. Buyer agrees to list for sale with The Real Estate Group all residential homes 
constructed on such Building lots (collectively, the "Residential Homes"). Buyer agrees that The Real 
Estate Group shall earn brokerage fees and commission of not less than six percent (6%) of the sales 
price of each Residential Home. Such listing agreement shall remain in effect for a period of at least one 
(1) year following completion of construction on each respective Residential Home. Seller, as the 
principal brokers of The Real Estate Group, agrees to use its best efforts to list and market for sale the 
Residential Homes once such Residential Homes are listed for sale. This provision shall survive each 
respective Closing. 
(b) Homeowners Association Fees. Buyer acknowledges and agrees that the Building lots 
will be assessed an annual assessment by the SubdiVision's Homeowners Association ("HOA") at the 
rate of Five Hundred and No/i00 Dollars ($500.00) per year (the "Annual Assessmenr), and Buyer 
agrees to pay the Annual Assessment for all Building lots owned by Buyer as and when the Annual 
Assessments become due. Additionally, the HOA will charge the owner of each Building Lot a set up fee 
in the amount ofTwo Hundred Fifty and No/100 Dollars ($250.00) (the "Set Up Fee"), and Buyer 
agrees to pay the Set Up Fee upon the later of: (i) Closing; or (ii) formation of the HOA. The HOA will 
also charge a transfer fee in the amount of Three Hundred and NoI100 Dollars ($300.00) (the "Transfer 
Fee") upon the sale of each Building lot and the Residential Home constructed thereon, and Buyer 
agrees to either pay the Transfer Fee upon closing on the sale of such Building Lot and Residential Home 
thereon, or notify Buyer's buyer in writing of the Transfer Fee and the reqUirement to pay such Transfer 
Fee upon closing of the sale of such BUilding lot and Residential Home thereon. This provision shall 
survive each respective Closing. 
(c) Construction. Buyer shall construct all Residential Homes on the Building lots in 
compliance with the guidelines promulgated by the Architectural Control Committee (-ACC") of the 
Subdivision (collectively, the -GuldellnH-). The Guidelines shall set forth rules relating to, without 
limitation, paint colors and exterior stone ornamentation on the Residential Homes, the landscaping 
criteria for the Building lots, and the ACC's approval process. Seller shall provide to Buyer a copy of the 
Guidelines no later than January 31, 2007. This provision shall survive each respective Closing. 
10. DEFAULT AND REMEDIES. 
(a) Defaun by Buyer. If Buyer should fail to consummate the transaction contemplated 
herein for any reason other than default by Seller, Seller may elect anyone or more of the folloWing 
remedies: (i) to enforce specific performance of this Agreement, (ii) to bring a suit for damages for breach 
of this Agreement; (iii) to terminate this Agreement whereupon Buyer will reimburse Seller for Seller's out­
of-pocket expenses incurred with respect to this transaction, including reasonable attorneys' fees and 
inspection costs; or (iv) pursue any and all remedies at law or equity. No delay or omission in the 
exercise of any right or remedy accruing to Seller upon the breach by Buyer under this Agreement shall 
impair such right or remedy or be construed as a waiver of any such breach theretofore or thereafter 
occurring. The waiver by Seller of any condition or the breach of any term, covenant or condition herein 
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contained shall not be deemed to be a waiver of any other term, covenant, condition or any subsequent 
breach of the same or any other term, covenant or condition contained herein. 
(b) Default by Seller. If Seller should fail to consummate the transaction contemplated 
herein for any reason other than default by Buyer, Buyer may elect anyone or more of the following 
remedies: (i) to enforce specific performance of this Agreement; (ii) bring suit for damages for breach of 
this Agreement; (iii) to terminate this Agreement Whereupon Seller shall reimburse Buyer for Buyer's out­
of-pocket expenses incurred with respect to this transaction, inclUding reasonable attorney's fees and 
costs; (iv) be entitled to the return of the Earnest Money; or (v) pursue any and all remedies at law or 
eqUity. The waiver by Buyer of any condition or the breach of any term, covenant or condition herein 
contained shall not be deemed to be a waiver of any other term, covenant, condition or any subsequent 
breach of the same or any other term. covenant or condition contained herein. 
11. INDEMNIFICATIONS AND DEFENSE OF CLAIMS. 
(a) Seller's IndemnitY. Seller shall indemnify, defend and hold Buyer harmless against and 
in respect of: (i) any damage or deficiency resulting from any breach of warranty or any non-fulfillment of 
any agreement on the part of Seller under this Agreement or from any misrepresentation in or omissions 
from any document or other instrument executed and delivered by Seller under this Agreement, unless 
waived in writing by Buyer: and/or (Ii) all actions, suits, proceedings, demands, assessments, jUdgments, 
reasonable court costs and attorneys' fees and expenses incident to or incurred by Buyer in connection 
with any of the foregoing. 
(b) Buyer's Indemnity. Buyer shall indemnify, defend and hold Seller harmless against and 
in respect of: (i) any damage or deficiency resulting from any breach of warranty or any non-fulfillment. of 
any agreement on the part of Buyer under this Agreement or from any misrepresentation in any document 
or other instrument executed and delivered by Buyer under this Agreement, unless waived in writing by 
Seller; and/or (ii) all actions, suits, proceedings, demands, assessments, judgments, reasonable court 
costs and attorneys' fees and expenses incident to or incurred by Seller in connection with any of the 
foregoing. 
12. BROKERAGE. 
(a) Representation Confirmation: Check one (1) box in Section 1 and one (1) box in 
Section 2 below to confirm that. in this transaction, the brokerage(s) involved had the following 
relationship(s) with the Buyer and Seller: 
Section 1: 
o The brokerage working with the Buyer is acting as an Agent for the Buyer. 
!XI The brokerage working with the Buyer Is acting as a Limited Dual Agent for the Buyer, 
without an Assigned Agent. 
o The brokerage working with the Buyers acting as a Limited Dual Agent for the Buyer, and 
has an Assigned Agent acting solely on behalf of the Buyer. 
o The brokerage working with the Buyer is acting as a Non-Agent for the Buyer. 
Section 2: 
o The brokerage working with the Seller is acting as an Agent for the Seller. 
!XI The brokerage working with the Seller Is acting as a Limited Dual Agent for the Seller, 
without an Assigned Agent. 
o The brokerage working with the Seller is acting as a Limited Dual Agent for the Seller, 
and has an Assigned Agent acting solely on behalf of the Seller. 
o The brokerage working with the Seller is acting as a Non-Agent for the Seller. 
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Each party signing this Agreement confirms that such party has received, read and understood the 
Agency Disclosure Brochure adopted or approved by the Idaho Real Estate Commission, and has 
consented to the relationship confirmed above. In addition, each party confirms that the Selling/Listing 
Brokerage's agency office policy was made available for inspection and review. Each party understands 
that such party is a "Customer," and is not represented by a brokerage unless there is a signed written 
agreement for agency representation. 
(b) The parties acknowledge that members of Quasar Development LLC are licensed real 
estate agents and/or brokers in the State of Idaho, but the parties agree that Seller's members shall not 
receive any finder's or brokerage fees or commissions related to this Agreement, except as expressly set 
forth in paragraph 9. Without limiting the foregoing, each of the parties represents and warrants to the 
other that it has not incurred and will not incur any liability for finder's or brokerage fees or commissions in 
connection with this Agreement. It is agreed that if any claims for finder's or brokerage fees or 
commissions are ever made against Seller or Buyer in connection with this transaction, all such claims 
shall be handled and paid by the party (the "Committing Party") whose actions or alleged commitments 
form the basis of such claim. The Committing Party further agrees to indemnify, defend and hold the 
other harmless from and against any and all claims or demands with respect to any finder's or brokerage 
fees or commissions or other compensation asserted by any person, firm or corporation in connection 
with this Agreement or the transaction contemplated hereby. This representation shall survive each 
respective Closing indefinitely. 
13. INTERVENING DAMAGE OR LOSS; CONDEMNATION. 
Seller shall deliver the Property to Buyer in SUbstantially the same condition on the Closing Date 
as on the date hereof, excepting therefrom ordinary wear and tear. If, prior to the respective Closing 
Date, all or a substantial portion of the Property having a replacement value In excess of Five Hundred 
Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($500,000.00) is destroyed by fire or other casualty or is taken or made 
subject to eminent domain proceedings, then Seller shall immediately notify Buyer in writing. Thereupon 
Buyer shall, at its sole option, have the right to: (i) terminate this Agreement; or (ii) complete the 
transaction contemplated by this Agreement, in which event Seller shall: (x) deliver to Buyer a duly 
executed assignment of all insurance proceeds or condemnation awards payable as a result of such fire, 
casualty, or condemnation, in form and substance satisfactory to Buyer; and (y) pay the amount of any 
deductible thereunder (Seller represents and warrants that Seller shall maintain until the respective 
Closing Date full replacement cost insurance and the present amount of rent loss insurance for the 
Property). 
14. NOTICES. 
All notices, demands. requests, and other communications under this Agreement shall be in 
writing and shall be deemed properly served or delivered, if delivered by hand to the party to whose 
attention it is directed, or when sent. three (3) days after deposit in the U.S. maN, postage prepaid, 
certified mail, return receipt requested, or one (1) day after deposit with a nationally recognized air carrier 
providing next day delivery, or if sent via facsimile transmission, when received, addressed as follows: 
(a) If to Seller: 
Quasar Development LLC
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(b) If to Buyer: 
Sunrise Development lLC
 






W~h copy to: 
David T. Krueck, Esq.
 









(a) Date Hereof. As used herein, the term "the date hereof' shall mean the date first set 
forth above. 
(b) Successors and Assigns. This Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the 
benefit of the parties hereto, and their respective heirs, personal representatives, successors and 
assigns. 
(c) Business Days. Wherever under the terms and provisions of this Agreement the time for 
performance falls upon a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, such time for performance shall be 
extended to the next business day. 
(d) CQunterparts. This Agreement may be executed in two (2) or more counterparts, each of 
which shall constitute an original, but all together shall constitute one and the same agreement. 
(e) Survival. The terms, provisions, and covenants (to the extent applicable) and indemnities 
shall survive the respective Closing and delivery of the respective warranty deed, and this Agreement 
shall not be merged therein, but shall remain binding upon and for the parties hereto until fully observed, 
kept or performed. 
(f) Eotire Agreement: Modifications. This Agreement embodies the entire contract between 
the parties hereto with respect to the subject maner hereof, and supersedes any and all prior agreements, 
whether written or oral, between the parties including, without limitation, that certain Lener of Intent, dated 
May 11, 2006, as amended to date. No extension, change, modification or amendment to or of this 
Agreement of any kind whatsoever shall be made or claimed by Seller or Buyer, and no notice of any 
'extension, change, modification or amendment made or claimed by Seller or Buyer shall have any force 
or effect whatsoever unless the same shall be endorsed in writing and be signed by the party against 
which the enforcement of such extension, change, modification or amendment is sought, and then only to 
the extent set forth in such instrument. Nothing herein is intended, nor shall it be construed, as obligating 
either party to agree to any modification of this Agreement. 
(g) Representation by Counsel. All parties hereto have either: (i) been represented by 
separate legal counsel; or (Ii) have had the opportunity to be so represented. Thus, in all cases, the 
language herein shall be construed simply and in accordance with its fair meaning and not strictly for or 
against a party, regardless of which party prepared or caused the preparation of this Agreement. 
(h) Captions. The captions at the beginning of the several paragraphs, respectively, are for 
convenience in locating the context, but are not part of the text. 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE AGREEMENT -12 













; O O l \ l O
(i) Severability. In the event any term or provisions of this Agreement shall be held illegal, 
invalid or unenforceable or inoperative as a matter of law, the remaining terms and provisions of this 
Agreement shall not be affected thereby, but each such term and provision shall be valid and shall remain 
in full force and effect. 
0) Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of Idaho. 
(k) Attorneys' Fees. If either party shall default in the full and timely performance of this 
Agreement and said default is cured with the assistance of an attorney for the other party and before the 
. commencement of a suit thereon, as a part of curing said default, the reasonable attorneys' fees incurred 
by the other party shall be reimbursed to the other party upon demand. In the event that either party to 
this Agreement shall file suit or action at law or equity to interpret or enforce this Agreement hereof, the 
unsuccessful party to such litigation agrees to pay to the prevailing party all costs and expenses. 
including reasonable attorneys' fees, incurred by the prevailing party, including the same with respect to 
an appeal. Without limiting the foregoing, Seller and Buyer agree to be solely responsible for any 
attorneys' fees and costs incurred by that party relating to the drafting of this Agreement. 
(I) Time of Essence. All times prOVided for in this Agreement or in any other instrument or 
document referred to herein or contemplated hereby, for the performance of any act will be strictly 
construed, it being agreed that time is of the essence of this Agreement. 
(m) No Public Disclosure. The parties agree not to disclose publicly (except as may be 
required by applicable law or debt instruments and/or financing or credit agreements by which a party is 
bound) any financial information in connection with the sale of the Property hereunder, and/or the terms 
and conditions of this Agreement. Neither party shall release any press releases or otherwise pUblicly 
disclose the subject of this Agreement without the prior written consent of the other party, which consent 
may be withheld, conditioned, or delayed in such party's sole discretion. This provision shall survive each 
respective Closing and the termination of this Agreement without limitation. 
[The remainder of this page left intentionally blank.] 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Real Estate Purchase 
Agreement as of the date set forth above. 
SELLER:	 BUYER: 
QUASAR DEVELOPMENT LLC, SUNRISE DEVELOPMENT LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company an Idaho limited liability company 




By:-,-	 _its Member 
Sandra K. Reynolds, Managing Member 
£f. '1J!JtBy:






By: Alvar eal Estate, Inc. 
an aho corporation, 
:y;~~"-
Amanda Alvaro, President 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Real Estate Purchase 
Agreement as of the date set forth above. 
SELLER: BUYER: 
QUASAR DEVELOPMENT LLC, SUNRISE DEVELOPMENT LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company an Idaho limited liability company 
By: McGraw & Co., Inc., 
an Idaho corporation, 
its Member 
By:,~_~~=-=-~_~--:-:-~ 
Richard W. McGraw, President 
By:	 Mirlyn, Inc., 
an Idaho corporation, 
Its Member 
By:.~~.--.~~--:-_~~_ 
Bradley M. Minasian, President 
By:	 Alvaro Real Estate, Inc. 
an Idaho corporation, 
its Member 
By:,-:-_--:-~ _ _:::----:--- ­
Amanda Alvaro, President 
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EXHIBIT A 
LEGAL DESCRIPTION 
A Portion of the Northwest Y. of the Northwest Y. of Section 15, Township 3 North, Range 1 East, Boise 
Meridian, Boise, Ada County. Idaho, more particularly described as follows; 
Beginning at a found Brass Cap Monument marking the West Y. Corner of Section 15, Township 3 North, 
Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, from which a found Brass Cap Monument marking the Northwest corner of 
said Section bears North 00°08'59" East, a distance of 2,661.15 feet; 
thence along the Westerly boundary of Section 15, North 00°08'59" East, a distance of 1772.00 feet 
(formerly North 00°16' West, a distance of 1772.00 feet) to the Southwest corner of property described in 
Warranty Deed Instrument Number 351262; 
thence along the Soulherly boundary of said property South 75°34'27" East, a distance of 63.10 feet to a 
set 5/8 inch rebar with plastic cap stamped "FLSI PLS 7612" at the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; 
thence continuing along said boundary the following courses and distances: 
South 75°34'27" East, a distance of 111.90 feet to a set 5/8 inch rebar with plastic cap stamped "FLSI 
PLS 7612"; 
North 66°25'33" East, a distance of 265.00 feet (formerly North 66°00' East, a distance of 265.00 feet) to 
a set 5/8-inch rebar with plastic cap stamped "FLSI PLS 7612"; 
South 59°34'27" East, a distance of 400.00 feet (formerly South 60°00' East, a distance of 400.00 feet) 
thence leaving Ihe Southerly boundary of property described in Warranty Deed Instrument Number 
351262, North 12"29'45" East, a distance of 209.48 feet to a set 5/8 inch rebar with plastic cap stamped 
"FLSI PLS 7612"; 
Ihence North 40°03'28" West, a distance of 280.95 feet to a set 5/8-inch rebar with plastic cap stamped 
"FLSI PLS 7612"; 
thence North 08°38'06" East, a distance of 177.75 feet to a found 5/8 inch rebar with no cap. set plastic 
cap stamped "FlSI PlS 7612" at the Southerly corner common to property described in Bargain and Sale 
Deed Instrument Number 9360806 and Warranty Deed Instrument Number 102030150; 
thence along the Northerly boundary of property described in Warranty Deed Instrument Number 
105093107, also being the Southerly boundary of property described in Bargain and Sale Deed 
Instrument Number 9360806 and Warranty Deed Instrument Number 98034874. North 84°49'48" West, a 
distance of 177.22 feet (formerly North 84°56" West) to a set 5/8 inch rebarwith plastic cap stamped 
"FlSI PLS 7612" at an angle point in the Southerly boundary of property described In Warranty Deed 
Instrument Number 98034874; 
thence continUing along the Northerly boundary of property described In Warranty Deed Instrument 
Number 105093107, also being the Southerly boundary of property described in Warranty Deed 
Instrument Number 98034874 and Quit Claim Deed Instrument Number 103114157, North 64°53'00" 
West, a distance of 249.65 feet (formerly North 64°17" West, a distance of 238.50 feet) to a found 1/2 
inch rebar with plastic cap stamped "PLS 4998" at an angle point in the Southerly boundary of property 












thence continuing along the Northerly boundary of property described in Warranty Deed Instrument 
Number 105093107, also being the Southerly boundary of property described in Quit Claim Deed 
Instrument Number 103114157 and Warranty Deed Instrument Number 94026991, North 80·19'27" West, 
a distance of 212.36 feet to a set 5/8 Inch rebar with plastic cap stamped "FLSI PLS 7612" on the Easterly 
Right-of-Way of South Cloverdale Road; 
thence along said Right-of-Way the following courses and distances: 
South 00·08'59" West, a distance of 156.82 feet to a set 5/8 inch rebar with plastic cap stamped "FLSI 
PlS 7612"; 
South 06·02'12" East, a distance of 190.48 feet to a found 1/2 inch rebar with plastic cap stamped "PLS 
4998"; 
South 04°58'39" West, a distance of 166.66 feet to a found 1/2 inch rebar with plastic cap stamped "PlS 
4998"; 
North 89°51'01" West, a distance of 6.50 feet to a found 1/2 inch rebar with plastic cap stamped "PLS 
4998"; 
South 00°08'59" West. a distance of 56.38 feet to a found 1/2 inch rebar with plastic cap stamped "PlS 
4998"; 
South 89"51'01" East, a distance of 26.15 feet to a found 1/2 inch rebarwith plastic cap stamped "PlS 
4998"; 
South 00°08'59" West. a distance of 59.75 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; 
Containing 357,216 square feet, 8.200 acres, more or less. 
The Basis of Bearings for this description is from the found Brass Cap Monument marking the West 1/4 
Corner of Section 15 to the found Brass Cap Monument marking the Northwest Corner thereof, which 
bears North 00"08'59" East, a distance of 2,661.15 feet. 
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Trout + Jones + Gledhill + Fuhrman, P.A. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
David r	 Krueek 
July 31, 2007 
VIA FACSIMILE AND u.s. MAIL 
FAX NO. 288-1516 
Amanda Alvaro 
Quasar Development LLC 
3090 Gentry Way #150 
Meridian, In 83642 




Dear Ms. Alvaro: 
I write to you as the attorney for Sunrise Development, LLC ("Sunrise") regarding the 
Real Estate Purchase Agreement ("Agreement'') Sunrise entered into with Q~ar Development 
LLC ("Quasar'') in July 2006. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Sunrise agreed to 
purchase lots from Quasar in the Dunham Place Subdivision ("Subdivision'') in Ada County, 
Idaho. 
Section 7(a) of the Agreement requires Quasar to record the final plat for the Subdivision 
by July 31, 2007 with the Ada County Recorder's Office. In the event Quasar fails to record the 
final plat by that date, Sunrise has the right to terminate the Agreement and receive a full refund 
of the $60,000.00 Eamest Money. Quasar has not recorded the final plat. Sunrise is, therefore, 
terminating the Agreement without any further obligations to Quasar, and Sunrise demands a full 
refund of the Earnest Money, pursuant to the terms of Section 7(a). 
This letter serves as fonnal written notice of Sunrise's intent to terminate the Agreement 
under the terms of Section 7{a) of the Agreement. Please remit a check made payable to Sunrise 
Development, LLC to my office within the next three (3) business days from the date ofthis 
letter. 
The 9111 &; Idaho Center. 225 North 9· Street, Suite 820 
P. O. Box 1097. Boise, Idaho 83701 















         






A.M ~- _.~ ..... -..__.~.(~.- "3:;::r 
-FrM~~ 
O£C 1 • Zora 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By J. RANDALLCraig L. Meadows, ISB No.1 081 
OEPUTY 
Michelle R. Points, IS,B No. 9224 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 





Attorneys for Defendants Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman 
P.A. and David T. Krueck 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JUSTIN S. REYNOLDS and S. KRISTINE ) 
REYNOLDS; and SUNRISE ) Case No. CV OC 1004458 
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, ) 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
Plaintiffs, ) DEFENDANTS' MOTIOJ\l FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
VS. ) 
) 
TROUT JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN, ) 
P.A.; and DAVID T. KRUECK, individually ) 
and in his capacity as a member of the ) 




Defendants Trout Jones Gedhill Fuhrman P.A. and David T. Krueck ("Defendants"), by 
and through their counsel of record Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP, and respectfully 
submit this Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, filed concurrently 
herewith. 
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I. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an attorney malpractice case. Plaintiffs assert that Defendants negligently drafted 
a certain Real Estate Purchase Agreement which allegedly caused them to lose earnest money in 
the amount of $60,000; which Plaintiffs paid to the sellers in the subject transaction. 
As set forth below, the statute of limitation has run on any claim Plaintiffs' may have 
asserted against the Defendants under an attorney malpractice cause of action, and further, 
Plaintiffs are barred from maintaining this action under the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel. 





Defendants represented Justin and Kristine Reynolds and Sunrise Development, LLC 
(collectively "Plaintiffs") in a transaction wherein they wished to purchase certain real property 
located in Ada County, Idaho, commonly known as the Dunham Place Subdivision ("the 
Property") from Quasar Development, LLC ("Quasar"). Affidavit of David T. Krueck in 
Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Krueck Aff."), ~ 3. 
On or about July 21, 2006, Plaintiffs and the principals of Quasar entered into a Real 
Estate Purchase Agreement ("Agreement") whereby Plaintiffs agreed to purchase the Property 
from Quasar under certain terms and conditions. Krueck Aff. ~ 4, Exh. A. 
Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Plaintiffs deposited $60,000 as earnest money, to 
be applied toward the purchase price for the Property, in the event the parties closed the 
transaction under the terms of the Agreement. Krueck Aff., ~ 5. The $60,000 in earnest money 
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paid by Plaintiffs was agreed up and was to be used by Quasar for costs incurred in getting the 
Property through the platting process. Id. 
Section 7(a) of the Agreement provided that in the event Quasar failed to record the final 
plat for the Property by July 31, 2007, Plaintiffs had the right to terminate the Agreement and 
seek a full refund of the earnest money. Id., Exh. A. 
Quasar failed to record the plat for the Property by July 31, 2007. Krueck Aff., ,-r 7. On 
that same date, Mr. Krueck on behalf of Plaintiffs, provided written notice to counsel for Quasar 
that Plaintiffs terminated the Agreement due to Quasar's failure to record the plat pursuant to the 
terms of the Agreement, and also demanded a full refund of the $60,000 paid in earnest money. 
Id., Exh. B. Quasar did not refund the Plaintiffs' earnest money in response to this demand. 
On August 9, 2007 on behalf of Plaintiffs, Mr. Krueck sent a letter to counsel for Quasar 
again demanding return of Plaintiffs' earnest money. Krueck Aff. ,-r 8, Exh. C. Quasar did not 
refund the Plaintiffs' earnest money in response to this demand. Id. 
On August 14, 2007, after receiving no response from Quasar or counsel, Mr. Krueck 
sent another demand for full refund of Plaintiffs' earnest money. Krueck Aff. ,-r 9, Exh. D. 
Quasar did not refund the Plaintiffs' earnest money in response to this demand. Id. 
On September 6, 2007, Mr. Krueck received a letter from counsel for Quasar, along with 
a proposed promissory note and release agreement, which proposed promissory note provided 
that Quasar would pay Plaintiffs, or Sunrise Development, LLC, $60,000 no later than 
September 17, 2007. Krueck Aff. ,-r 10, Exh. E. The parties could not reach a resolution 
regarding the terms of the proposed promissory note and release agreement, and no payment was 
ever made by Quasar. Id. 
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On September 25, 2007, Defendants filed on behalf of Plaintiffs, a Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial as Sunrise Development, LLC v. Quasar Development, LLC, Ada 
County Case No. CV OC 0717098 (the "Underlying Litigation"). Krueck Aff. ~ 12, Exh. F. In 
the Complaint, Plaintiffs asserted that Quasar was obligated under the terms o[the Agreemen[ to 
fully refund the earnest money to Reynolds on July 31, 2007. Id., ~~ 14, 15. 
On October 25,2007, Quasar filed its Answer in the Underlying Litigation. Krueck Aff., 
Exh. G. 
On December 4,2007, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment. Krueck Aff., ~ 9. 
On that same date, the Affidavit of Kristine Reynolds in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment was filed. Krueck Aff., Exh. H. In that affidavit, Ms. Reynolds confirmed that 
"Sunrise has made numerous written demands to Quasar seeking a refund of the Earnest Money 
pursuant to the express terms ofthe Agreement." Id., ~ 8 (emphasis added). 
In August of 2008, Quasar stipulated to the entry of a Judgment against it (subject to a 
covenant not to execute) for the full refund amount of $60,000, in addition to attorney fees and 
costs incurred by Plaintiffs, for a total amount of $70,488.81. Krueck Aff, Exh. L 
Plaintiffs incurred substantial attorney fees associated with Quasar's failure to refund the 
earnest money upon their termination of the Agreement on July 31, 2007; from that date until the 
litigation was concluded. Krueck Aff., Exh. J. 
III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment shall be rendered when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." LR.C.P.56(c). All 
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facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Boudreau v. City of 
Wendell, 147 Idaho 609, 611, 213 P.3d 394, 396 (2009) (citations omitted). 
If the moving party challenges an element of the nonmoving party's case on the basis that 
no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come 
forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact. Smith v. Meridian Jt. School 
Dist. No.2, 128 Idaho 714, 719, 918 P.2d 583, 588 (1996). A party opposing the summary 
judgment motion may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials contained in that party's 
pleadings but, instead, the party's response, by affidavits or otherwise, must set forth specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. A mere scintilla of evidence is 
insufficient to create a material issue of fact. Zimmerman v. Volkswagen ofAmerica, Inc., 128 
Idaho 851,854,920 P.2d 67,70 (1996); Snake River Equip. Co. v. Christensen, 107 Idaho 541, 
549,691 P.2d 787, 795 (Ct. App. 1984). Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, 
affidavits, and discovery documents on file with the court demonstrate no material issue of fact 
such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a mater of law. Taylor v. Maile, IV, 146 






A.	 The Statute Of Limitation For Plaintiffs To Assert Any Claim Against Defendants 
Has Expired. 
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this case on March 9, 2010. The statue oflimitation on 
Plaintiffs' claim of attorney malpractice commenced to run on July 31,2007. Therefore, 
Plaintiffs' claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitation, which is two years. 
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The statute of limitations on a professional malpractice claim is set forth in Idaho Code 
§ 5-219(4). That section provides that with regard to a malpractice claim, "the statute of 
limitations ... expire[s] two years following the occurrence, act or omission complained of, 
barring fraudulent or knowing concealment of the injury, and will not be extended due to any 
continuing consequences, resulting damages, or continuing professional relationship." Rice v. 
LUster, 132 Idaho 897, 899, 980 P.2d 561,563 (1999) (emphasis added), see also Lapham v. 
Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 585, 51 P.3d 396, 399 (2002) ("An action to recover damages for 
professional malpractice must be commenced within two years after the cause of action has 
accrued."). 
Although the statute purports to create a strict "occurrence" rule for accrual of such an 
action, the Idaho courts have interpreted the statute to allow for a cause of action to accrue for 
attorney malpractice once the Plaintiff has suffered "some damage." Streib v. Veigel, 
109 Idaho 174, 178, 706 P.2d 63, 67 (1985). See also Chicoine v. Bignall, 122 Idaho 487, 
835 P.2d 1299 (1992). 
"The detennination of what constitutes 'damage' for purposes of accrual of an action 
must be decided on the circumstances presented in each individual case." Parsons Packing, Inc. 
v. Massengil, 140 Idaho 480, 482, 95 P.3d 631, 633 (2004) (citing Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 
539,543,808 P.2d 876, 880 (1991)). 
Moreover, the last clause of the statute states, "the limitation period shall not be extended 
by reason of any continuing consequences or damages resulting therefore or any continuing 
professional relationship between the injured party and the alleged wrongdoer." I.C. 5-219(4). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals reinforced the plain meaning of this provision in Pichon v. 
Benjamin, 108 Idaho 852, 702 P.2d 890 (Ct. App. 1985). In that case, the plaintiff attempted to 
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argue a theory of a continuing tort. The Pichon court held: "Our legislation has expressly 
rejected the theory of continuing negligence advocated by the Plaintiff. The cause of action 
accrued for each event of alleged malpractice on the day the event occurred '" and the Plaintiff 
had two years from that date (the date of alleged malpractice) to file suit." Id. at 854, 702 P.2d 
at 892. 
Where a single act causes damage for which compensation is claimed, even if those 
damages are continuing and their full extent unknown, where "some damage" occurs, the stalute 
of limitation accrues. Lapman, 137 at 603, 850 P.2d 754. This includes certain situations where 
attorney fees are paid that are attributable to the alleged malpractice of an attorney. See 
Chicoine, 122 Idaho 487, 835 P.2d 1298 (the existence of damage does not depend on the 
outcome of the lawsuits, since only 'some damage' is necessary for the action to accrue under 
I.e. § 5-219(4)").1 
Thus, as soon as a plaintiff has suffered some damage, as a result of an alleged event of 
malpractice, the statute of limitations begins to accrue and his or her entire claim is barred two 
years following said the occurrence of said damage. 
1. Plaintiffs Suffered "Some Damage" On July 31, 2007. 
The Agreement was drafted and thereafter executed by the parties on or about July 31, 
2006. Although no action could have been taken to avoid the effect of the alleged negligently 
drafted Agreement after it was executed by the parties, Plaintiffs did not suffer any damage as a 
result until Quasar refused to refund the earnest money. See e.g. Sudweeks, 139 Idaho at 543, 
I Unlike certain factual scenarios where the existence of some actual damage depends on the 
outcome of the lawsuit. See, e.g. City ofMcCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 663, 20 I P.3d 
629, 636 (2009). 








808 P.2d at 879 (alleged negligence can cause a plaintiff to conceivably suffer damage, but 
statute of limitations accrues when plaintiff objectively damaged). 
At no time in the underlying case did Quasar take the position that they did not owe 
Plaintiffs the refund of some portion of the earnest money, rather, Quasar took the position in the 
underlying litigation that only a portion of the $60,000 was refundable, and that it only had to 
actually refund the earnest money to Plaintiffs within a "reasonable" time. Krueck Aff., ~ 11.2 
When Quasar refused to refund Plaintiffs their $60,000 earnest money payment, on or 
about July 31,2007, Reynolds suffered some damage - they expected and did not receive the 
funds, and the statute of limitation on their claim against Defendants began to accrue on that 
date. 
In addition, Plaintiffs began to incur substantial attorney fees and costs on or about that 
date due to Quasar's refusal to refund the earnest money as Defendants commenced with 
continuous communications with counsel for Quasar regarding the Plaintiffs' continued demands 
for the refund. Again, incurring damages in addition to the "refusal to refund" - beginning July 
31,2007. 
2 As set forth above, Quasar ended up stipulating to a judgment in for the entire principal 
amount of $60,000, in addition to the attorney fees and costs Reynolds incurred in the underlying 
litigation. 






2. Plaintiffs Suffered "Some Damage" No Later Than October 25, 2007 When 
Quasar Filed Its Answer In The Underlying Litigation. 
As set forth above, a cause of action accrues when there is objective proof that would 
support the existence of some actual damage, there is no requirement that a plaintiff have 
knowledge of the damage, that is, there is no "discovery rule" as it applies to attorney 
malpractice claims. All that is required is the existence of records showing alleged damage 
suffered by plaintiff sufficient to constitute accrual of an action. Bignall and Stewart, supra. 
Notwithstanding the fact that there is no requirement that a plaintiff have knowledge of 
having suffered from some damage, in this case, not only did the Plaintiffs suffer some damage 
when Quasar refused to fully refund the earnest money upon Plaintiffs terminating the 
Agreement - Plaintiffs knew that Quasar's refusal to make the refund was based on the language 
of the Agreement on or before October 25,2007, when Quasar filed its Answer in the 
Underlying Litigation. 
Based on Quasar's refusal to refund the earnest money pursuant to the terms of the 
Agreement, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint containing claims of breach of contract and breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In sum, the Complaint alleged that Plaintiffs were to 
receive a full refund of the earnest money on July 31, 2007, and despite repeated demands and 
numerous promises to pay by Quantum, no refund had been made. Kruek Aff., Exh. F, ~~ 12, 
14. 
Quantum filed its Answer in the Underlying Litigation on October 25,2007. In that 
answer, the Plaintiffs were put on notice that Quasar denied that the Agreement provided for a 
"full" refund of the earnest to Plaintiffs immediately upon termination of the Agreement. 
(Quasar denied paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 of the Complaint which alleged that Quasar was 







obligated under the tenns of the Agreement to fully refund the earnest money upon Plaintiffs 
tenninating the Agreement). 
If Plaintiffs were not put on notice before, they learned no later that October 25, 2007 that 
Quasar took the position that the terms of the Agreement did not provide that Plaintiffs receive a 
full refund of the earnest money immediately upon Plaintiffs tenninating the Agreement, and the 
Underlying Litigation was pursued by Plaintiffs on that premise. 
It is the relevant terms of the Agreement which Plaintiffs claim in this action, were 
negligently drafted by Defendants. They knew that the tenns of the Agreement, from Quasar's 
perspective, did not provide they should receive a full and immediate refund - which, following 
Plaintiffs rationale, resulted in them having to file the Underlying Litigation. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Quasar ultimately received a judgment against Quasar D)r 
the full principal amount of the earnest money, the Plaintiffs nevertheless pursued the 
Underlying Litigation on notice that the tenns of the Agreement were the basis of Quasar's 
defense. In fact, as reflected in Defendant's invoices, the Plaintiffs incurred substantial attorney 
fees and costs in pursuing a motion for summary judgment beginning in November of2007, 
addressing the issues of the amount of refund and the timing of the refund. 
Plaintiffs first incurred some damage when Quasar failed to immediately and fully refund 
their earnest money, and Plaintiffs were certainly made aware of Quasar's reasoning for non·· 
payment when Quasar filed their answer. Plaintiffs cannot be heard to claim that they did not 
know they incurred some damage or that the were not aware of the alleged "cause" of that 
damage in the Fall of2007. 
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3. Plaintiffs' Claim That Defendants Negligently Drafted The Terms Of The 
Agreement Is Barred By The Doctrine Of Judicial Estoppel. 
Plaintiffs asserted in the Underlying Litigation that Quasar was obligated under the terms 
ofthe Agreement to fully refund the earnest money Reynolds on July 31, 2007. In this case, 
Plaintiffs assert that Defendants negligently drafted the Agreement and that the Agreement did 
not require any particular time frame for the refund of the earnest money. 
The doctrine ofjudicial estoppel bars Plaintiffs' claim. The doctrine ofjudicial estoppel 
prohibits a party from assuming a position in one proceeding and then taking an inconsistent 
position in a subsequent proceeding. lndian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Investment, 
LLC, 147 Idaho 737, 748,215 P.3d 457,468 (2009)(citations omitted). 
In McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148,937 P.2d 1222 (1997), the Idaho Supreme Court held 
that a party who is taking an inconsistent position to a position taken in an underlying action, is 
estopped from bringing a legal malpractice claim against an attorney who represented them in an 
underlying action, "when the party maintaining an inconsistent position either did have, or was 
chargeable with, full knowledge of the attendant facts prior to adopting the initial position." [d. 
at 155,937 P.2d at 1229. 
In McKay, the plaintiff, Ms. McKay, brought a legal malpractice action against her 
attorney and the guardian ad litem appointed to represent her child in an underlying medical 
malpractice action. In the medical malpractice action, the claim was settled, and all parties 
agreed to the terms of settlement, and the Court approved the settlement. In the legal malpractice 
action Ms. McKay argued that the settlement was made without her consent and that the 
settlement amount was insufficient. Id. at 149,937 P.2d at 1223. Specifically, Ms. McKay 
stated that she was never satisfied with the settlement and that she never really agreed to the 
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settlement. Id. at 150, 937 P.2d 1224. The original attorney, Mr. Bruce Owens, and the 
guardian ad litem, Mr. Howard Mamvciller, both filed motions for summary judgment on the 
basis of judicial estoppel. The District Court granted the respective motions for summary 
judgment and also ordered Ms. McKay's counsel to pay Mr. Owens' and Mr. Manweiller's 
attorney fees and computer research costs as a sanction under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11. 
The Idaho Supreme Court affinned the District Court's decision to grant the motions for 
summary judgment based on the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel. 
The Idaho Supreme Court, in surveying decisions from appellate courts from other states, 
held that judicial estoppel is applicable in the context of legal malpractice claims. Id. at 153,937 
P.2d at 1277.3 In McKay, the Supreme Court, consistent with the District Court, found that 
because Ms. McKay, as the litigant, stated in court that she agreed to the settlement, and that her 
attorney, Mr. Ellis, stated that he agreed with the settlement, she was bound by those statements. 
Notwithstanding Ms. McKay's representation that "she never really meant to approve the 
settlement", she nevertheless agreed to the settlement and obtained an advantage as a result of 
the settlement, therefore, the Supreme Court held, McKay "could not repudiate" her earlier 
agreement, and by way of her inconsistent position, "obtain recovery from another party, arising 
out of the same transactions." Id. at 155, 937 P.2d 1229. 
The Idaho Supreme Court noted the following cases: Brown v. Small, 825 P.2d 1209)(Mont. 
1992)(insured accepted settlement and later sued attorneys for not finding endorsement for 
additional coverage sooner, judicially estopped from bringing malpractice claim); Owen v, 
Knop, 853 S. W.2d 638 (Tex.App. 1993)(plaintiff claimed she had to take inconsistent 
position in medical malpractice claim due to her attorney's malpractice in not timely filing 
preserving her claims, judicially estopped because can't claim that malfeasance of her 
attorney made her do it); Winmark v. Miles & Stockbridge, 674 A.2d 73 (Md. App. 
1996)(attorney malpractice claim not listed on bankruptcy schedule, subsequent lawsuit 
barred by judicial estoppel). 
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Similarly in this case, the Plaintiffs are taking a position inconsistent with their position 
taken in the Underlying Litigation. 
As set forth above, Plaintiffs asserted in the Underlying Litigation that Quasar was 
obligated under the terms ofthe Agreement to fu/(v refund the earnest money Reynolds on July 
31, 2007. Plaintiffs asserted that a "plain" reading of the Agreement mandated that the refund of 
the earnest money was due upon Plaintiffs termination of the Agreement. Ms. Reynolds signed 
an affidavit wherein she testified that upon providing written notice of termination of the 
Agreement to Quasar, that Plaintiffs were to obtain a full refund of the earnest money; that 
demands had been made seeking a full refund of the earnest money "pursuant to the express 
terms of the Agreement." Plaintiffs prevailed on their motion for summary judgment to the 
extent the District Court found that they were entitled to a refund of the full $60,000 in earnest 
money. Plaintiffs later reached an agreement with Quasar wherein Quasar stipulated to a 
judgment for the full amount of earnest money, in addition to Plaintiffs attorney fees. 
Contrary to the position Plaintiffs took in the Underlying Litigation, in this case, 
Plaintiffs assert that the Agreement was defectively drafted and did not make clear that the full 
$60,000 was refundable, and in addition failed to specify any particular time for the refund. See 
Complaint, ~~ 5,6. 
A "litigant who obtains a judgment, advantage, or consideration from one party through 
means of sworn statements is judicially estopped from adopting inconsistent and contrary 
allegations or testimony, to obtain a recovery or a right against another party, arising out of the 
same transactions or subject matter." Lawrence v. Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892, 204 P.3d 532 
(2009), citing Loomis v. Church, 76 Idaho 87, 277 P.2d 561 (1954). 
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Clearly the Plaintiffs intended for the Court in the Underlying Litigation to rely on their 
representations with regard to the "plain meaning" of the terms of the Agreement, and Plaintiffs 
were granted, in part, their motion for summary judgment, which resulted in Quasar entering into 
a stipulated judgment for the full amount of the earnest money, as well as Plaintiffs attorney fees 
and costs. In taking a contrary position in this case, Plaintiffs are "deliberately shifting positions 
to suit the exigencies of a particular situation" - to support a claim of alleged malpractice against 
the Defendants. See Hutchison, supra. 
Plaintiffs claim7~se are barred under the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel. 
DATED THIS day of December, 2010. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & H 
~ 
.A. and David T. Krueck 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on Ihis!L(f.!;;;fDecember. 2010, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the 
following: 
Robert C. Huntley 
The HUNTLEY LAW FIRM PLLC 
815 W. Washington Street 
P.O. Box 2188 
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Attorneys for Defendants Trout Jones Gledhill 
Fuhrman P.A. and David T. Krueck 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JUSTIN S. REYNOLDS and S. KRISTINE ) 
REYNOLDS; and SUl\TRISE ) Case No. CV OC 1004458 
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, ) 
) REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION 




TROUT JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN, ) 
P.A.; and DAVID T. KRUECK, individually ) 
and in his capacity as a member of the ) 




Defendants Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman P.A. and David T. Krueck ("Defendants"), by 
and through their counsel of record, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, respectfully submit 
this Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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This is an attorney malpractice action. Plaintiffs assert that they were damaged due to 
Defendants negligently drafting the terms of a certain agreement. Defendants assert in the 
subject Motion for Summary Judgment that (l) the Complaint was not filed within the applicable 
two year statute of limitations and is therefore time barred; and (2) that Plaintiffs are judicially 




Defendants will restate here a portion of the facts contained in their opening 
"Memorandum In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment" ("Opening Memo"), which facts 
were not disputed by Plaintiffs, in order to put Defendants following reply in context. 
Defendants represented Justin and Kristine Reynolds and Sunrise Development, LLC 
(collectively "Plaintiffs") in a transaction wherein they wished to purchase certain real property 
located in Ada County, Idaho, commonly known as the Dunham Place Subdivision ("the 
Property") from Quasar Development, LLC ("Quasar"). Affidavit of David T. Krueck in 
Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Krueck Aff."), ~ 3, filed December 14, 
2010. 
On or about July 21, 2006, Plaintiffs and the principals of Quasar entered into a Real 
Estate Purchase Agreement ("Agreement") whereby Plaintiffs agreed to purchase the Property 
from Quasar under certain terms and conditions. Krueck Aff. ~ 4, Exh. A. 
Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Plaintiffs deposited $60,000 as earnest money, to 
be applied toward the purchase price for the Property, in the event the parties closed the 
transaction under the terms of the Agreement. Krueck Aff., ~ 5. 
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Section 7(a) of the Agreement provided that in the event Quasar failed to record the final 
plat for the Property by July 31, 2007, Plaintiffs had the right to terminate the Agreement and 
seek a full refund of the earnest money. Id., Exh. A. 
Quasar failed to record the plat for the Property by July 31, 2007. Krueck Aff., ~ 7. On 
that same date, Mr. Krueck on behalf of Plaintiffs, provided written notice to counsel for Quasar 
that Plaintiffs terminated the Agreement due to Quasar's failure to record the plat pursuant to the 
terms of the Agreement, and also demanded a full refund of the $60,000 paid in earnest money. 
Id., Exh. B. Quasar did not refund the Plaintiffs' earnest money in response to this demand. 
Mr. Krueck, on behalf of Plaintiffs, send several letters to counsel for Quasar demanding 
refund of the earnest money pursuant to the terms of the Agreement. . Krueck Aff. ~ 8, Exh. C; 
~ 9, Exh. D. 
On September 6,2007, Mr. Krueck received a letter from counsel for Quasar, along with 
a proposed promissory note and release agreement, which proposed promissory note provided 
that Quasar would pay Plaintiffs, or Sunrise Development, LLC, $60,000 no later than 
September 17,2007. Krueck Aff. ~ 10, Exh. E. The parties could not reach a resolution 
regarding the terms of the proposed promissory note and release agreement, and no payment was 
ever made by Quasar. Id. 
On September 25, 2007, Defendants filed on behalf of Plaintiffs, a Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial as Sunrise Development, LLC v. Quasar Development, LLC, Ada 
County Case No. CV OC 0717098 (the "Underlying Litigation"). Krueck Aff. ~ 12, Exh. F. In 
the Complaint, Plaintiffs asserted that Quasar was obligated under the terms ofthe Agreement to 
fully refund the earnest money to Reynolds on Ju~y 31, 2007. Id., ~~ 14,15. Plaintiffs also 
asserted that they "had been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial, including but not 
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limited to, the amount of the Earnest Money deposit and other incidental and consequential 
damages ... " Id., ~ 19 (emphasis added). 
On October 25,2007, Quasar filed its Answer in the Underlying Litigation. Krueck Aff., 
Exh. G. 
On December 4,2007, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment. Krueck Aff., ~ 9. 
On that same date, the Affidavit of Kristine Reynolds in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment was filed. Krueck Aff., Exh. H. In that affidavit, Ms. Reynolds confirmed that 
"Sunrise has made numerous written demands to Quasar seeking a refund of the Earnest Money 
pursuant to the express terms ofthe Agreement." Id., ~ 8 (emphasis added). 
Judge Darla Williamson entered an Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment 
on March 11, 2008. In that Order, Judge Williamson granted Plaintiffs motion regarding the 
amount due to be refunded (the $60,000), but denied the motion regarding the timing of the 
payment of the refund finding there was an issue of fact as to whether a reasonable time had 
passed for the refund of the earnest money. Affidavit of Plaintiff Justin S. Reynolds in 
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment ("Reynolds Aff."), Appendix A. 
Plaintiffs incurred substantial attorney fees associated with Quasar's failure to refund the 
earnest money upon their termination of the Agreement on July 31,2007; from that date until the 
litigation was concluded. Krueck Aff., Exh. 1. 
II.
 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
 
Quasar never disputed in the Underlying Litigation that they owed Plaintiffs some refund, 
but they nevertheless refused to pay. 
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However, when Quasar refused to refund Plaintiffs their $60,000 earnest money payment 
upon Plaintiffs terminating the Agreement on July 31, 2007, Reynolds suffered some damage ­
they expected and did not receive the funds, and the statute of limitation on their claim against 
Defendants began to accrue on that date. 1 
In the "Brief of Plaintiffs in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment" 
("Opposition Memo"), Plaintiffs assert that there was no "actionable negligence" against the 
Defendants until Judge Williamson entered the Order on Summary Judgment in the Underlying 
Litigation, which made reference to the Agreement not specifying a specific time in which the 
refund of earnest money was to be made. Opposition Memo, p. 8. 
Plaintiffs assert, referring to Judge Williamson's Order, that "[u]p until that point in time 
there was no actionable negligence and no damages incurred upon the Plaintiffs herein could 
have sued their attorney." Id. This argument is without merit. The negligence Plaintiffs 
complain about allegedly took place when Defendants drafted the Agreement. All Judge 
Williamson found was that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether or not a 
reasonable time had passed from for Quasar to refund the earnest money to Plaintiffs. 2 Judge 
1 In addition, Plaintiffs began to incur substantial attorney fees and costs on or about that dati;~ 
due to Quasar's refusal to refund the earnest money as Defendants commenced with 
continuous communications with counsel for Quasar regarding the Plaintiffs' continued 
demands for the refund. Again, incurring damages in addition to the "refusal to refund" -­
beginning July 31, 2007. 
2 Judge Williamson specifically stated "[n]ext Plaintiff argues that section 15(1) requires the 
refund to occur immediately. That section states "time of the essence: all times provided for 
in this Agreement or in any other instrument or document referred to herein or contemplated 
hereby, for the performance of any act will be strictly construed, it being agreed that time is 
of the essence in this Agreement. Defendant counters that 7(a) does not state a specific time 
for paying the refund, and therefore performance must merely occur in a reasonable time." 
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Williamson's ruling has nothing to do with the inquiry this Court must make on this motion, 
which is when Plaintiffs first suffered some damage - which date has to be the date when Quasar 
refused to pay the earnest money upon demand - or July 31,2007. 
In asserting the argument that "they didn't have a claim" until Judge Williamson's Order, 
Plaintiffs rely on the case of City ofMcCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656 (2009). Plaintiffs assert 
that a Plaintiffs had to have their claim "adjudicated" in the Underlying Litigation to trigger the 
commencement of the statute oflimitations. Plaintiffs' analysis of the findings in Buxton are 
incorrect, and as pointed out in Defendants' Opening Memo, the facts at issue in this case are 
clearly distinguishable. 
Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertions, a party does not have to have their claim adjudicated in 
the underlying case to trigger the statute of limitation for a claim of attorney malpractice, and 
Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, does not support that unqualified proposition. 
Defendants do not dispute, for the purpose of this motion, that in certain cases a 
determination of actual damages will depend upon that outcome of certain litigation, but those 
cases, as recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court, are fact specific. Where the existence of 
"some damage" does not depend on the outcome of a lawsuit (such as the facts in this case), the 
statute oflimitations begins to accrue. See Buxton at 662,201 P.3d at 635. 
Plaintiffs misconstrue the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Buxton. There were two 
distinct rulings in Buxton, wherein the City of McCall sued its attorneys based on allegations of 
negligent advice. Two counts of the City'S complaint were based on allegations of negligent 
advice by the City's attorney pertaining to termination of a contract and the withholding of 
ld., p. 6. Because the case was settled, the issue of what time period constituted a reasonable 
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certain payments to contractors. The Idaho Supreme Court held that until there was an outcome 
of the litigation related to this "advice" on the breach of contract claims, there could not be a 
determination of damage; that is, the City could have prevailed in the litigation and arguably 
suffered no damage. Id., 146 Idaho at 663, 20 I P.3d at 636. The remaining claim of negligence 
in Buxton had to do with the City attorney advising the City to release a lien against 
J-U-B Engineering. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the date on which the City of McCall 
released its lien was the date on which the damage occurred because that was the date on whkh 
the City of McCall lost its opportunity to recover against J-U-B Engineering. [d. at 663, 
201 P.3d at 636. 
Here, Plaintiffs attempt to argue that until Judge Williamson entered the Order holding 
there was an issue of material fact regarding whether or not a reasonable time had passed from 
the date of Plaintiffs' letter to Quasar, that they had no cause of action against the Defendants. 
That is incorrect. This is not a case where a party has to have their claim adjudicated in the 
underlying case to trigger the statute of limitation for a claim of attorney malpractice, because 
Plaintiffs suffered damage when Quasar refused to pay the earnest money upon demand by 
Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs "raise" several other facts in the Opposition Memo regarding Quasar's 
ownership of certain real property and specified time periods and speculative testimony 
regarding Quasar's ability at any given time to satisfy a judgment. These "facts" are subject of 
the motion to strike filed concurrently herewith. Notwithstanding, the facts are completely 
irrelevant to the motion before the Court. The only facts material to Defendants' motion 
time was not resolved. 
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pertaining to the statute of limitation go to the issue of when Plaintiffs suffered some damage to 
commence that statute of limitation. 
Plaintiffs assert, in sum, that if Defendants would have included a date certain in which 
the earnest money must have been refunded in the Agreement, that Plaintiffs would have 
recovered funds from Quasar. Plaintiffs' extend that argument by asserting that ifthere was such 
a date certain in the Agreement, that Plaintiffs would have obtained a judgment at an earlier date 
and would have collected on that judgment before Quasar become insolvent. As a preliminary 
matter (and again, notwithstanding the pending motion to strike) this statement is based on pure 
speculation. Second, this statement is not relevant to the issue of when Plaintiffs suffered some 
damage to commence the accrual of the applicable statute oflimitation. 
This motion does not pertain to whether or not Plaintiffs' believe Defendants were 
negligent in the drafting of the Purchase and Sale Agreement or what Plaintiffs believe 
Defendants "should have" inserted in the Agreement. Moreover, it is not relevant to this motion 
whether Quasar was or was not insolvent at any relevant time; these facts are simply not relevant 
to the issue of when Plaintiffs suffered some damage in determining when the statute of 
limitation commenced.3 
In addition, Plaintiffs' self-serving (and frankly not very credible) assertion that they 
"didn't know" Quasar's refusal to pay might be due to the language contained in the Agreement 
is a red herring. That Plaintiffs were not aware of the "reasoning" behind the non-payment does 
not negate the fact that they were damaged by the non-payment. 
3 Although not pertinent to this motion, a creditor's attorney's liability cannot be measured by 
the solvency of a third-party debtor at any given time. 
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Plaintiffs' statement that they "could not have sued their attorney on that date [referring 
to July 31, 2007] because no one had established that any defect in the Agreement causing 
Quasar not to return the earnest money" is similarly not relevant to this motion.4 Again, 
Quasar's "reasoning" for not paying Plaintiffs is not relevant to the issue of whether Plaintiff s 
suffered ascertainable damage to commence the applicable statute of limitations. When 
Plaintiffs allegedly became "aware" of the issue pertaining to the Agreement regarding timing, 
Plaintiffs could have filed litigation against Defendants within the applicable statute of 
limitations, which commenced on or about July 31, 2007. 
Plaintiffs suffered some damage when Quasar failed or refused to refund their earnest 
money upon demand and the Court should make such a finding as a matter of law. 
III. 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL 
As set forth in Defendants Opening Memo, Plaintiffs asserted in the Underlying 
Litigation that Quasar was obligated under the terms ofthe Agreement to fully refund the earnest 
money Reynolds on July 31, 2007. In this case, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants negligently 
drafted the Agreement and that the Agreement did not require any particular time frame for the 
refund of the earnest money. 
The doctrine of judicial estoppel bars Plaintiffs' claim. The doctrine of judicial estoppel 
prohibits a party from assuming a position in one proceeding and then taking an inconsistent 
4 Judge Williamson did not find there was a "defect" in the Agreement, she only found there was 
an issue of fact regarding the reasonable time for Quasar to refund the earnest money. 
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position in a subsequent proceeding. Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Investment, 
LLC, 147 Idaho 737, 748, 215 P.3d 457, 468 (2009)(citations omitted). 
In the Opposition Memo, Plaintiffs state that "[t]he asserted inconsistent position regards 
the fact that the failure of Quasar to timely file the plat of the development parcel on or before: 
July 2007 is somehow different than the position now taken." Opposition Memo, p. 10. 
Plaintiffs' statement is incorrect; that is not the "position" Defendants assert is inconsistent. 
Defendants do not dispute and there is no issue of material fact that the "triggering event" for 
Quasar to refund Plaintiffs the earnest money payment was failure to file the plat by July 31, 
2007. That fact is not at issue. 
Plaintiffs go onto assert that "[i]t was not until Judge Williamson ruled that the absence 
of a definitive end date for the refund became [the] cause of the delay which then resulted in an 
inability to collect from Quasar." Opposition Memo, p. 10. This line of argument by Plaintiffs 
is non-responsive to the argument asserted by Defendants. 
Finally Plaintiffs summarize the testimony from a Ylonda Hays (which is also subject of 
a motion to strike) which opines on the alleged "sufficiency" of the language in the Agreement at 
issue in this case, speculations regarding property owned by Quasar during the relevant time 
period, and additional speculative opinions that Plaintiffs "could have expected to recover all or 
a substantial portion of their earnest money deposit of $60,000." Opposition Memo, p. 11. This 
information, albeit inadmissible, is completely irrelevant to Defendants judicial estoppel 
argument. 
Again, Plaintiffs took the position in the underlying litigation and relied upon the 
language in the Agreement that "time was of the essence", and that this term in the Agreement 
meant that the refund from Quasar was payable upon demand by Plaintiffs; payment was due 
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immediately. In this case, Plaintiffs are taking an inconsistent position; Plaintiffs assert that 
there was "no time frame" in which the refund was to be paid to Plaintiffs, that the language of 
the Agreement was negligently drafted, and that Plaintiffs did not have the right to a refund from 
Quasar upon demand. Notwithstanding there is no such finding by the Court in the underlying 
case. 
As set forth in the Opening Memo, Plaintiffs intended for the Court in the Underlying 
Litigation to rely on their representations with regard to the "plain meaning" of the terms of the 
Agreement, and Plaintiffs were granted, in part, their motion for summary judgment, which 
resulted in Quasar entering into a stipulated judgment for the full amount of the earnest money, 
as well as Plaintiffs attorney fees and costs. In taking a contrary position in this case, Plaintiffs 
are "deliberately shifting positions to suit the exigencies of a particular situation" - to support a 
claim of alleged malpractice against the Defendants. Such an inconsistent position is barred 
under the doctrine of judicial estoppel. 
Plaintiffs claims in this case are barred under the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel and the 
Court should make such a finding as a matter of law, I / 
.~1~ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS !JZ/ day of February, 2011. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of February, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the 
following: 
Robert C. Huntley ~U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
The HUNTLEY LAW FIRM PLLC Hand Delivered 
815 W. Washington Street ------r- Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 2188 V E-mail 
Boise, ID 83701 __ Telecopy: 208.388.0234 
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Craig L. Meadows, ISB No.1 081 
Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 





Attorneys for Defendants Trout Jones Gledhill 
Fuhrman P.A. and David T. Krueck 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JUSTIN S. REYNOLDS and S. KRISTINE )
 




) MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF 
Plaintiffs, ) ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
vs. ) 
) 
TROUT JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN, ) 
P.A.; and DAVID 1. KRUECK, individually ) 
and in his capacity as a member of the ) 







Defendants Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A. and David Krueck ("Defendants"), by 
and through their counsel of record, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, respectfully submit 
this Motion for their attorney fees and costs incurred in defending this matter. 





















This Motion is brought pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d) and 58, and 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3). 
The basis of this Motion is that Defendants are the prevailing party per this Court's order 
entered from the Bench on February 28, 2011, granting Defendants Motion for Summary 
Judgment holding that Plaintiffs' Complaint was barred under the applicable statute of limitation. 
This Motion is supported by the Affidavit of Michelle R. Points Setting Forth 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees and the Memorandum in Support of Motion for Costs 
and Attorney Fees, both file0 concurrently herewith. 
DATED THIS / !./~ of March, 2011. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 









I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /!ftly(;fMarch, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
copy ofthe foregoing MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS by 
the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Robert C. Huntley .Vu.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
The HUNTLEY LAW FIRM PLLC Hand Delivered 
815 W. Washington Street __ Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 2188 E-mail 
Boise, ID 83701 __ Telecopy: 208.388.0234 














Craig L. Meadows, ISB No.1 081 
Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 





Attorneys for Defendants Trout Jones Gledhill 
Fuhrman P.A. and David T. Krueck 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JUSTIN S. REYNOLDS and S. KRISTINE ) 
REYNOLDS; and SUNRISE ) Case No. CV OC 1004458 
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF MICHELLE R. POINTS 
Plaintiffs, ) SETTING FORTH MEMORANDUM OF 
vs. ) COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
) 
TROUT JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN, ) 
P.A.; and DAVID T. KRUECK, individually ) 
and in his capacity as a member of the ) 




MICHELLE R. POINTS, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. Affiant. I am an attorney with the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley 
LLP, which represents Defendants in this action. I am licensed to practice law in the state of 
Idaho. This affidavit is submitted in support of Defendants' motion for attorney fees and costs, 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHELLE R. POINTS SETTING FORTH 








filed concurrently herewith. It is intended to comply with provisions of Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54, including but not limited to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(5) and 54(e)(5). 
2. Basis of Affidavit. The matters set forth in this affidavit are based upon my 
personal knowledge, the work records of my law firm, and a review of those records made by me 
and other persons with knowledge. The records were made contemporaneously with the events 
set forth in the records, were made in the ordinary course, and were regularly kept by Hawley 
Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, counsel for Defendants. 
3. Fees and Costs Claimed. Accompanying this affidavit is Exhibit A, which 
itemizes the requested attorney's fees and costs, organized in a manner which details the nature 
and amount of attorney's fees and costs sought by Defendants, based upon Defendants having 
successfully defended against all claims asserted by Plaintiffs. I am familiar with the fact of, and 
the necessity for, such attorney's fees and costs having been incurred in this case. Such fees and 
costs were actually, necessarily, and reasonably incurred. To the best of my knowledge and 
belief, the items are correct and the costs claimed are in compliance with Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(d)(5). The attorney's fees claimed are for work actually performed in this action 
and represent time which relates to claims asserted by Plaintiffs in this litigation against whom 
Defendants seek recovery of fees and costs. The costs are claimed in compliance with Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l). Defendants are entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code 
§ 12-120(3) as Defendants are the prevailing party in this case, the underlying case of which was 
a commercial transaction. 
4. Parties Against Whom Defendants Claim Fees and Costs. Defendants Trout 
Jones Gledhill Fuhrman P.A. and David T. Krueck seek recovery of fees and costs from 
Plaintiffs Justin S. Reynolds, S. Kristine Reynolds and Sunrise Development, LLC. 
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5. Basis for Claim Against Plaintiffs. The basis for Defendants' claim arises from 
this Court's order entered from the Bench on February 28, 2011, granting Defendants motion for 
summary judgment holding that Plaintiffs' Complaint was barred under the applicable statute of 
limitation. 
6. Factors Supporting the Reasonableness of Defendants' Claim for Attorney Fee:s. 
Factors that the Court should consider in determining the reasonableness of Defendants' claim 
for attorney fees are set forth in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3). Those factors are 
individually discussed in the following paragraphs of this affidavit. 
7. The Time and Labor Required. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3)(A) 
provides that the Court shall consider the time and labor required. There were several 
characteristics about this case which required substantial time and labor in order to fully and 
fairly pursue and obtain Defendants' complete defense in this case. In addition, thorough 
evaluation of client documents, court filings, as well as applicable law was required. 
8. The Novelty and Difficulty of the Questions. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(e)(3)(B) provides that the Court shall consider the novelty and difficulty of the questions. As 
discussed in the previous paragraph, it was necessary to review several documents and research 
applicable law to evaluate the case and craft a successful Motion for Summary Judgment. 
9. The Skill, Experience and Ability of the Attorney. Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(e)(3)(C) provides that the Court shall consider the skill requisite to perform the 
legal service properly and the experience and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law. 
The lawyers primarily involved in this case are: Craig Meadows, ISB No. 1081, Partner, and 
myself, Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224, Partner. Mr. Meadows and I have the requisite skill 
and experience to properly and efficiently handle this case. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHELLE R. POINTS SETTING FORTH 
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10. The Prevailing Charges. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3)(D) provides that 
the Court shall consider the prevailing charges for like work. Throughout the course of this 
litigation, I believe that the charges billed for lawyers and litigation assistance staff have been at 
the prevailing charges for like work. 
11. Mandatory Costs. Mandatory costs, as outlined in Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(d)(1 )(C) are as follows: 
I.R.C.P 54(d)(1 )(C)(1) court filing fees:	 $58.00 
12. Discretionary Costs. Discretionary costs, as outlined in Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(d)(1)(D) are as follows: 
Photocopies (at 18¢/pg):	 $93.78 
Total $151.78 
13. Factors Supporting the Reasonableness of Defendant's Claim for Costs. 
Defendants are claiming costs as a matter of right pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(d)(l)(C), and discretionary costs pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1)(D). The 
date set forth to each cost, on the exhibit attached hereto, is the date the cost was posted to the 
accounting records of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, and not necessarily the date the 
cost was incurred. 
SUMMARY OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES REQUESTED: 
Attorney fees $6,072.50 
Mandatory costs (I.R.C.P 54(d)(1)(C) $58.00 
Discretionary costs (I.R.C.P 54(d)(1)(D) $93.78 
Total $6,224.28 
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Further your affiant sayeth nau·ght. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this Jtf'fUday of March, 2011. 
Name:--"L==¥~~

Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Br..2Ii5~, /D ;837o¢ 
My commission expires' -Jurl.£ lit c2D/5­
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thisL daY~fMarch,2011, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF MICHELLE R. POINTS SETTING FORTH 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to each of the following: 
Robert C. Huntley /'U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
The HUNTLEY LAW FIRM PLLC Hand Delivered 
815 W. Washington Street __ Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 2188 E-mail 
Boise, ID 83701 __ Telecopy: 208.388.0234 
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Receipt and review of file 
materials from 
ALPS; conference with M. 















Conference with C. Meadows re 
various issues 










E-mail from S. Smith; e-mail to 
S. Smith; 
conference with M. Points on 
issue of 











Begin review of client 
documents; conference 
with C. Meadows re statute of 
limitations and 
other related defenses; pull 
previous 
research on "some damage" 
rule as applied to 











Call with client re meeting next 
week. 04188-0082 1'543053 
11/8/2010 
12/7/2010 






Prepare for and attend meeting 
with client; 
conference with C. Meadows re 
proceeding with 
dispositive motion; draft letter 
to 
Plaintiffs' counsel responsive to 
offer of 












Draft e-mail to S. Smith re 
summary of 
meeting with client and options 
for 
proceeding with defense of 
litigation; revise 










Revise and edit answer and 
letter to B. 
Huntley and e-mail to client and 
S. Smith for 
04188·0082 1544726 
review; finalize for filing and 
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Recap of Time Detail Page 2 of 5 
faxing. 
Begin draft of motion, 
11/21/2010 MPOI Michelle Points 1.30 195.00 memorandum and 04188-0082 1546982 
affidavit of D. Krueck in support 
12/7/2010 Invoice;239126 1.30 195.00 of 
Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
Review client file and pleadings 
11/23/2010 MPOI Michelle Points 1.50 225.00 from 04188-0082 1547479 
underlying case; review order 
12/7/2010 Invoice;239126 1.50 22S.00 from Court re 
trial setting and related 
matters. 
Continue to draft pleadings in 
11/28/2010 MPOI Michelle Points 1.90 285.00 support of 04188-0082 1548876 
motion for summary judgment 
12/7/2010 Invoice;239126 1.90 285.00 and designate 
exhibits to client's affidavit. 
E-mail client re invoice 
11/29/2010 MPOI Michelle Points 0.50 75.00 documents and 04188-0082 1548891 
correspondence from M. Spink; 
12/7/2010 Invoice; 239126 0.50 75.00 continue to 
draft affidavit of client in 
support of 
motion for summary judgment. 
Designate and copy exhibits for 
12/6/2010 MPOI Michelle Points 1.40 210.00 client 04188-0082 15;52248 
affidavit; continue to draft 
1/5/2011 Involce= 240264 1.40 210.00 affidavit and 
portions of memorandum in 
support of motion 
for summary judgment. 
Continue to draft and edit 
12/7/2010 MPOI Michelle Points 1.30 195.00 memorandum in 04188-0082 1552258 
support of motion for summary 
1/5/2011 Invoice=240264 1.30 195.00 judgment and 
affidavit of client in support of 
the same; 
update research on issue of 
judicial estoppel. 
Continue to draft and edit 
12/8/2010 MPOI Michelle Points 1.50 225.00 memorandum and 04188-0082 1"52791 
affidavit in support of motion for 
1/5/2011 Invoice=240264 1.50 225.00 summary 
judgment; review additional 
case law re 
statute of limitation issue, 
Continue to draft and edit 
12/9/2010 MPOI Michelle Points 1.90 285.00 memorandum in 04188-0082 1552797 
support of motion for summary 
1/5/2011 Involce;240264 1.90 285.00 judgment and 
affidavit from client; brief 
conference with 
C. Meadows re review of the 
same. 
Review and reVise draft 
12/10/2010 ClM Craig L. Meadows 0.80 140.00 memorandum for 04188-0082 1552826 
summary judgment; conference 
1/5/2011 InvolCe= 240264 0.80 140.00 With M. Points. 
Brief conference with C. 
12/10/2010 MPOI Michelle Points 1.20 180.00 Meadows re summary 04188-0082 1553216 
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Recap of Time Detail Page 3 of5 
1/5/2011 Invoice=240264 1.20 180.00 
judgment brief; revise and edit 
the same; 











Confirm and mark exhibits to 
client's 
affidavit; brief review of client's 
invoices 
to Plaintiff for content; prepare 
all 
04188-0082 1553458 
pleadings for filing. 
12/14/2010 
1/5/2011 






Review Judge's trial setting 
order for 
instructions on filing of motions 
and copies 
to be delivered to chambers and 
final review 
04188-0082 1553959 
and execution of all pleadings in 
support of 
motion for summary judgment 
for filing today. 
12/17/2010 
1/5/2011 






Call and exchange e-mails with 
court clerk re 
hearing on motion for summary 
judgment; draft 












Exchange e-mails with court 
clerk and counsel 
for Plaintiffs re new hearing 
date on motion 
for summary jUdgment; draft 











E-mail client and 5. Smith re 
amended hearing 











oraft proposed stlpu lation for 
scheduling and 
planning and fax to counsel for 
Plaintiffs re 










Call from counsel for Plaintiffs re 
edits to 











Revise and edit stipulation for 
scheduling 
and planning for filing today and 
fax counsel 










Follow up with T, Hummel re 
confirmation of 
vacated scheduling conference; 
call from 
Plaintiffs' counsel re the same, 
04188-0082 1565049 
Brief review of opposition to 
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Recap of Time Detail Page 4 of5 
2/16/2011 MPOI Michelle Points 0.30 45.00 motion for 04188-0082 15'71560 
summary judgment; draft e­
3/4/2011 Invoice=242335 0.30 45.00 mail to client re 
the same. 
Draft and edit reply 
2/17/2011 MPOI Michelle Points 4.70 705.00 memorandum on motion for 04188-0082 1571851 
summary judgment; conference 
3/4/2011 Invoice=242335 4.70 705.00 with C. Meadows re 
the same. 
Continue to draft reply on 
2/18/2011 MPOI Michelle Points 1.60 240.00 motion for summary 04188-0082 1572279 
judgment and motion and 
3/4/2011 Invoice=242335 1.60 240.00 memorandum in support 
of motion to strike portions of 
affidavits 
filed in opposition of motion for 
summary 
judgment and e-mail to client 
for review and 
comment. 
Continue to draft and edit 
2/21/2011 MPOI Michelle Poi nts 0.90 135.00 pleadings re reply 04188-0082 1572285 
on motion for summary 
3/4/2011 Invoice=242335 1.40 210.00 judgment, motion to 
strike and motion for order 
shortening time. 
Review pleading filed by Plaintiff 
2/24/2011 MPOI Michelle Points 0.70 105.00 re 04188-0082 1573326 
non-objection to motion for 
3/4/2011 Invoice oo 242335 0.70 105.00 order shortening 
time and response to motion to 
strike; prepare 
materials to review in 
preparation for hearing 
on motion for summary 
judgment. 
Begin preparation for hearing on 
2/27/2011 MPOI Michelle POints 0.80 120.00 motion for 04188-0082 194866 
3/4/2011 Invoice= 24233 5 1.00 150.00 summary judgment tomorrow. 
Continue to review relevant 
2/28/2011 MPOI Michelle Points 2.60 390.00 case law and 04188-0082 1~;75688 
briefing in preparation for 
3/4/2011 Invoice= 24 2335 2.60 390.00 hearing on motion 
for summary judgment and 
present argument at 
motion hearing; call to client 
and draft e-mail 
to S. Smith re ruling from the 
bench; brief 
conference with C. Meadows re 
potential appeal 
issues. 
Exchange e-malls with counsel 
3/1/2011 MPOI Michelle Points 0.70 105.00 for Plaintiffs 04188-0082 1~;76140 
re drafting of judgment; call 
from court 
clerk re clarifications on 
transcript; begin 
draft of order and jUdgment. 
Draft order and judgment based 
3/2/2011 MPOI Michelle Points 0.90 135.00 on court's 04188-0082 1~;76364 
ruling on motion for summary 
jUdgment; 
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3/3/2011 MPOI Michelle Points 0.50 75.00 
3/7/2011 MPOI Michelle Points 0.30 45.00 
3/8/2011 MPOI Michelle Points 1.20 180.00 
UNBILLED TOTALS: 
WORK: 3.60 540.00 
UNBILLED TOTALS: 
BILL: 3.60 540.00 
BILLED TOTALS: 
WORK: 35.70 5,427.50 
BILLED TOTALS: 
BILL: 36.40 5,532,50 
GRAND TOTALS: 
WORK: 39.30 5,967.50 
GRAND TOTALS: 
BILL: 40.00 6,072.50 
exchange emails with counsel 
for Plaintiffs 
re the same and arrange for 
filing with court 
today. 
Obtain information of fees and 
costs incurred 
thus far; draft e-mail to client 
and S. Smith 
re potential motion for fees and 
costs. 
Exchange e-mails with S. Smith 
and client re 
motion for attorney fees; 
outline motion, 
memo and affidavit. 
Draft motion, memorandum and 
affidavit in 
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Name / Invoice 
Date Timekeeper Number Code Rate 
11/11/2010 MPOI Michelle Points 74C 58.00 
12/7/2010	 58.00 
Voucher= 19122 2 Paid 
11/12/2010 HTEH Hawley Troxell 01C 0.18 
12/7/2010 Invoice=239126 0.18 
12/6/2010 HTEH Hawley Troxell 01C 0.18 
1/5/2011 Invoice= 2402 64 0.18 
12/13/2010 HTEH Hawley Troxell 01C 0.18 
1/5/2011 Invoice= 240264 0,18 
12/14/2010 HTEH Hawley Troxell 01C 0.18 
1/5/2011 Invoice=240264 0.18 
12/14/2010 HTEH Hawley Troxell 01C 0.18 
1/5/2011 Involce=240264 0.18 
12/17/2010 HTEH Hawley Troxell 01C 0.18 
1/5/2011 Invoice= 240264 0.18 
1/10/2011 HTEH Hawley Troxell Ole 0.18 
2/4/2011 Invoice=241193 0.18 
1/21/2011 HTEH Hawley Troxell 01C 0.18 
2/4/2011 Invoice=241193 0.18 
1/24/2011 HTEH Hawley Troxell Ole 0.18 
2/4/2011 Invoice=241193 0.18 
2/1/2011 HTEH Hawley Troxell 01C 0.18 
3/4/2011 Invoice= 242335 0.18 
2/22/2011 HTEH Hawley Troxell 01C 0.18 
3/4/2011 Invoice=242335 0.18 
3/2/2011 HTEH Hawley Troxell 01C 0.18 
UNBILLED TOTALS: 
Page 1 of2 
_SummaryJ _submitJ 
11/1/2010 III to 3/11/2011 
III to 
Quantity Amount	 Description 
Court Fees - ADA COUNTY CLERK 
1.00	 58.00 Filing fee for 
initial Appearance / Answer to 
1.00	 58.00 Complaint 
Vendor=ADA COUNTY CLERK 
Balance= .00 Amount= 58.00 
Check #123319 11/11/2010 
Copying USER=493 UNIT=5 
15.00 2.70	 TIME=13:45 PAGES=15 
15.00 2.70	 CLlENT NAME: 
Copying USER= 111 UNIT= 13 
32.00 5,76	 TIME=16:00 PAGES=32 
32.00 5.76	 CLIENT NAME: 
Copying USER=493 UNIT=20 
41.00 7.38	 TIME= 14: 52 PAGES=41 
41.00 7.38	 CLlENT NAME: 
CopYing USER=493 UNIT=5 
190.00 34.20 TIME=14:54 PAGES=190 
190.00 34.20 CUENT NAME: 
Copying USER=493 UNIT=5 
95.00 17.10	 TIME=15:34 PAGES=95 
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Craig L. Meadows, ISB No. 1081 
Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HA WLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 





Attorneys for Defendants Trout Jones Gledhill 
Fuhrman P.A. and David T. Krueck 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JUSTIN S. REYNOLDS and S. KRISTINE ) 
REYNOLDS; and SUNRISE ) Case No. CV OC 1004458 
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, ) 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 




TROUT JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN, ) 
P.A.; and DAVID 1. KRUECK, individually ) 
and in his capacity as a member of the ) 




Defendants Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman P.A. and David T. Krueck ("Defendants")., by 
and through their attorneys of record, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, submit this 
Memorandum in support of their Motion for an Award of Attorney Fees and Costs in connection 
with their successful defense of this action. 















This is a legal malpractice action. Defendants were retained to perform professional legal 
services as their attorney in the underlying case. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants 
negligently drafted a certain Real Estate Purchase Agreement which allegedly caused them to 
lose earnest money in the amount of $60,000; which amount Plaintiffs paid to the sellers in the 
subject transaction. The sellers did not meet their obligations under the referenced agreemenl 
and litigation ensued; Ada County Case No. CV OC 0717098, which was ultimately settled. 
This Court's order entered from the Bench on February 28, 2011, granted Defendants" 
Motion for Summary Judgment holding that Plaintiffs' Complaint was barred under the 
applicable statute of limitation. For the purpose of an attorney fee and cost determination, 
Defendants are the prevailing party. 
Defendants, through this Motion, request an award of attorney fees and costs incurred in 
defending against Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54 as the prevailing party, and 
I.C. § 12-120(3), as the prevailing party in a commercial transaction. 
B. Attorney Fees Must Be Awarded Under I.e. § 12-120(3). 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) provides a basis for an attorney fee award in this case. That 
statutory provision mandates a fee award in cases based on a "commercial transaction." Before 
the Idaho Supreme Court's recent decision in Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 
723, 152 P.3d 592 (2007), however, section 12-120(3) had been interpreted not to apply in 
"commercial transaction" cases in which the theory of recovery was a tort theory. In Blimka, the 
court overruled all prior decisions prohibiting fee awards in such cases. Id. One decision plainly 
overruled by Blimka, is Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415, 425, 807 P.2d 633, 643 (1991). There, 
the court refused to award fees under section 12-120(3) in a legal malpractice case simply 







because such a case is a tort case, "even though the underlying transaction which resulted in the 
malpractice was a 'commercial transaction. '" Id. There is no doubt that the Defendants' 
attorney-client relationship with Plaintiffs was a "commercial transaction." Accordingly, on its 
face, section 12-120(3) applies, and it mandates an award of attorney fees. 
In a recent attorney malpractice case, District Judge McLaughlin held that given the 
Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Blimka, supra, an attorney fee award was appropriate under 
I.C. § 12-120(3). Judge McLaughlin's Decision (City ofMcCall v. Buxton, et al.) is attached 
hereto as Exhibit A for the Court's review. Judge McLaughlin specifically held that a contract 
for attorney services was a commercial transaction, and, "the fact that the contract was for 
attorney services, not any other service, does not change the nature of the transaction into one for 
either personal services or household services." Exhibit A, p. 5. 
More recently, District Judge Copsey also held that attorney fees are awardable under 
I.C. § 12-120(3) to a prevailing party in an attorney malpractice case because the underlying 
action is based on an attorney-client relationship, a contract to perform professional services. A 
true and correct copy of Judge Copsey's decision (Cady v. Jones, et at.) is attached hereto as 
Exhibit B. 
Given the clear applicability of I.C. § 12-120(3) to the facts of this case, and because 
Defendants are the prevailing party, attorney fees should be awarded to Defendants incurred in 
defending this action. 







RESPECTFULLY SUBMITIED Tlns/~of March, 2011. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this I ~March, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Robert C. Huntley l/' U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
The HUNTLEY LAW FIRM PLLC Hand Delivered 
815 W. Washington Street __ Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 2188 E-mail 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF T·3 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA4 
5 






THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION .
 
FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY
 
vs.9 
10 SUSAN E. BUXTON, MOORE, SMITH, FEES AND PLAINTIFPS' . 
BUXTON & TRUKE, CHARTERED, a MOTION TO DISALLOW 
11 professional service corporation, WILLIAM ATTORNEY FEES 
A. MCCURDY and BRASSEY, . 
12. WETHERELL, CRAWFORD & GARRETT, 
13 a limited liability partnership, 
14 11 --=:....:;;.;..;;,.;...;,.;;;=.;.;;..;;.;...... Defendants. 01.- ----- ­
15 APPEARANCES 
16 For Plaintiff: Allen B. Ellis of Ellis, Brown &Shells, Chartered and Jeffrey A.
 
Strother of Strother Law Offlce for City of McCall
 
17 . . 
For Defendants: Craig L Meadows and Jason D. Scott of Hawley Troxell Ennis18 
& Hawley LLP for Susan E. Buxton an.d Moore, Smith, Buxton & Turcke, . 
. Chartered19 
20 Matthew L Walters of Elam & Burke, P.A. for William A. McCurdy and Brassey, 




This matter came before the Court on September 18, 2007 upon the Plalntiff!iI 
24 


































 The claims of malpractice allegedly occurred while the Defendants were representing 
4 the City of McCall during a course of events leading up to and throughout the Iitfgatlon 
5 invoMng Employers Insurance of Wausau and the construction of a wastewater storage 
8 lagoon. As a result of this alleged malpractice, the Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit on 
7 May 3, 2006, filing a Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. On June 15, 2006, the 
8 
Plaintiff filed their Rrst Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial.' On November 
9 
13, 2006, Defendants WIlliam A. McCUrdy and Brassey, Wetherell, Crawford & Garrett, 
10 
flied· their Answer to Rrst Amend~'Compl~nt and Demand for Jury Trial. And ,on 
11 
November 14,2006, Defendants Susan E. Buxton 'and Moore, Smith, Buxton & Turcke,
12 
13 Chartered filed their Answer to Rrst Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury trial. 
, 14 Subsequently, on January 17, 2007, the Court entered an Order Denying 
15 Plaintiffs Motion to Hold Matter in Abeyance Pending Completion of Ninth Circuit . 
18 Appeal and Motion for Protective Order. The Defendants separately filed motions for 
17 summary Judgment, which the Court granted on June 22, 2007. The Defendants 
18 
William A. McCurdy and Brassey, Wetherell, Crawford & Garrett flied the present 
19
 
Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees on July 23, 2007. Also on July 23,' 2007, the
 
20. . 
Defendants Susan E. Buxton and Moore, Smith, Buxton & Turcke filed a Memorandum 
21
 
of Costs and Attorney Fees, which was followed by a Supplemental Memorandum
 
22 
23 asking for an additional $2,819.00. The Plaintiff filed the present Motion to Disallow 
24 Attomey Fees on August 3, 2007. The Plaintiff also requested that the· Court 
25 reconsider the original decision granting summary JUdgment and the Court. issued al· 
28 
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Memorandum Decision denying the Motion for Reconsideration. 
LEGAL STANDARDS 
The Plaintiff claims that the Defendants are not entitled to the attorney fees 
they have requested under the followfng statutory provisions: 
I. Attorney fees for cMI acdon to recover In commercial transaction 
A trial court may provide for attorney fees to the prevaiRng party when there Isa
 
nexus between the lawsuit and a commercial transaction, under Idaho Code § 1~~-
120(3). Continental Cas. Co. v. Brady, 127 Idaho 830, 835, 907 P.2d 807, 812
 




. . " 
-personator hous$hc:>kt purposes. Idaho Code §12-120(3). .' ",.- . 
II.' , AttOl'l18Y fees, for, claim defended frivolously, 'unreasanabiy 'or 
withoUt foundation 
Under Idaho Code § 1~-121, a trial court may award attorney' fees to a 
; , 
prevailing' party where it finds that the case was "brought, pursued or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.- Bums v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480,
 
486, 65 P.3d 502, 508 (2003). However, if any alternative legal basis can be found to
 
support the opposing party's claims, attorney fees are unwarranted under this rule. 
Han'v. Syringa Realty, Inc., 120 Idaho 364, 370, 816 P.2d 320, 326 (1991). This
 
detennination rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, but any such award -must
 
be supported by findings and those findings, in tum, must be supported by the
 
record.,- Sunshine Mining Co. v. Metropolitan Mines Corp., 111 Idaho 654, 659, 726
 
P.2d 766, 771 (1986).
 






















































































III.	 Attorney fees for party adverse to a state agency that did not act 
with a reasonable basis In fact or law 
Idaho Code § 12·117 provides that if a state agency against whom the 
judgment is rendered acted 'Without a reasonable basis in fact or law,- the prevailing 
party shall be awarded attorney fees. Idaho Code § 12-117(1). 
DISCUSSION 
The fact that the Plaintiffs lawsuit Is one In tort, rather than contract, does not 
mean that the lawsuit Is not a -commercial transaction- under Idaho Code § 12-120(3). 
Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 728-729, 152 P.3d 594, 599-600
 
(2007). Prior to Blimka, the Idaho Supreme Court did not award attorney fees for 
' .• i
 
professional malpractice cases because the theory of recovery was In. tort.. 8ee fuller 
. • . '. '.	 ! 
.	 .~. 
V. WOIteIS, 119 Idaho.415, 424-425, 807 P.2d 633, 642-643 (1991). SInce FLiller and
 
the cases that followed no longer bar recovery after Blimka, the only Issue'Is whether a
 
contract to provide attorney services Is a -commercial transactlon.­
The Idaho Supreme Court has, In dicta, addressed this Issue. In Fuller, the
 
Court held that -an action for legal malpractice Is a tort action, and even though the
 
undertyfng transaction which resulted In the malpractice was a 'commercial transactforl,'
 
attorney fees under 12-120(3) are not authorized.-· Id. at 425, 807 P.2d at 643. this
 
statement by the Court Indicates that, had the Court been able to award attorney fees
 
under the staMe for a tort claim, the Court would have because the lJnde~ng
 
transaction - a contract for attorney services - was a commercial one. The Court has 
artlculated this same reasoning in other cases that follow Fuller. See e.g. Brooks ~'. 
24
 




The Defendants are the prevailing parties in this action, which is not an issuel 
26
 


















   
   





















· ' . 
'that Plaintiff argues otherwise. The record demonstrates that this transaction is a 
2 contract for attorney services and therefore was a commercial transaction. The fact 
3 that the contract was for legal services, rather than another type of services, does not 
4 change the nature of the transaction Into one for either personal services or household 
5 services. Since the two requirements set forth in section 12-120(3) have been fulfilled, 
8 the Court is compelled to award reasonable attorney fees under that statute. 
7 The Defendants have also argued that they are entitled to attorney fees under 
8 
Idaho Code §§ 12-121 and 12-117. While the Court does not necessarily believe that 
9 
this lawsuit w~ without foundation or without a reasonable basis In fact or law, the 
10 
Court need 'not continue analysis under either sections 12-121 or 12-117 since attomey 
11 
fees are'botha.,prWrlateand required ~nder ~o~ 1:2~120(3).
12' ' , 
13 The record does not retiect'any objection to the amount of attorney fees or costs 
14 claimed by any of the Defendants. The Defendants William A. McCurdy and Brassey, 
15 Wetherell, Crawford & Garrett have asked for $58.00 In costs as a matter of I1ght and 
18 $30,285.00 as reasonable attorney fees. The Defendants Susan E. Buxton and Moore, 
17 Smith, Buxton &' Turcke have asked for $58.00 in costs as a matter of right and 
18 $26,731.00 as reasonable attorney fees. Based upon the sworn affidavits 1:>1I 
19 
Defendanfs counsel the Court finds that the attorney fees incurred by the Defendants 
20 
were reasonable considering the time and labor involved in this litigation. The Court will 
21 
award the Defendants these costs and reasonable attorney fees, as requested. 
22 
CONCLUSION23 
The Court will DENY the Plaintiffs Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees and will 24 
25 award the Defendants William A. McCurdy and Brassey, Wetherell, Crawford & Garrett 
28 
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costs as a matter of right in the amount of $58.00 and reasonable attorney fees in the
 
amount of $30,285.00. The Court will also award the Defendants Susan E. Buxton and 
Moore, Smith, Buxton & Turcke costs as a matter of right in the amount of $58.00 and·" 
reasonable' attomey fees in the amount of $26,731.00. Counsel for the Defendant 
Wilnam McCurdy will prepare a judgment with an 'RCP 54 (b) certification that compclrts 
with the Court's decision. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 2..t..day of September' 2007. 
-
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. I hereby certify that on the .Lday of~er2007, I mailed (served) a 
Allen B. Ellis 













Craig Meadows . 
Hawley Troxell Ennis &Hawfey 




James O. LaRu~ 





J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 





































































THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC 
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 
STEVEN P. CADY. et al.• 
Plaintiffs. Case No. CV OC-2007-13830 
vs. 
RORY R. JONES. JONES. 
FURHMAN &. EIDEN. P.A. 
HESS. 
ORDER GRANTING COSTS AND 
ATIORNEY FEES 
Defendants. 
On July 10. 2008. the Court entered final judgment dismissing the Plaintiffs' case with 
prejudice having granted summary judgment to Rory R. Jones. Jones. Hess. Fwhman &. Eiden, 
P.A. that same day. On July 17.2008. Rory R. Jones. Jones. Hess. Furhman &. Eiden, P.A. timely 
filed their Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs as the prevailing party asking the Court to award 
attorney fees Wlder I.C. § 12-120(3). The Plaintiffs never replied or opposed. The Court heard 
argument on August 21. 2008. The Plaintiffs did not appear. 
I.R.C.P. S4(e)(6) states that "[alny objection to the allowance of attorney fees. or to the: 
amount lhereof. shall be made in the same manner as an objection to costs as provided by Rule: 
54(d)(6)." I.R.c.P. 54(d)(6) provides that "[alny party may object to the claimed costs of anothClr 
party set forth in a memorandum of costs by filing and serving on adverse parties a motion to 
disallow part or aU of such costs within ten days of service of the memorandum of costs.... 
Failure to timely object to the items in the memorandum of costs shall constitute a waiver of all 
objections to the costs claimed." 
By failing to respond at all or to appear at the oral argument. the Plaintiffs thereby waived 
their right to further contest the amoWlt of the award of attorney fees. I.R.C.P. 54(eX6) and 
54(dX6); I.C. § 12-120(3); Conner v. Dalce. 103 Idaho 761, 653 P.2d 1173. (1982). The Court 
30 
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notes that both the Defendants and the Plaintiffs clearly requested costs and attorney fees in their 
respective pleadings and that the Defendants requested attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3). 
Based on the following, in an exercise of discretion, the Court awards $216.75 in non­
discretionary costs l and grants an award for attorney fees in the amount of$19,144.50. The Court 
denies any award for discretionary costs because the Court does not fmd these costs 
extraordinary.2 
ANALYSIS 
In Idaho, parties pay their own attorney's fees unless a statute or contract provides 
otherwise. Rohr v. Rohr, 128 Idaho 137, 911 P.2d 133 (1996); Owner-Operator Independent 
Drivers v. Idaho Public Utilities Com 'n, 125 Idaho 401,871 P.2d 818 (1994); Maner ofEstate of 
Keeven, 126 Idaho 290, 882 P.2d 457 (Ct. App. 1994) (also called the "American Rule"). Thc~ 
party who claims attorney fees must present the Court either a statute or contract between the: 
parties permitting such an award; if the party does not point the Court to a statute or contract, 
attorney fees may be denied. Fournier v. Fournier, 125 Idaho 789, 74 P.2d 600 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Rory R. Jones, Jones, Hess, Furhman & Eiden, P.A. moved for attorney's fees and cost'! 
pursuant to I.C. §12-120(3), I.R.C.P. 54(dXI)(B) and 54(eXI). They cite to no other statutory 
authority in support of the requested fees. They further contend they are the prevailing parties and 
that the gravamen of the case was a commercial transaction making attorney's fees proper under 
I.C. §12-120(3). 
I While the Defendanrs request an expert witness fee of S9,)20.~) u a cost punuant to I.R.C.P. 54(dXIXc), only 
expert witnesl fees may be awarded u a matter of risht where the wilnCSS either testified at triaJ or in a deposition mil 
the amount Is limited to S2,000.00. l.R.C.P.. 54(dXIXC)(8) reeds u follows: "Rcuonable expert witness fees foil' 
on expert who IUliflu Q/ a dep08il/on Of' Q/ a /rIal ofan aclio" not to exceed the sum of S2,000 for each expert 
witness for aU appearances." (Emphasis added.) Since there Is no evidence that Dennis Reinstein either testified lit 
trial or in a deposition, the Defendants wmot aet these cOStl u a m.tter of right. If the Defendants provide evidence 
that Reinstein testified. the Court will reconsider. 
2 Rule S4(d)(I)(D) governs discretionary costs and provides In relevant part u follows: 
Additional items of cost not enumerated in, or In an amount In excess of that listed In subparqraph 
(C) r'Costs as a Matter of Right"], !DIX be allowed upon • showing that said costs were necessll[)' 
and ex_jon'l costs reasonably jncyrred, IDd should In the interest of justice be assessed against 
the adverse party. The trial court, in ruling upon objections to such discretionary costs contained in 
the memorandum ofcostl, shall make express findings u to why such spec;ific item of discretionary 
cost should or should not be allowed. 
The Court recognizes this issue u one of discretion. Although the costs may be reasonable and necessary, the Court 
cannot find that these are "exceptional" costs as contemplated by the Rule. 
ORDER GRANTING COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
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The Plaintiffs did not oppose. However, the fact that the Plaintiffs failed to timely object 
does not absolve the Court of its responsibility to independently review the legal basis for the 
attorney fee award or the amount of the award; whether a statute authorizes an award of fees is a
 
question of law. See Security Pacific Bank of Idaho. F.S.B. v. Curtis, 123 Idaho 320, 847 P.2d
 
1181, 1189 (Ct. App. 1993); Devine v. Cluff, 110 Idaho I, 713 P.2d 437 (Ct. App.1986); Fearless
 
Farris Wholesale, Inc. v. Howe//, 105 Idaho 699, 704,672 P.2d 577, 582 (Ct. App. 1983).3
 
A.	 THE DEFENDANTS ARE THE PREVAILING PARTIES. 
The Court finds Defendants are the prevailing parties. The determination as to which 
party, if any, prevailed is within the Court's discretion. Holmes, 125 Idaho at 787, 874 P.2d at
 
598 (Ct App. 1994) (citing Badell v. Bade//, 122 Idaho 442, 450. 835 P.2d 677. 685 (Ct..
 
App.I992». In determining whether there is a prevailing party. the Court first looks to the Idaho
 
Rules ofCivil Procedure. Rule 54(eX I) incorporates Rule 54(dXIXB) which provides in part: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, 
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of 
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties, whether there 
were multiple claims. multiple issues, counterclaims, third party claims. cross­
claims. or other multiple or cross issues between the parties. and the extent to 
which each party prevailed upon each ofsuch issue or claims. 
See also Jerry J. Joseph C.L. U Ins. Associates v. Vaught. 117 Idaho 555. 789 P.2d 1146 (Ct. 
App.199O). 
The Plaintiffs prevailed on no issue, and the Court finds in an exercise of its discretion 
that Rory R. Jones, Jones. Hess, Furhman & Eiden, P.A. are the prevailing parties in this matter. 
3 In Fearless Farris. the court wrote as (ollows: 
Failure to timely object to a memorandwn o(costs and attorney fees constitutes a waiver ofthe right
 
to contest the requesting party's entitlement to the fees sought. Co"ner v. Drake, 103 Idaho 761,
 
653 P.2d 1173 (1982). 77.,s doG "01 "'"" tile trlIII c"." "'Dlfllllkally IffIUI tlWlllfl tile /IIU
 
am".'" Jp«lfkd III III. memortUtdll"" See OpuQt;", Eng;Mers Local U"io" J 70 v. Goodwi"
 
Construclion Co. 0/Blaclr/ool. 104 Idaho 83, 656 P.2d 144 (Ct. App.1982). But it does mean that
 
the party who fails to object has waived its right to contest any award within the amount sought.
 
Therefore, we hold that, having failed to object to Fearless Farris' memorandum in support of an
 
award of attorney (ees, the Howells cannot now be heard to complain either concerning the fonn of
 
the request or that the court erred in failing to make a written finding as to the buis and reasons for
 
awarding such (ees to Fearless Farris.
 
(Emphasis added.) 
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The Court therefore finds they are entitled to a reasonable award of attorney's fees provided a 
statute applies to its request. 
B.	 THE DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES UNDER I.e. §11­
120(3). 
I.C. § 12-120(3) provides that the prevailing party in an action based upon "any
 
commercial transaction" is entitled to recover attorney fees. The statute defines "commercial
 
transaction" as "all transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes." The test
 
for the application of this section is "whether the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen,
 
of the lawsuit, that is, whether the commercial transaction is integral to the claim and constitutes
 
the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover'" Spence v. Howell. 126 Idaho 763, 776"
 
890 P.2d 714, 717 (1995). The term "commercial transaction" is defined in I.C. §12-120(3) to
 
mean "all transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes." Thus, by the:
 
plain tenDs of the statute, "[w]here a party alleges the existence of a contractual relationship of I:L
 
type embraced by section 12-120(3), ... that claim triggers the application of the statute.·'
 
Continental Casualty, 127 Idaho 835, 907 P.2d 812. However, there must also be a nexwi
 
between the commercial transaction and the lawsuit:
 
[T]he award of attorney's fees [under § 12-120(3) ] is not warranted every time a 
commercial transaction is remotely connected with the case. Rather, the test is 
whether the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit. 
Attorney's fees are not appropriate under I.C. § 12.120(3) unless the commercial 
transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the party 
is attempting to recover. 
Id. (quoting Brower v. E.l DuPont De Nemours and Co., 117 Idaho 780, 784, 792 P.2d 345, 349
 
(1990». This case is a legal malpractice case.
 
In Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415, 807 P.2d 633 (1991), the Idaho Supreme Court
 
decided "that an action for legal malpractice is a tort action, and even though the underlying
 
transaction which resulted in the malpractice was a 'commercial transactioo,' attorney fees unde:r
 
12-120(3) are not authorized," Id. at 425,807 P.2d at 643. The Fuller coun ruled that "under OUJl'
 
present statute, 'tort actions are essentially actions in which the parties bear their own attorney'~J
 
fees, regardless of [who] prevail[ed].'" Id. The Fuller rule has been continuously applied to
 
reject claims for attorney fee awards in legal malpractice actions. See Rice v. Litster, 132 Idaho
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897.901.980 P.2d 561. 565 (1999); Smith v. David S. Shurtleff & Assoc.• 124 Idaho 239. 858 
P.2d 778 (Ct. App.1993). 
The Defendants cite the recent Supreme Court case. Blimlca v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 
143 Idaho 723. 152 P.3d 594 (2007). for the proposition that because the underlying relationship 
between them and the Plaintiffs is a commercial transaction. attorney fees are authorized.. 
However. a close reading of Blimlca and its recent progeny suggests otherwise. In Blimlra, the: 
fraud arose in the commercial transaction itself. In BlImlca. the Supreme Court observed that I.C. 
§ 12-120(3) does not prohibit attorney fees for commercial transactions involving tortious conduct 
when ''the commercial transaction is integral to the claim. and constitutes the basis upon whiclt 
the party is attempting to recover'" [d. at 728. 152 P.3d at 599 (quoting Brower v. E.l DuPont Dt~ 
Nemours & Co., 117 Idaho 780, 784, 792 P.2d 345, 349 (1990) (emphasis added». In this case, 
the commercial transaction. the parties' attorney client relationship, is integral to the Plaintiffs' 
claims. Absent an attorney-elient relationship, there can be no malpractice claim. 
The Supreme Court's recent reading of BlImlca in Lee v. Nickerson, _Idaho-,189 P.3d 
(2008) suggests that where the nexus of the claim even where it sounds in tort is the relevant 
inquiry.· In Lee, the Nickersons hired Lee to construct a level barn pad and do some work on 11 
pond on their property. Lee filed suit against the Nickersons. Lee's complaint contained claims 
of breach ofcontract, unjust enrichment, and implied contract. Lee also filed a $20.000 tort claim 
based on the Nickersons' alleged refusal to allow Lee to retrieve his equipment left on thl~ 
Nickerson's property. The district court entered judgment in favor of the NicJcersons after a jury 
trial. On the question of attorney fees. the district court stated that I.C. §12-120(3) did not entitl4~ 
the Nickersons to attorney fees on the tort claim. Based on its reading of BI/mlca, the Idaho 
Supreme Court vacated the district court's award of attorney fees and held that the NicJcersons 
were entitled to reasonable attorney fees relating to their defense of Lee's tort claim. Th4~ 
Supreme Court stated that the commercial transaction. the parties' contract. initiated the preseoo~ 
of Lee's equipment on the Nickerson's property and was integral to Lee's claim. 
• The Coon rec:ognizes that the Honorable Judge Michael Mclaughlin's decision awarding attorney fees in C/I)I qf 
McCall v. Buxton, el 01., (a legal malpractice case) is cumntly on appeal. 
ORDER GRANTING COSTS AND ArrORNEY FEES 
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Lee seems to create a "but for" standard for determining whether a civil action is ''to 
recover ... in any commercial transaction" for purposes ofI.C. § 12-120(3). In other words. but 
for the contract or commercial transaction between Lee and the Nickersons. Lee's equipment 
would not have been on the Nickersons' property and no tort could have been committed. Under 
this standard. most, if not all. legal malpractice claims would fall within the scope of I.C. §12·· 
120(3) since legal malpractice can only occur where the parties have entered into an attorney.. 
client relationship. which most often involves a contract or commercial transaction. In short, LeE~ 
greatly expands the scope ofI.C. § 12-120(3). 
In this case. the commercial transaction. the contract or attorney-client relationship 
between the parties. gave rise to the attorney's duties and obligations to his client. But for the 
underlying contract. no legal malpractice could have occurred. Therefore. Plaintiffs were seeking 
recovery of damages sustained as a result of a commercial transaction and the prevailing parties. 
the Defendants. are entitled to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3). 
The Court finds there was such a nexus. Clearly. the contractual relationship was central 
to all the Plaintiffs' claims and attorney fees are awardable. 
C. AITORNEYS FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF Sl',l44.SO ARE REASONABLE. 
The Defendants sought an award of $19.144.50 in attorney fees. Determining whether thl: 
amount of an attorney fee award is reasonable is within the Court's sound discretion. P.O 
Ventures. Inc. v. Loucks Family I"evocable Trust. 144 Idaho 233. 159 P.3d 870 (2007); Craft 
Wall of Idaho, Inc. v. Stonebraker. 108 Idaho 704. 701 P.2d 324 (Ct. App. 1985). What 
constitutes a reasonable fee is controlled by the criteria of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). See Sanders l". 
Lankford. 134 Idaho 322. I P.3d 823 (Ct. App. 2000); Kelly v. Hodges. 119 Idaho 872. 876. 8J 1 
P.2d 48. 52 (Ct. App. 1991). "These factors are applicable wherever they would not conflict with 
the contract or statute upon which the award is based. See Rule 54(e)(8)!' Bank of Idaho \I'. 
Colley. 103 Idaho 320.326,647 P.2d 776. 782 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Court is "permitted to examine the reasonableness of the time and labor expended by 
the attorney under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A) and need not blindly accept the figures advanced by thl~ 
attorney:' Craft Wall. 108 Idaho at 705-706. 701 P.2d at 325. In this case. Cady does not contest 
ORDER GRANTING COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
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the reasonableness of the claimed attorney fees and, in fact, waived any objection to the amount. 
However, the Court independently examined the bills. 
The Court finds that fees charged by each individual attorney given their respectivc~ 
experience and the prevailing fees for similarly experienced attorneys are reasonable. The Court 
further finds that the number of hours claimed are reasonable. 
After considering all the factors listed in I.R.C.P. 54(eX3), the Court finds, in its 
discretion, attorney's fees in the total amount of $19,144.50 are reasonable fees and awards the 
Defendants $19,144.50 in attorney fees. 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Rory R. Jones and Jones, Hess, FurhmaJl 
& Eiden, P.A's Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees is hereby GRANTED and Rory R. Jones and 
Jones, Hess, Furhman & Eiden, P.A. are awarded attorney's fees in the amount ofSI9,144.50 and 
costs as a matter of right in the amount ofS216.75. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 11 th day of September 2008. 
eo..,&. G ~I-- _ 
Cheri C. Copsey 0 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
JUSTIN S. REYNOLDS and S. KRISTINE 

















TROUT JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN,
 )
 
P.A.; and DAVID T. KRUECK, individually ) 
and in his capacity as a member of the ) 






WHEREAS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment having been timely filed, the 
parties having fully briefed the motion, the motion having been heard on oral argument before 
this Court on February 28,2011, and based on the findings set forth by the Court on the record at 
the close of said hearing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' claims are not barred under the doctrine 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is fill' 
GRANTED in part and denied in part, and Plaintiffs' Complaint ~dismissed., ~/}i.. 








CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
j~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thisJi day of March, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing ORDER by the method indicated below, and addressed to each ofthe 
following: 
Robert C. Huntley -X- U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
The HUJ"fTLEY LAW FIRM PLLC Hand Delivered 
815 W. Washington Street __ Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 2188 E-mail 
Boise, ill 83701 __ Telecopy: 208.388.0234 
Michelle R. Points ~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP Hand Delivered 
P.O. Box 1617 __ Overnight Mail 
Boise, ill 8370-1-1617 E-mail 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JUSTIN S. REYNOLDS and S. KRISTINE )
 








TROUT JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN, )
 
P.A.; and DAVID T. KRUECK, individually )
 
and in his capacity as a member of the )
 





Based upon this Court's ruling in granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
and good cause appearing therefore, the Court hereby enters judgment as follows: 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AGAINST Plaintiffs Justin S. Reynolds, S. Kristine 
Reynolds and Sunrise Development LLC, and in favor of Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A. 
and David T. Krueck, and the Complaint for Demand and Jury Trial and all claims set forth 
therein are dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED THIS 4 day ofMarch, 2011. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thi~ \ s;t1.y ofMarch, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
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Robert C. Huntley -.L U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
The HUNTLEY LAW FIRM PLLC Hand Delivered 
815 W. Washington Street __ Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 2188 E-mail 
Boise, ill 83701 __ Telecopy: 208.388.0234 
Michelle R. Points -.X.- U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP Hand Delivered 
P.O. Box 1617 __ Overnight Mail 
Boise, ill 83701-1617 E-mail 
__ Telecopy 
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Attorney for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
mSTIN S. REYNOLDS and S. KRISTINE 
REYNOLDS; and SUNRISE Case No. CV OC 2010-04458 
DEVELOPMENT LLC, 
Plaintiffs' Objection to Motion for 
Plaintiffs, Attorney Fees and Costs 
v. 
TROUT JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN, 
P.A.; and DAVID T. KRUECK, individually 
and in his capacity as a member of the 
Defendant Law Firm, 
Defendants. 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs and enter their response to the Defendants' Motion for 
Attorney Fees and Costs and follows: 
1. The hourly billings rates and hours expended as set forth in the affidavit of 
Michelle R. Points appear to be reasonable. 
2. Plaintiffs advise the Court and Counsel that they are filing a timely request for the 
Court to Alter or Amend its Judgment to rule for the Plaintiffs and deny the summary judgment 
Plaintiffs' Objection to Motion for Attorney Fees and CostS-1 
000161
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entered in favor of Defendants, and will be filing an appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court if 
necessary. 
Accordingly, the Defendants are not the prevailing party at this time and until and unless 
it is finally adjudicated that Defendants are the prevailing party, any execution or attachment for 
attorney fees will be inappropriate. 
DATED this 28th day ofMarch, 2011. 
The HUNTLEY LAW FIRM 
C/~
 
Robert C. Huntley 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 28th day of March 2011, I caused to be served a trul~ 
copy of the foregoing Plaintiffs' Objection to Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Craig L. Meadows and Michelle R. Points US Mail 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP Hand Delivered 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 _ Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 1617 X E-Mail 
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By ELYSHIA HOLMES 
Craig L. Meadows, ISB No. 1081 OEPUTY 
Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 





Attorneys for Defendants Trout Jones Gledhill 
Fuhrman P.A. and David T. Krueck 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JUSTIN S. REYNOLDS and S. KRISTINE ) 
REYNOLDS; and SUNRISE ) Case No. CV OC 1004458 
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, ) 
) DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO 
Plaintiffs, ) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ALTER OR 
vs. ) AMEND JUDGMENT 
) 
TROUT JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN, ) 
P.A.; and DAVID T. KRUECK, individually ) 
and in his capacity as a member of the ) 




Defendants Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A. and David T. Krueck, by and through 
their counsel of record, respectfully submit this memorandum in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion 
to Alter or Amend Judgment, filed on or about April 4, 2011. 
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Pursuant to LR.C.P. 59(e), a district court can correct legal and factual errors occurring in 
proceedings before it. Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 705, 707, 979 P.2d 107, 109 
(1999). In this case, the District Court committed no error in granting Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment or in entering Judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint. Therefore, 
Plaintiffs' motion should be denied. 
The basis of Plaintiffs' malpractice claim is that Defendants negligently drafted a certain 
Real Estate Purchase Agreement ("Agreement"). Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that the language 
in the Agreement did not provide a date certain that the $60,000 of earnest money had to be 
refunded to Plaintiffs by the seller, Quasar Development, LLC ("Quasar") in the event the 
Agreement was terminated. 
When Quasar refused to refund Plaintiffs their $60,000 earnest money payment upon 
Plaintiffs terminating the Agreement on July 31,2007, Reynolds suffered some damage - tht::y 
expected and did not receive the funds, and the statute of limitation on their claim against 
Defendants began to accrue on that date. 
In addition, Plaintiffs began to incur substantial attorney fees and costs on or about that 
date due to Quasar's refusal to refund the earnest money as Defendants commenced with 
continuous communications with counsel for Quasar regarding the Plaintiffs' continued demands 
for the refund which culminated in Plaintiffs filing litigation against Quasar on September 25, 
2007 (the "Underlying Litigation"). Plaintiffs incurred damages in addition to the "refusal to 
refund" by Quasar - beginning July 31, 2007. 
Plaintiffs filed this malpractice action against Defendants on March 9, 2010, well beyond 
the expiration of the two year statute of limitation. 
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Plaintiffs raise two issues in their motion to amend the Judgment entered by the Court on 
March 21, 2011. First, Plaintiffs claim that the statute of limitations on their attorney 
malpractice claim could not have commenced prior to the Court in the underlying case entering a 
finding that there was an issue of material fact regarding the timing in which the earnest money 
had to be refunded. Second, Plaintiffs claim that based on the "principal" of estoppel, 
Defendants should not be able to assert that Plaintiffs' claim is barred under the applicable 
statute of limitations. Both of Plaintiffs arguments are without merit. 
A.	 The Court Properly Applied The Law Regarding The Commencement Of The 
Statute Of Limitations. 
Plaintiffs assert that this Court erred in holding that their claims were barred by the 
statute of limitations: that statute of limitation could not have commenced prior to the Judge 
Williamson, in the Underlying Litigation, entering her opinion on partial summary judgment in 
which she held there was an issue of fact regarding the timing in which the earnest money had to 
be refunded to Plaintiffs by Quasar. 
Plaintiffs assert that they could not have known they had a viable lawsuit against 
Defendants until that decision was issued and that they are "informed of no Idaho cases which 
support the proposition that in legal malpractice cases, the two-year statute begins running before 
the injured client would be able to file a viable suit." Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Alter or Amend Judgment, p. 2. 
There are no cases in Idaho that support this proposition because it is not the law in 
Idaho, as it applies to the commencement of the statute of limitations in an attorney malpractice 
case. This is the same argument Plaintiffs made in opposition to Defendants' motion for 
summary judgment. There is no new argument for this Court to review. 
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Plaintiff is again confusing the two distinct holdings by the Idaho Supreme Court in City 
ofMcCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656 (2009). Plaintiffs assert that they had to have their claim 
"adjudicated" in the Underlying Litigation to trigger the commencement of the statute of 
limitations. That is, they claim they were not aware they had a viable claim against their 
attorney until Judge Williamson's decision was entered. Plaintiffs' analysis of the findings in 
Buxton are incorrect, and as pointed out in Defendants' briefing on the motion for summary 
judgment, the facts at issue in this case are clearly distinguishable. 
Defendants do not dispute, for the purpose of this motion, that in certain cases a 
determination of actual damages will depend upon that outcome of certain litigation, but those 
cases, as recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court, are fact specific. Where the existence of 
"some damage" does not depend on the outcome of a lawsuit (such as the facts in this case), the 
statute oflimitations begins to accrue. See Buxton at 662,201 P.3d at 635. 
As set forth in Defendants' Reply brief in support of their Motion for Summary 
Judgment, there were two distinct rulings in Buxton, wherein the City of McCall sued its 
attorneys based on allegations of negligent advice. Two counts of the City's complaint were 
based on allegations of negligent advice by the City's attorney pertaining to termination of a 
contract and the withholding of certain payments to contractors. The Idaho Supreme Court held 
that until there was an outcome of the litigation related to this "advice" on the breach of contract 
claims, there could not be a determination of damage; that is, the City could have prevailed in the 
litigation (i.e. no breach of the contract) and arguably suffered no damage. !d., 146 Idaho at 663, 
201 P.3d at 636. 
The remaining claim of negligence in Buxton had to do with the City attorney advising 
the City to release a lien against J-U-B Engineering. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the date 
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on which the City of McCall released its lien was the date on which the damage occurred 
because that was the date on which the City of McCall lost its opportunity to recover against 
1-U-8 Engineering. Id. at 663,201 P.3d at 636. 
This Court's ruling is entirely consistent with City ofMcCall v. Buxton. Plaintiffs are 
only looking at one part of the Idaho Supreme Court's analysis in that case, the part that is not 
applicable to the facts of this case. 
As set forth by Defendants and confirmed by the Court, the facts of this are more closely 
in line with Elliot v. Parsons, 128 Idaho 723, 918 P.2d 592 (1996) and Parsons Packing, Inc. v. 
Masingill, 140 Idaho 480, 95 P.3d 631 (2004). 
In Elliot v. Parsons, the attorney drafted documents for the Elliots associated with the 
sale of their business to purportedly obtain favorable installment sales tax treatment. Later, the 
Internal Revenue Service ("I.R.S") audited the Elliots, concluded that the transactions did not 
qualify for installment tax treatment and provided notice to the Elliots that a substantial amount 
of taxes was still owed. !d. at 724,918 P.2d at 593. Thereafter, the Elliotts hired an attorney to 
appeal the I.R.S decision. In ascertaining when the Elliots incurred some damage, the Idaho 
Supreme Court held it was when they were assessed unpaid taxes, and when they had to pay an 
attorney pursue the appeal - not when their appeal was finally denied by the I.R.S. 
In Parsons Packing, Inc. v. Masingill, the attorney failed to file a U.C.C financing 
statement in connection with a lease and purchase agreement he had drafted for his client. The 
purchaser under the agreement made payments forseveral years, but then filed for bankruptcy 
and the client was not secured with the U.C.C. filing. The Idaho Supreme Court, in applying the 
"some damage" rule, held that the seller did not suffer some damage until the purchaser 
defaulted on payments under the agreement. 
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Similarly, the Plaintiffs in this case suffered some damage when the Quasar refused to 
pay Plaintiffs their earnest money upon their demand. They also suffered some damage when 
they incurred attorney fees in pursuing payment of the earnest money from Quasar. 
The statute of limitations does not commence only when a party realizes they might have 
a claim against their attorney, rather, it commences when they suffer some damage as a result of 
the attorney's alleged negligence. These are mutually exclusive inquiries, and one is not relevant 
to the other. The statute of limitations applicable to attorney malpractice claims does not have a 
discovery exception: it is not material when a plaintiff discovers he might sue his or her 
attorney, but rather when "some damage" occurs as a result of the alleged negligence. In this 
case, it was when Quasar did not refund the earnest money upon demand. Plaintiffs have 
presented no basis on which to amend the Judgment. 
B. Defendants' Statute Of Limitation Argument Is Not Barred Under Estoppel. 
Plaintiffs assert that because Defendants allegedly "failed to disclose" certain infonnation 
to them during the course of the Underlying Litigation, that Defendants should be estopped from 
asserting a statute of limitations defense. 
As a preliminary matter, the statements made in the referenced Affidavit of Justin 
Reynolds, do not approach a claim of estoppel. The elements of equitable estoppel are: (1) a 
false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual or constructive knowledge of 
the truth, (2) that the party asserting estoppel did not know or could not discover the truth, (3) 
that the false representation or concealment was made with the intent to be relied upon, and (4) 
that the person to whom the representation was made, or from whom the facts were concealed, 
relied and acted upon the representation or concealment to his or her prejudice. See Ogden v. 
Griffith, 149 Idaho 489,236 PJd 1249 (2010). 
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Mr. Reynolds cannot assert that any representation made to him was false or that any fact 
was concealed. Mr. Reynolds cannot assert that he didn't know or could not discovered the 
"truth" (for instance upon review of the pleading file). Mr. Reynolds cannot assert that 
Defendants intended for him to rely upon any false representation. Nor can Mr. Reynolds assert 
that he relied upon any false representation or concealment. Plaintiffs' argument simply is 
without any factual basis whatsoever. 
Moreover, the commencement of the statute of limitations is not affected by what the 
client says - after the fact - about what their attorney told them or allegedly did not tell them 
during the course of litigation. Nor does Plaintiffs' newly fashioned argument of "unclean 
hands" provide a defense and/or basis to toll the statute of limitations (nor was such an allegation 
pled in Plaintiffs' complaint). 
It appears that what Plaintiffs be might be attempting 10 "spin" as "unclean hands" or 
"estoppel" is really an assertion of fraudulent concealment on the part of Defendants. See I.e. § 
5-219(4), McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765,820 P.2d 360 (l99l)(when professional malpractice 
involves fraudulent or intentional concealment of wrongdoing, the statute of limitations 
contained in I.e. § 5-219(4) is tolled until the injured party knows or is put on inquiry regarding 
the matter complained of ... after that dale, the statute of limitations period is one year after 
which an action for professional malpractice is barred). However, there is no fraud claim pkd in 
Plaintiffs' complaint and certainly no facts to substantiate such a claim. 
As it applies to the applicable statute of limitations, Plaintiffs knew that Quasar refused to 
return their earnest money, and they knew that they had to bring litigation (and incur attorney 
fees in doing so) based on Quasar's continued refusal to pay. There is no issue of fact that 
Plaintiffs incurred some damage beginning July 31,2007. 
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Plaintiffs have cited to no legal authority that would allow this Court the discretion to 
"estop" Defendants from asserting their claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs 
have again presented no basis on which to amend ~gment. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS K day of April, 2011. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
BY--'-I!~\A:7''-I-t44''-'''-l\;;;7-----I-'I-----;f--!---''--'---'=--:...j,I-­
Mi elle . Points, SB No. 6224 
Attorneys for Defendants Trout Jones Gledhill 
Fuhrrn'a1'lf>.A. and David T. Krueck 
DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 









I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of April, 2011, I caused to be served a true: 
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ALTER 
OR AMEND JUDGMENT by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the 
following: 
Robert C. Huntley 
The HUNTLEY LAW FIRM PLLC 
815 W. Washington Street 
P.O. Box 2188 
Boise, ID 83701 
----.-IU.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
~Telecopy: 208.388.0234 
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Attomeys for Defendants Trout Jones Gledhill 
Fuhrman P.A. and David T. Krueck 
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MICHELLE R. POWTS, being first duly swom upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
On March 14,2011, I submitted an affidavit setting forth Defendants' Memorandum of 
Costs and Attomey fees, following the Court's granting Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Plaintiffs then filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's ruling titled "Motion 
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to Alter or Amend Judgment." At the close of the hearing held April 25, 2011, the Court denied 
Plaintiffs' Motion. This affidavit sets forth those costs and fees incurred by Defendants since the 
time I submitted my original affidavit. 
1. Affiant. I am an attorney with the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley 
LLP, which represents Defendants in this action. I am licensed to practice law in the state of 
Idaho. This affidavit is submitted in support ofDefendants' motion for attorney fees and costs, 
filed March 14,2011. It is intended to comply with provisions ofIdaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54, including but not limited to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(5) and 54(e)(5). 
2. Basis of Affidavit. The matters set forth in this affidavit are based upon my 
personal knowledge, the work records of my law firm, and a review of those records made by me 
and other persons with knowledge. The records were made contemporaneously with the events 
set forth in the records, were made in the ordinary course, and were regularly kept by Hawley 
Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, counsel for Defendants. 
3. Fees and Costs Claimed. Accompanying this affidavit is Exhibit A, which 
itemizes the requested attorney's fees and costs, organized in a manner which details the nature 
and amount of attorney's fees and costs sought by Defendants, based upon Defendants having 
successfully defended against Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. I am familiar with the fact 
of, and the necessity for, such attorney's fees and costs having been incurred in this case. Such 
fees and costs were actually, necessarily, and reasonably incurred. To the best of my knowledge 
and belief, the items are correct and the costs claimed are in compliance with Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(d)(5). The attorney's fees claimed are for work actually performed in this action 
and represent time which relates to claims opposing Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and 
related matters. The costs are claimed in compliance with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
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54(d)(l). Defendants are entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) as Defendants 
are the prevailing party in this case, the underlying case of which was a commercial transaction. 
4. Parties Against Whom Defendants Claim Fees and Costs. Defendants Trout 
Jones Gledhill Fuhrman P.A. and David T. Krueck seek recovery of fees and costs from 
Plaintiffs Justin S. Reynolds, S. Kristine Reynolds and Sunrise Development, LLC. 
5. Basis for Claim Against Plaintiffs. The basis for Defendants' claim arises from 
this Court granting Defendants motion for summary judgment holding that Plaintiffs' Complaint 
was barred under the applicable statute of limitation and denying Plaintiffs' motion for 
reconsideration of that order. 
6. Factors Supporting the Reasonableness of Defendants' Claim for Attorney Fees. 
Factors that the Court should consider in determining the reasonableness of Defendants' claim 
for attorney fees are set forth in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3). Those factors are 
individually discussed in the following paragraphs of this aftldavit. 
7. The Time and Labor Required. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3)(A) 
provides that the Court shall consider the time and labor required. The time and labor expended 
in responding to Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration was reasonable. Thorough evaluation of 
applicable law was required. 
8. The Novelty and Difficulty of the Questions. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(e)(3)(B) provides that the Court shall consider the novelty and difficulty of the questions. As 
discussed in the previous paragraph, thorough evaluation of applicable law was required in order 
to draft a successful response. 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MICHELLE R. POINTS SETTING 






    
 
9. The Skill, Experience and Ability of the Attorney. Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(e)(3)(C) provides that the Court shall consider the skill requisite to perform the 
legal service properly and the experience and ability of the attorney in the particular field oflaw. 
The lawyers primarily involved in this case are: Craig Meadows, ISB No.1 081, Partner, and 
myself, Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224, Partner. Mr. Meadows and I have the requisite skill 
and experience to properly and efficiently handle this case. 
10. The Prevailing Charges. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3)(D) provides that 
the Court shall consider the prevailing charges for like work. Throughout the course of this 
litigation, I believe that the charges billed for lawyers and litigation assistance staff have be,~n at 
the prevailing charges for like work. 
11. 
affidavit. 
Mandatory Costs. No mandatory costs have been incurred since my previous 
12. Discretionary Costs. No discretionary costs have been incurred since my previous 
affidavit: 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MICHELLE R. POINTS SETTING 





SUMMARY OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES REQUESTED: 
Attorney fees $2,880 
Further your affiant sayeth naught~ 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County ofAda) . I 
) ~f\ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me th~__ day of May, 2011. 
Name: (}... 0/'~h----- t'.s 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at {7?6 .s.e.-. . 
:t- ~
If 
My commission expires "3 ( ("I, <.:;)- 0 Ir 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MICHELLE R. POINTS SETTING 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _P_ day of May, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MICHELLE R. POINTS SETTING 
FORTH MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES by the method indicated 
below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Robert C. Huntley 
The HUNTLEY LAW FIRM PLLC 
815 W. Washington Street 
P.O. Box 2188 
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Recap of Time Detail	 Page 1 of3 
~' 
Recap of Time Detail	 .~J 
All Entries Matter Number 04188-0082 _summaryJ _submitJ 
iC!) Sort by Date Sort by Timekeeper (~) Date Worked 3/9/2011 ~ to 4/29/2011 rm 
First Column ~ to ~ 
Invoice 
Second Column 
Name / Invoice Matter 
Date Timekeeper Number Hours Amount Description Number Index 
Continue to draft and edit 
3/13/2011 MPOI Michelle Points 1.10 165.00 motion, memorandum 04188-0082 1578490 
and affidavit in support of 
4/12/2011 Invoice=243534 1.10 165.00 motion for 
attorney fees and costs. 
Exchange calls and e-mails with 
3/14/2011 MPOI Michelle Points 0.30 45.00 counsel for 04188-0082 1578506 
Plaintiff re status of order and 
4/12/2011 Invoice=243534 0.30 45.00	 judgment; 




CIlII freA'! Ee~A'1il1 far PliliAtiff-f'e 
3/16/2011 MPOI Michelle Points 0.40 60.00 ~e 04188-0082 1579033 
ta sUer ef 3e\:l;lsA'lIilAt; "rilf't G 
4/12/2011 Invoice=243534 0.40 60.00 ",ail tQ J... 
Rei. Fe the sam!:. 
Exchange e-mails with court 
3/17/2011 MPOI Michelle Points 0.20 30.00 clerk re 11earing 04188-0082 1579516 
on motion for attorney fees and 
4/12/2011 Invoice=243534 0.20 30.00 costs. 
Exchange e-mails with court 
3/18/2011 MPOI Michelle Points 0.30 45.00 clerk and 04188-0082 1579787 
Plaintiff's counsel re hearing on 
4/12/2011 Invoice=243534 0.30 45.00 motion for 
attorney fees and costs. 
Exchange e-mails with Plaintiffs 
3/21/2011 MPOI Michelle Points 0.30 45.00 counsel and 04188-0082 1580220 
court clerk re hearing on motion 
4/12/2011 Invoice= 243534 0.30 45.00 for attorney 
fees; draft notice of hearing. 
Exchange e-mails with counsel 
3/27/2011 MPOI Michelle Points 0.30 45.00 for Plaintiff 04188-0082 1582200 
re issues related to timing on 
4/12/2011 Invoice=243534 0.30 45.00	 entry of 
judgment and brief review of 
opposition to 
motion for fees. 
Exchange e-mails with counsel 
3/28/2011 MPOI Michelle Points 0.70 105.00 for Plaintiffs 04188-0082 1582522 
and JUdge's clerk throughout 
4/12/2011 Invoice= 243534 0.70 105.00	 day re 
scheduling for briefing and 
hearings on 
motion to reconsider and motion 
for attorney 
fees and costs; amended notice 
of hearing on 
fee motion. EXHIBIT 
A 
















/ ebvie /1  .
Recap of Time Detail Page 2 of3 
'-' ......
 
Brief review of motion for 
4/4/2011 MPOI Michelle Points 0,60 90,00 reconsideration 04188-0082 1585424 
and forward to client for review; 
exchange 
emails with counsel for Plaintiff 
re the 
same; e-mail brief status report 
to client, 
Review and outline 
4/5/2011 MPOI Michelle Points 1.20 180,00 memorandum in support of 04188-0082 1586122 
Plaintiffs' motion to alter or 
amend jUdgment 
and outline opposition. 
Continue to draft opposition to 
4/6/2011 MPOI Michelle Points 1.60 240,00 Plaintiffs' 04188-0082 1586355 
motion to amend judgment and 
research case 
law related to application of Rule 
59. 
Continue to draft and edit 
4/7/2011 MPOI Michelle Points 3,40 510,00 opposition to 04188-0082 1586744 
Plaintiff's motion to amend 
judgment. 
Continue to draft and edit 
4/8/2011 MPOI Michelle Points 2,60 390,00 opposition to 04188-0082 1586983 
motion to amend judgment and 
conference with 
C. Meadows re the same. 
Brief review of issued opinion 
4/11/2011 MPOI Michelle Points 0,70 105,00 from Idaho 04188-0082 1587381 
Supreme Court re "some 
damage" rule 
applicable to statute of 
limitations in 
professional negligence claim 
and brief 
conference with C. Meadows re 
potentially 
supplementation of materials 
submitted in 
opposition to motion to amend 
jUdgment. 
Continue to review Stuard v. 
4/13/2011 MPOI Michelle Points 0,70 105,00 Jorgenson and 04188-0082 1588093 
conference with C. Meadows re 
potential 
supplement to opposition 
briefing (conclude 
not to file supplemental 
briefing), 
Continue to review Plaintiffs' 
4/18/2011 MPOI Michelle Points 0,80 120.00 reply brief 04188-0082 1588693 
and outline argument re the 
same in 
preparation for hearing next 
week, 
Review relevant cases and 
4/25/2011 MPOI Michelle Points 3.20 480.00 briefing on motion 04188-0082 1590342 
to amend judgment in 
preparation for hearing 




















Recap of Time Detail Page 3 of 3
-' 
4/27/2011 MPOI Michelle Points 0.50 75.00 
Draft order on plaintiff's motion 
to amend 
judgment and request 
supplemental information 
on costs and fees to supplement 
previous 
request to the court. 
04188-0082 1590849 
4/28/2011 MPOI Michelle Points 0.30 45.00 
Finalize order on motion to alter 
judgment 
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MAY 18 :2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By KATHY JOHNSON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JUSTIN S. REYNOLDS and S. KRISTn~E ) 
REYNOLDS; and SUNRISE ) 
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, ) Case No. CV OC 1004458 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) ORDER 
vs. ) 
) 
TROUT JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN, ) 
P.A.; and DAVID T. KRUECK, individually ) 
and in his capacity as a member of the ) 




Defendants, having timely filed and supplemented pleadings in support of their motion 
for attorneys fees and costs pursuant to I.e. § 12-120(3), and upon finding that Defendants are 
the prevailing parties in this matter, and Plaintiffs, filing no objection to the Defendants' 





 NO. \\ ~ ... ~ A.M.l \ ' Ul'L~.~, ____ , 
 




IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Defendants are awarded fees and costs in the amount 
of $9, 104.28. 










CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this I~y of May, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing ORDER by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the 
following: 
Robert C. Huntley L U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
THE HUNTLEY LAW FIRM PLLC Hand Delivered 
815 W. Washington Street ___ Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 2188 E-mail 
Boise, ID 83701 __ Telecopy: 208.388.0234 
Craig L. Meadows ---..:.'L U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Michelle R. Points Hand Delivered 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP __ Overnight Mail 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 E-mail 
P.O. Box 1617 __ Telecopy 208.954.5252 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
~ ... ... ~ ," 
-.. ''1­ ••••••••• ....."'.' 
~« -1~ c)\. .'
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COU1\JTY OF ADA
 
JUSTIN S. REYNOLDS and S. KRISTINE 























P.A.; and DAVID T. KRUECK, individually ) 
and in his capacity as a member of the ) 
Defendant Law Firm, )
Defendants. 
Based upon this Court's ruling in granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
and denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, and good cause appearing 
therefore, the Court hereby enters this Amendment Judgment as follows: 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AGAINST Plaintiffs Justin S. Reynolds, S. Kristine 
Reynolds and Sunrise Development LLC, and in favor of Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A. 
therein are dismissed with prejudice. 


























DATED THIS __ day of May, 2011. 









CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this \6~y of May, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing AMENDED JUDGMENT by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to each of the following: 
Robert C. Huntley )( U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
The HUJ'J"TLEY LAW FIRM PLLC Hand Delivered 
815 W. Washington Street __ Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 2188 E-mail 
Boise, ID 83701 __ Telecopy: 208.388.0234 
Michelle R. Points _~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP Hand Delivered 
P.O. Box 1617 __ Overnight Mail 











-'	 NO. tJ Fh.EO A.M, L) )~.P.M_--
\,;AY 2 '7 2011 





IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COU1\lTY OF ADA 
JUSTIN S. REYNOLDS and S. KRISTINE ) 
REYNOLDS; and SUNRISE ) Case No. CV OC 1004458 
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, ) 




TROUT JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN, ) 
P.A.; and DAVID T. KRUECK, individually ) 
and in his capacity as a member of the ) 




Based upon this Court's ruling in granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, and granting Defendants' Motion for 
Attorney Fees and Costs and good cause appearing therefore, the Court hereby enters this 
Amendment Judgment as follows: 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AGAINST Plaintiffs Justin S. Reynolds, S. Kristine 
Reynolds and Sunrise Development LLC, and in twor of Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A. 
and David T. Krueck, and the Complaint for Demand and Jury Trial and all claims set forth 
therein are dismissed with prejudice and Defendants Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A., and 
David T. Krueck shall have Judgment against Plaintiffs Justin S. Reynolds and S. Kristine 
SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT - I 
o ~ 04188008223989161 000187








Reynolds and Sunrise Development, LLC, and each of them in the principal amount of 
$9,104.28. Post judgment interest on this amount shall accrue from the date of entry of this 
Second Amended Judgment by the Court until it is fully and finally satisfied. 
DATED THIS H day of May, 2011. 
SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT - 2 
0418800E223989161 000188
'­
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
l:h 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thi~day of May, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to each of the following: . 
Robert C. Huntley _)( U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
The HUNTLEY LAW FIRM PLLC Hand Delivered 
815 W. Washington Street ___ Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 2188 E-mail 
Boise, ID 8370 I __ Telecopy: 208.388.0234 
Michelle R. Points _L U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP Hand Delivered 
P.O. Box 1617 ___ Overnight Mail 
Boise, 10 83701-1617 E-mail 
___ Telecopy 
~""""" CHRJSTOPHE~~lCfIJll/)""« 
CLERK OF T~ .... ~("I..;••.,. 
~: -,- ~ 
~ ~ X('" ~ 
: F-.. of THE sr... ,. ~ 
_,C : Ii d:. --.... ..... . 
I ::=(:' ( - OF - J~ :• if • ' 't7 
-t- \\ I ~ : 
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Donald W. Lojek ISB # 1395 
LOJEK LAW OFFICES CHARTERED 
623 W. Hays, Ste. B 




Attorney for Plaintiffs/ Appellants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JUSTIN S. REYNOLDS and S. KRISTINE 







TROUT JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN,
 
P.A.; and DAVID T. KRUECK, individually
 





TO:	 THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS AND THEIR ATTORNEYS, Craig L. 
Meadows and Michelle R. Points of the firm HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & 
HAWLEYLLP 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellants appeal against the above-named Respondents to the 
Idaho Supreme Court from the Amended Judgment on motion for summary judgment ordering 
dismissal of Plaintiffs' case, entered on May 18,2011, attached hereto as Appendix A. Plaintiffs 












also appeal from the Second Amended Judgment filed on May 27, 2011, attached hereto as 
Appendix B, the Honorable Richard D. Greenwood presiding. 
2. The Appellants have the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments and orders described in paragraph 1 are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 
11(a)(l), I.A.R. 
3. Preliminary statement of the issues on appeal: The primary issue on appeal is 
whether the trial court erred in its ruling that the Plaintiffs had not filed their complaint within 
the period provided by the statute of limitations. A secondary issue is whether the Court erred in 
awarding attorney fees to the Defendants. 
4. No order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. (a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes 
(b) The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's 
transcript: e.g. 
The reporter's standard transcript as defined in Rule 25(c), I.A.R. (This indudes 
the transcription of the oral argument on summary judgment conducted on February 28, 
2011 and the oral argument on Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment conducted 011 May 
11, 2011, which latter argument included argument on attorney fees.) 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's (agency's) 
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R. - NONE 
Appellants request an electronically scanned Clerk's Record as announced in the 
May 2011 Advocate article by Michael Henderson. 
7. I certify: 
(a) that a copy ofthis notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a transcript has 
been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Name and address: Francis J. Morris and Leslie Anderson at the offices of Judge Greenwood 








(b) (1) [X] That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been paid the 
estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
(c) (1) [X] That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record has been paid. 
(d) (1) [X] That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20 (and 
the attorney general of Idaho pursuant to § 67-1401 (1), Idaho Code). 
DATED this 27th day of June, 2011 
LOJEK LAW OFFICES CHARTERED 
21_JL_' _
 
Donald W. Lojek 
Attorney for the Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27th day of June 2011, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
each ofthe following: 
Craig L. Meadows and Michelle R. Points X US Mail 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP Hand Delivered 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 _ Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 1617 X E-Mail 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 Fax: 208-954-5252 
cmeadowsCa;hawleytroxell.com 
Donald W. Lojek 










NO. I'ILEO l~3c1 
A.M. P.M.- ~q. 
JUL 1 8 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH. Clerk 
By JERI HEATON 
DI:PUTY 
Craig L Meadows, ISB No.1 081 
Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 





Attorneys for Defendants Trout Jones Gledhill 
Fuhrman P.A. and David T. Krueck 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JUSTIN S. REYNOLDS and S. KRISTINE ) 
REYNOLDS; and SUNRISE ) Case No. CV OC 1004458 
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, ) 
) REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL 
Plaintiffs, ) DOCUMENTS AND TRANSCRIPTS ON 
vs. ) APPEAL 
) 
TROUT JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN, ) 
P.A.; and DAVID T. KRUECK, individually ) 





Defendants Trout Jones Gledhill Fu~an, P.A. and David T. Krueck, by and through 
their counsel of record, Hawley Troxell Ennis & I-Iawley LLP, pursuant to Idaho Appellate 
Rule 28(c), respectfully request that the following portions of the recorder's transcripts and 
additional pleadings be made part of the record on appeal in this case. 








1. The reporter's transcript from the hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend 
Judgment, held on April 25, 2011 at 4:00 p.m. 
2. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
December 14,2010. 
3. Affidavit of David T. Krueck in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed December 14,2010. 
4. Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
filed February 22, 2011. 
5. Motion for an Award of Attorney Fees and Costs, filed March 14,2011. 
6. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees, filed March 14, 
2011. 
7. Affidavit of Michelle R. Points Setting Forth Memorandum of Costs and Attorney 
Fees. 
8. Order, entered March 21, 2011. 
9. Judgment, entered March 21, 2011. 
10. Plaintiffs' Objection to Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs. 
11. Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. 
12. Order, entered May 18,2011. 
13. Amended Judgment, entered May 18, 2011. 
14. Second Amended Judgment, entered May 27, 2011. 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS AND TRANSCRIPTS ON APPEAL - 2 
04188 0082 2463672 1 000194
-

DATED THIS J.1;.y of July, 20 I I. 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS AND TRANSCRIPTS ON APPEAL - 3 
04188.0082 24636721
 0 0195
   J J  
. 3672.  
.....' -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~-::;July, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS AND TRANSCRIPTS 
ON APPEAL by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Donald W. Lojek _ t/U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LOJEK LAW OFFICES CHARTERED Hand Delivered 
623 W. Hays, Suite B __ Overnight Mail 
Boise, ID 83702 E-mail 
[Attorney for Plaintiffs] __ Telecopy: (208) 345-0050 








Craig L. Meadows, ISB No.1 081 
Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 





Attorneys for Defendants Trout Jones Gledhill 
Fuhrman P.A. and David T. Krueck 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JUSTn\J S. REYNOLDS and S. KRISTINE 












Case No. CV OC 1004458 
AMENDED REQUEST FOR
 
ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS AND 
TRANSCRIPTS ON APPEAL 
vs.
 
TROUT JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN,
 )
 
P.A.; and DAVID T. KRUECK, individually ) 
and in his capacity as a member of the ) 






Defendants Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A. and David T. Krueck, by and through 
their counsel of record, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, pursuant to Idaho Appellate 
Rule 28(c), respectfully request that the following portions of the recorder's transcripts and 
additional pleadings be made part of the record on appeal in this case. 
AMENDED REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS AND TRANSCRIPTS ON 



















1. The reporter's transcript from the hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend 
Judgment, held on April 25, 2011 at 4:00 p.m.; Court Reporter Kim Madsen. 
2. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
December 14,2010. 
3. Affidavit of David T. Krueck in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed December 14, 2010. 
4. Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
filed February 22, 2011. 
5. Motion for an Award of Attorney Fees and Costs, filed March 14,2011. 
6. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees, filed March 14, 
2011. 
7. Affidavit of Michelle R. Points Setting Forth Memorandum of Costs and Attorney 
Fees. 
8. Order, entered March 21, 2011. 
9. Judgment, entered March 21, 2011. 
10. Plaintiffs' Objection to Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs. 
11. Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. 
12. Order, entered May 18, 2011. 
13. Amended Judgment, entered May 18,2011. 
14. Second Amended Judgment, entered May 27, 2011. 
AMENDED REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS AND TRANSCRIPTS ON 
APPEAL - 2 




AMENDED REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS AND TRANSCRIPTS ON 






I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thiJ~day of July, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing AMENDED AMENDED REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL 
DOCUMENTS AND TRANSCRIPTS ON APPEAL by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to each of the following: 
Donald W. Lojek _ V'U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LOJEK LAW OFFICES CHARTERED Hand Delivered 
623 W. Hays, Suite B __ Overnight Mail 
Boise, ID 83702 E-mail 
[Attorney for Plaintiffs] 
Kim Madsen 
__ Telecopy: (208) 345-0050 
-L- U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Court Reporter ___ Hand Delivered 
200 W Front St. ___ Overnight Mail 




AMENDED REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS AND TRANSCRIPTS ON 




   JJ!:  
NO._"~--,;n;~'----Fax: 334-2616 AM 6: co ~_, _ 
AUG 09 2011 
In the Supreme COUli of the State of Idaho 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH,Clerk
 




Justin S. Reynolds, et a1. ) Docket No. 38933-2011 
Plaintiffs-Appellants ) 
v ) 
Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman et al) 
Defendants-Respondents ) 
Notice of Transcript Lodged
 
Notice is hereby given that on July 8, 2011,
 
I lodged one (1) original and three (3) copies of transcripts 37 pages in length,
 
as listed below, for the above referenced appeal with
 
the District Court Clerk of Ada County, Fourth Judicial District.
 
TRANSCRIPTS LODGED 









































TO: Clerk of the Court .a Iiili6 ~ v:oo PM---, _ 
Idaho Supreme Court 
451 West State Street AUG 09 2011Boise, Idaho 83720 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
 








NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED 
Notice is hereby given that on July 28, 2011, I 
lodged an appeal transcript of 31 pages in length for 
the above-referenced appeal with the District Court 
Clerk of the County of Ada in the 4th JUdicial 
District 
This transcript contains hearings held on 
...... April 25, 2011 
~~~-----
Ada County Courthouse 
200 West Front Street 



































IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
JUSTIN S. REYNOLDS and S. KRISTINE 




TROUT JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN, 
P.A.; and DAVID T. KRUECK, 
individually and in his capacity as a 
member of the Defendant Law Firm, 
Defendants-Respondents. 




I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certifY: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 10th day of August, 2011. 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 













IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
JUSTIN S. REYNOLDS and S. KRISTINE 




TROUT JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN, 
P.A.; and DAVID T. KRUECK, 
individually and in his capacity as a 
member of the Defendant Law Firm, 
Defendants-Respondents. 




I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
to each ofthe Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
DONALD W. LOJEK MICHELLE R. POINTS 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDE\fT 
BOISE, IDAHO BOISE, IDAHO 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
 
Clerk of the District Court
 
















IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
JUSTIN S. REYNOLDS and S. KRISTINE 
REYNOLDS; and SUNRISE Supreme Court Case No. 38933 
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
TROUT JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN, 
P.A.; and DAVID T. KRUECK, 
individually and in his capacity as a 
member of the Defendant Law Firm, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certifY that the above and foregoing 
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true 
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
27th day of June, 2011. 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD
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